Merge pull request #317 from mofeng-git/dev

Dev

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -34,13 +34,11 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
         with:
           node-version: 24
-          cache: npm
-          cache-dependency-path: web/package-lock.json
 
       - name: Build frontend
         working-directory: web
         run: |
-          npm ci
+          npm install
           npm run build
 
       - name: Upload frontend dist
@@ -66,8 +64,16 @@ jobs:
 
       - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
 
+      - name: Cache Rust dependencies
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+        with:
+          # The Docker workflow builds the same targets with the same Cross images.
+          shared-key: linux-cross-release
+          key: ${{ hashFiles('Cross.toml', 'build/cross/Dockerfile.*') }}
+          cache-all-crates: true
+
       - name: Install cross
-        run: cargo install cross --locked
+        run: cargo install cross --version 0.2.5 --locked
 
       - name: Build linux binary
         run: bash build/build-images.sh
@@ -127,6 +133,12 @@ jobs:
           "TURBOJPEG_LIB_DIR=$env:TURBOJPEG_LIB_DIR" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Append
           "TURBOJPEG_INCLUDE_DIR=$env:TURBOJPEG_INCLUDE_DIR" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Append
 
+      - name: Cache Rust dependencies
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+        with:
+          shared-key: windows-msvc-release
+          key: ${{ hashFiles('vcpkg.json', 'vcpkg-configuration.json') }}
+
       - name: Build Windows exe
         shell: pwsh
         run: .\build\windows\build.ps1 -Configuration release -Package

.github/workflows/docker.yml

@@ -37,21 +37,27 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
         with:
           node-version: 24
-          cache: npm
-          cache-dependency-path: web/package-lock.json
 
       - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
 
+      - name: Cache Rust dependencies
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+        with:
+          # Reuse dependency artifacts produced by the deb job and vice versa.
+          shared-key: linux-cross-release
+          key: ${{ hashFiles('Cross.toml', 'build/cross/Dockerfile.*') }}
+          cache-all-crates: true
+
       - name: Install build dependencies
         run: |
           sudo apt-get update
           sudo apt-get install -y unzip xz-utils
-          cargo install cross --locked
+          cargo install cross --version 0.2.5 --locked
 
       - name: Build frontend
         working-directory: web
         run: |
-          npm ci
+          npm install
           npm run build
 
       - name: Set up QEMU

.gitignore

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 # Rust
 target/
-Cargo.lock
 
 # IDE
 .idea/

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 [package]
 name = "one-kvm"
-version = "0.2.5"
+version = "0.2.8"
 edition = "2021"
 authors = ["SilentWind"]
 description = "A open and lightweight IP-KVM solution written in Rust"
-license = "GPL-2.0"
+license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
 repository = "https://github.com/mofeng-git/One-KVM"
 keywords = ["kvm", "ipkvm", "remote-management", "embedded"]
 categories = ["embedded", "network-programming"]
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ desktop = [
     "dep:urlencoding",
     "dep:rust-embed",
     "dep:mime_guess",
-    "dep:rustls",
+    "dep:openssl",
     "dep:rcgen",
     "dep:axum-server",
     "dep:clap",
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ desktop = [
     "dep:v4l2r",
     "dep:alsa",
     "dep:gpio-cdev",
+    "dep:one-kvm-bluetooth-hid",
     "dep:cpal",
     "dep:windows-sys",
 ]
@@ -109,8 +110,7 @@ base64 = { version = "0.22", optional = true }
 tempfile = { version = "3", optional = true }
 
 # HTTP client (for URL downloads)
-# Use rustls by default, but allow native-tls for systems with older GLIBC
+reqwest = { version = "0.13", features = ["stream", "native-tls-vendored", "json"], default-features = false, optional = true }
-reqwest = { version = "0.13", features = ["stream", "rustls-no-provider", "json"], default-features = false, optional = true }
 urlencoding = { version = "2", optional = true }
 
 # Static file embedding
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ rust-embed = { version = "8", features = ["compression", "debug-embed"], optiona
 mime_guess = { version = "2", optional = true }
 
 # TLS/HTTPS
-rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = ["ring", "std", "tls12"], optional = true }
+openssl = { version = "0.10", features = ["vendored"], optional = true }
 rcgen = { version = "0.14", optional = true }
-axum-server = { version = "0.8", features = ["tls-rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
+axum-server = { version = "0.8", features = ["tls-openssl"], optional = true }
 
 # CLI argument parsing
 clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"], optional = true }
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ parking_lot = { version = "0.12", optional = true }
 arc-swap = { version = "1.8", optional = true }
 
 # WebRTC
-webrtc = { version = "0.17", optional = true }
+webrtc = { version = "0.17", features = ["vendored-openssl"], optional = true }
 rtp = { version = "0.17", optional = true }
 rtsp-types = { version = "0.1", optional = true }
 sdp-types = { version = "0.1", optional = true }
@@ -177,6 +177,8 @@ turbojpeg = { version = "1.3", optional = true }
 audiopus = { version = "0.2", optional = true }
 
 [target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies]
+one-kvm-bluetooth-hid = { path = "libs/bluetooth-hid", optional = true }
+
 # Utilities
 nix = { version = "0.31", default-features = false, features = ["fs", "socket", "net", "hostname", "poll"], optional = true }
 
@@ -203,6 +205,9 @@ windows-sys = { version = "0.61", features = [
 [build-dependencies]
 protobuf-codegen = "3.7"
 
+[patch.crates-io]
+dtls = { path = "libs/dtls" }
+
 [profile.release]
 opt-level = 3
 lto = true

Cross.toml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Cross-compilation configuration for One-KVM
-# Uses pre-built custom Debian 11 based images for consistent build/runtime environment
+# Uses pre-built custom Debian 12 based images for consistent build/runtime environment
 # See: https://github.com/cross-rs/cross
 
 [build]

LICENSE

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+                    GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
-                       Version 3, 29 June 2007
+                       Version 3, 19 November 2007
 
  Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <https://fsf.org/>
  Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
@@ -7,17 +7,15 @@
 
                             Preamble
 
-  The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
+  The GNU Affero General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
-software and other kinds of works.
+software and other kinds of works, specifically designed to ensure
+cooperation with the community in the case of network server software.
 
   The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
 to take away your freedom to share and change the works.  By contrast,
-the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to
+our General Public Licenses are intended to guarantee your freedom to
 share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains free
-software for all its users.  We, the Free Software Foundation, use the
+software for all its users.
-GNU General Public License for most of our software; it applies also to
-any other work released this way by its authors.  You can apply it to
-your programs, too.
 
   When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
 price.  Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
@@ -26,44 +24,34 @@ them if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you
 want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new
 free programs, and that you know you can do these things.
 
-  To protect your rights, we need to prevent others from denying you
+  Developers that use our General Public Licenses protect your rights
-these rights or asking you to surrender the rights.  Therefore, you have
+with two steps: (1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer
-certain responsibilities if you distribute copies of the software, or if
+you this License which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute
-you modify it: responsibilities to respect the freedom of others.
+and/or modify the software.
 
-  For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
+  A secondary benefit of defending all users' freedom is that
-gratis or for a fee, you must pass on to the recipients the same
+improvements made in alternate versions of the program, if they
-freedoms that you received.  You must make sure that they, too, receive
+receive widespread use, become available for other developers to
-or can get the source code.  And you must show them these terms so they
+incorporate.  Many developers of free software are heartened and
-know their rights.
+encouraged by the resulting cooperation.  However, in the case of
+software used on network servers, this result may fail to come about.
+The GNU General Public License permits making a modified version and
+letting the public access it on a server without ever releasing its
+source code to the public.
 
-  Developers that use the GNU GPL protect your rights with two steps:
+  The GNU Affero General Public License is designed specifically to
-(1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer you this License
+ensure that, in such cases, the modified source code becomes available
-giving you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify it.
+to the community.  It requires the operator of a network server to
+provide the source code of the modified version running there to the
+users of that server.  Therefore, public use of a modified version, on
+a publicly accessible server, gives the public access to the source
+code of the modified version.
 
-  For the developers' and authors' protection, the GPL clearly explains
+  An older license, called the Affero General Public License and
-that there is no warranty for this free software.  For both users' and
+published by Affero, was designed to accomplish similar goals.  This is
-authors' sake, the GPL requires that modified versions be marked as
+a different license, not a version of the Affero GPL, but Affero has
-changed, so that their problems will not be attributed erroneously to
+released a new version of the Affero GPL which permits relicensing under
-authors of previous versions.
+this license.
-
-  Some devices are designed to deny users access to install or run
-modified versions of the software inside them, although the manufacturer
-can do so.  This is fundamentally incompatible with the aim of
-protecting users' freedom to change the software.  The systematic
-pattern of such abuse occurs in the area of products for individuals to
-use, which is precisely where it is most unacceptable.  Therefore, we
-have designed this version of the GPL to prohibit the practice for those
-products.  If such problems arise substantially in other domains, we
-stand ready to extend this provision to those domains in future versions
-of the GPL, as needed to protect the freedom of users.
-
-  Finally, every program is threatened constantly by software patents.
-States should not allow patents to restrict development and use of
-software on general-purpose computers, but in those that do, we wish to
-avoid the special danger that patents applied to a free program could
-make it effectively proprietary.  To prevent this, the GPL assures that
-patents cannot be used to render the program non-free.
 
   The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
 modification follow.
@@ -72,7 +60,7 @@ modification follow.
 
   0. Definitions.
 
-  "This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU General Public License.
+  "This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License.
 
   "Copyright" also means copyright-like laws that apply to other kinds of
 works, such as semiconductor masks.
@@ -549,35 +537,45 @@ to collect a royalty for further conveying from those to whom you convey
 the Program, the only way you could satisfy both those terms and this
 License would be to refrain entirely from conveying the Program.
 
-  13. Use with the GNU Affero General Public License.
+  13. Remote Network Interaction; Use with the GNU General Public License.
+
+  Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, if you modify the
+Program, your modified version must prominently offer all users
+interacting with it remotely through a computer network (if your version
+supports such interaction) an opportunity to receive the Corresponding
+Source of your version by providing access to the Corresponding Source
+from a network server at no charge, through some standard or customary
+means of facilitating copying of software.  This Corresponding Source
+shall include the Corresponding Source for any work covered by version 3
+of the GNU General Public License that is incorporated pursuant to the
+following paragraph.
 
   Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have
 permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed
-under version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License into a single
+under version 3 of the GNU General Public License into a single
 combined work, and to convey the resulting work.  The terms of this
 License will continue to apply to the part which is the covered work,
-but the special requirements of the GNU Affero General Public License,
+but the work with which it is combined will remain governed by version
-section 13, concerning interaction through a network will apply to the
+3 of the GNU General Public License.
-combination as such.
 
   14. Revised Versions of this License.
 
   The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of
-the GNU General Public License from time to time.  Such new versions will
+the GNU Affero General Public License from time to time.  Such new versions
-be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to
+will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to
 address new problems or concerns.
 
   Each version is given a distinguishing version number.  If the
-Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU General
+Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU Affero General
 Public License "or any later version" applies to it, you have the
 option of following the terms and conditions either of that numbered
 version or of any later version published by the Free Software
 Foundation.  If the Program does not specify a version number of the
-GNU General Public License, you may choose any version ever published
+GNU Affero General Public License, you may choose any version ever published
 by the Free Software Foundation.
 
   If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future
-versions of the GNU General Public License can be used, that proxy's
+versions of the GNU Affero General Public License can be used, that proxy's
 public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you
 to choose that version for the Program.
 
@@ -635,40 +633,29 @@ the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
     Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>
 
     This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+    it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
     the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
     (at your option) any later version.
 
     This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
     but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
     MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-    GNU General Public License for more details.
+    GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
 
-    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+    You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
     along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 
 Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
 
-  If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short
+  If your software can interact with users remotely through a computer
-notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode:
+network, you should also make sure that it provides a way for users to
-
+get its source.  For example, if your program is a web application, its
-    <program>  Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>
+interface could display a "Source" link that leads users to an archive
-    This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
+of the code.  There are many ways you could offer source, and different
-    This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
+solutions will be better for different programs; see section 13 for the
-    under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
+specific requirements.
-
-The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
-parts of the General Public License.  Of course, your program's commands
-might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an "about box".
 
   You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school,
 if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary.
-For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see
+For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU AGPL, see
 <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-
-  The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program
-into proprietary programs.  If your program is a subroutine library, you
-may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with
-the library.  If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
-Public License instead of this License.  But first, please read
-<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/why-not-lgpl.html>.

build/Dockerfile.runtime

@@ -1,24 +1,35 @@
 # One-KVM Runtime Image
 # This Dockerfile only packages pre-compiled binaries (no compilation)
 # Used after cross-compiling with `cross build`
-# Using Debian 11 for maximum compatibility (GLIBC 2.31)
+# Using Debian 12 to match the build images (GLIBC 2.36)
 
 ARG TARGETPLATFORM=linux/amd64
 
-FROM debian:11-slim
+FROM debian:12-slim
 
 ARG TARGETPLATFORM
+ARG APT_MIRROR=
 
 # Install runtime dependencies in a single layer
 # All codec libraries (libx264, libx265, libopus) are now statically linked
 # Only hardware acceleration drivers and core system libraries remain dynamic
-RUN sed -i 's/ main$/ main contrib non-free/' /etc/apt/sources.list && \
+# Set APT_MIRROR=mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn to speed up builds in China
+RUN if [ -n "$APT_MIRROR" ]; then \
+        sed -i "s@deb.debian.org@${APT_MIRROR}@g" /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources; \
+    fi \
+    && sed -i 's/^Components: main$/Components: main contrib non-free non-free-firmware/' /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources && \
     apt-get update && \
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         # Core runtime (all platforms) - no codec libs needed
         ca-certificates \
+        # Bluetooth HID uses the host BlueZ system bus; btmgmt manages a dedicated adapter.
+        bluez \
         libudev1 \
         libasound2 \
+        # OTG Ethernet bridge control (nmcli talks to the host NetworkManager over D-Bus)
+        network-manager \
+        iproute2 \
+        iputils-ping \
         # v4l2 is handled by kernel, minimal userspace needed
         libv4l-0 \
         && \

build/Dockerfile.runtime-full

@@ -1,24 +1,35 @@
 # One-KVM Runtime Image (full)
 # This Dockerfile only packages pre-compiled binaries (no compilation)
 # Used after cross-compiling with `cross build`
-# Using Debian 11 for maximum compatibility (GLIBC 2.31)
+# Using Debian 12 to match the build images (GLIBC 2.36)
 
 ARG TARGETPLATFORM=linux/amd64
 
-FROM debian:11-slim
+FROM debian:12-slim
 
 ARG TARGETPLATFORM
+ARG APT_MIRROR=
 
 # Install runtime dependencies in a single layer
 # All codec libraries (libx264, libx265, libopus) are now statically linked
 # Only hardware acceleration drivers and core system libraries remain dynamic
-RUN sed -i 's/ main$/ main contrib non-free/' /etc/apt/sources.list && \
+# Set APT_MIRROR=mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn to speed up builds in China
+RUN if [ -n "$APT_MIRROR" ]; then \
+        sed -i "s@deb.debian.org@${APT_MIRROR}@g" /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources; \
+    fi \
+    && sed -i 's/^Components: main$/Components: main contrib non-free non-free-firmware/' /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources && \
     apt-get update && \
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         # Core runtime (all platforms) - no codec libs needed
         ca-certificates \
+        # Bluetooth HID uses the host BlueZ system bus; btmgmt manages a dedicated adapter.
+        bluez \
         libudev1 \
         libasound2 \
+        # OTG Ethernet bridge control (nmcli talks to the host NetworkManager over D-Bus)
+        network-manager \
+        iproute2 \
+        iputils-ping \
         # v4l2 is handled by kernel, minimal userspace needed
         libv4l-0 \
         && \

build/build-images.sh

@@ -21,21 +21,25 @@ build_arch() {
 
     case "${CHINAMIRRO:-}" in
         1|true|TRUE|yes|YES|on|ON)
-            local cross_build_opts="${CROSS_BUILD_OPTS:+$CROSS_BUILD_OPTS }--progress=plain --build-arg CHINAMIRRO=1 --build-arg GH_PROXY=${GH_PROXY:-https://gh-proxy.com/} --build-arg DEBIAN_IMAGE=${DEBIAN_IMAGE:-docker.1ms.run/library/debian:11}"
+            # Default Rust toolchain mirror is USTC (rsproxy.cn is unreachable via the
+            # Docker bridge on some networks because its CDN blocks the SNAT source IP).
+            local rust_dist="${RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER_MIRROR:-https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/rust-static}"
+            local rust_root="${RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT_MIRROR:-https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/rust-static/rustup}"
+            local crates_sparse="${CARGO_SPARSE_MIRROR:-sparse+https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/crates.io-index/}"
+            local crates_git="${CARGO_GIT_MIRROR:-https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/crates.io-index}"
+            local cross_build_opts="${CROSS_BUILD_OPTS:+$CROSS_BUILD_OPTS }--progress=plain --build-arg CHINAMIRRO=1 --build-arg GH_PROXY=${GH_PROXY:-https://ghfast.top/} --build-arg DEBIAN_IMAGE=${DEBIAN_IMAGE:-dockerproxy.net/library/debian:12}"
             cross_build_opts="$cross_build_opts --build-arg HTTP_PROXY= --build-arg HTTPS_PROXY= --build-arg ALL_PROXY= --build-arg NO_PROXY="
             cross_build_opts="$cross_build_opts --build-arg http_proxy= --build-arg https_proxy= --build-arg all_proxy= --build-arg no_proxy="
             echo "=== China mirror acceleration: enabled ==="
             echo "=== Building: $rust_target (via cross with custom Dockerfile) ==="
             env \
                 CROSS_BUILD_OPTS="$cross_build_opts" \
-                CARGO_SOURCE_CRATES_IO_REPLACE_WITH=rsproxy-sparse \
+                CARGO_SOURCE_CRATES_IO_REPLACE_WITH=cn-mirror \
-                CARGO_SOURCE_RSPROXY_REGISTRY=https://rsproxy.cn/crates.io-index \
+                CARGO_SOURCE_CN-MIRROR_REGISTRY="$crates_sparse" \
-                CARGO_SOURCE_RSPROXY_SPARSE_REGISTRY=sparse+https://rsproxy.cn/index/ \
-                CARGO_REGISTRIES_RSPROXY_INDEX=https://rsproxy.cn/crates.io-index \
                 CARGO_REGISTRIES_CRATES_IO_PROTOCOL=sparse \
                 CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI=true \
-                RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER=https://rsproxy.cn \
+                RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER="$rust_dist" \
-                RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT=https://rsproxy.cn/rustup \
+                RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT="$rust_root" \
                 cross build --release --target "$rust_target"
             return
             ;;

build/cross/Dockerfile.arm64

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-# Cross-compilation image for ARM64 based on Debian 11
+# Cross-compilation image for ARM64 based on Debian 12
-# Build on Debian 11 (GLIBC 2.31) for maximum runtime compatibility
+# Build on Debian 12 (GLIBC 2.36) to match the runtime images
 
-ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE=debian:11
+ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE=debian:12
 FROM ${DEBIAN_IMAGE}
 
 ARG CHINAMIRRO=0
 ARG GH_PROXY=https://gh-proxy.com/
-ARG RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER_CN=https://rsproxy.cn
+ARG RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/rust-static
-ARG RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT_CN=https://rsproxy.cn/rustup
+ARG RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/rust-static/rustup
-ARG CARGO_INDEX_CN=https://rsproxy.cn/crates.io-index
+ARG CARGO_INDEX_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/crates.io-index
-ARG CARGO_REGISTRY_CN=sparse+https://rsproxy.cn/index/
+ARG CARGO_REGISTRY_CN=sparse+https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/crates.io-index/
 ARG LIBJPEG_TURBO_VERSION=3.1.4.1
 ARG LIBYUV_REV=957f295ea946cbbd13fcfc46e7066f2efa801233
 ARG LIBVPX_VERSION=1.16.0
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ ARG FFMPEG_ROCKCHIP_REV=40c412daccf08164493da0de990eb99a8948116b
 # Optionally use China mirrors for builds in China.
 RUN if [ "$CHINAMIRRO" = "1" ]; then \
         sed -i -E \
-            -e 's|http://deb.debian.org/debian([[:space:]])|http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian\1|g' \
+            -e 's@http://deb.debian.org/debian([[:space:]]|$)@http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian\1@g' \
-            /etc/apt/sources.list; \
+            /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources; \
     fi
 
 # Install Rust toolchain
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         mkdir -p /root/.cargo; \
         printf '%s\n' \
             '[source.crates-io]' \
-            "replace-with = 'rsproxy-sparse'" \
+            "replace-with = 'cn-mirror-sparse'" \
-            '[source.rsproxy]' \
+            '[source.cn-mirror]' \
             "registry = '${CARGO_INDEX_CN}'" \
-            '[source.rsproxy-sparse]' \
+            '[source.cn-mirror-sparse]' \
             "registry = '${CARGO_REGISTRY_CN}'" \
-            '[registries.rsproxy]' \
+            '[registries.cn-mirror]' \
             "index = '${CARGO_INDEX_CN}'" \
             '[net]' \
             'git-fetch-with-cli = true' \
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ RUN dpkg --add-architecture arm64
 # Install cross-compiler and native build tools
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
     build-essential \
+    patch \
     pkg-config \
     cmake \
     nasm \
@@ -83,8 +84,8 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
 
 # Install ARM64 development libraries (without VAAPI/X11 for ARM)
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-    libssl1.1 \
+    libssl3 \
-    libssl1.1:arm64 \
+    libssl3:arm64 \
     libasound2-dev:arm64 \
     libv4l-dev:arm64 \
     libudev-dev:arm64 \
@@ -250,6 +251,9 @@ RUN github_prefix="" \
     && make install \
     && rm -rf /tmp/opus /tmp/opus.tar.gz
 
+# Reject raw formats smaller than the requested frame before any V4L2 upload.
+COPY build/cross/patches/0001-v4l2-m2m-reject-undersized-encoder-format.patch /tmp/ffmpeg-v4l2-size.patch
+
 # Download and build FFmpeg with RKMPP support
 RUN mkdir -p /tmp/ffmpeg-build && cd /tmp/ffmpeg-build \
     && github_prefix="" \
@@ -261,6 +265,7 @@ RUN mkdir -p /tmp/ffmpeg-build && cd /tmp/ffmpeg-build \
     && git remote add origin "${github_prefix}https://github.com/nyanmisaka/ffmpeg-rockchip.git" \
     && git fetch --depth 1 origin ${FFMPEG_ROCKCHIP_REV} \
     && git checkout --detach FETCH_HEAD \
+    && patch -p1 < /tmp/ffmpeg-v4l2-size.patch \
     && cd .. \
     # Build RKMPP
     && mkdir -p rkmpp/build && cd rkmpp/build \

build/cross/Dockerfile.armv7

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-# Cross-compilation image for ARMv7 based on Debian 11
+# Cross-compilation image for ARMv7 based on Debian 12
-# Build on Debian 11 (GLIBC 2.31) for maximum runtime compatibility
+# Build on Debian 12 (GLIBC 2.36) to match the runtime images
 
-ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE=debian:11
+ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE=debian:12
 FROM ${DEBIAN_IMAGE}
 
 ARG CHINAMIRRO=0
 ARG GH_PROXY=https://gh-proxy.com/
-ARG RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER_CN=https://rsproxy.cn
+ARG RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/rust-static
-ARG RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT_CN=https://rsproxy.cn/rustup
+ARG RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/rust-static/rustup
-ARG CARGO_INDEX_CN=https://rsproxy.cn/crates.io-index
+ARG CARGO_INDEX_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/crates.io-index
-ARG CARGO_REGISTRY_CN=sparse+https://rsproxy.cn/index/
+ARG CARGO_REGISTRY_CN=sparse+https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/crates.io-index/
 ARG LIBJPEG_TURBO_VERSION=3.1.4.1
 ARG LIBYUV_REV=957f295ea946cbbd13fcfc46e7066f2efa801233
 ARG LIBVPX_VERSION=1.16.0
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ ARG FFMPEG_ROCKCHIP_REV=40c412daccf08164493da0de990eb99a8948116b
 # Optionally use China mirrors for builds in China.
 RUN if [ "$CHINAMIRRO" = "1" ]; then \
         sed -i -E \
-            -e 's|http://deb.debian.org/debian([[:space:]])|http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian\1|g' \
+            -e 's@http://deb.debian.org/debian([[:space:]]|$)@http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian\1@g' \
-            /etc/apt/sources.list; \
+            /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources; \
     fi
 
 # Install Rust toolchain
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         mkdir -p /root/.cargo; \
         printf '%s\n' \
             '[source.crates-io]' \
-            "replace-with = 'rsproxy-sparse'" \
+            "replace-with = 'cn-mirror-sparse'" \
-            '[source.rsproxy]' \
+            '[source.cn-mirror]' \
             "registry = '${CARGO_INDEX_CN}'" \
-            '[source.rsproxy-sparse]' \
+            '[source.cn-mirror-sparse]' \
             "registry = '${CARGO_REGISTRY_CN}'" \
-            '[registries.rsproxy]' \
+            '[registries.cn-mirror]' \
             "index = '${CARGO_INDEX_CN}'" \
             '[net]' \
             'git-fetch-with-cli = true' \
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ RUN dpkg --add-architecture armhf
 # Install cross-compiler and native build tools
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
     build-essential \
+    patch \
     pkg-config \
     cmake \
     nasm \
@@ -83,8 +84,8 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
 
 # Install ARMv7 development libraries (without VAAPI/X11 for ARM)
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-    libssl1.1 \
+    libssl3 \
-    libssl1.1:armhf \
+    libssl3:armhf \
     libasound2-dev:armhf \
     libv4l-dev:armhf \
     libudev-dev:armhf \
@@ -239,6 +240,9 @@ RUN github_prefix="" \
     && make install \
     && rm -rf /tmp/opus /tmp/opus.tar.gz
 
+# Reject raw formats smaller than the requested frame before any V4L2 upload.
+COPY build/cross/patches/0001-v4l2-m2m-reject-undersized-encoder-format.patch /tmp/ffmpeg-v4l2-size.patch
+
 # Download and build FFmpeg with RKMPP support
 RUN mkdir -p /tmp/ffmpeg-build && cd /tmp/ffmpeg-build \
     && github_prefix="" \
@@ -250,6 +254,7 @@ RUN mkdir -p /tmp/ffmpeg-build && cd /tmp/ffmpeg-build \
     && git remote add origin "${github_prefix}https://github.com/nyanmisaka/ffmpeg-rockchip.git" \
     && git fetch --depth 1 origin ${FFMPEG_ROCKCHIP_REV} \
     && git checkout --detach FETCH_HEAD \
+    && patch -p1 < /tmp/ffmpeg-v4l2-size.patch \
     && cd .. \
     # Build RKMPP
     && mkdir -p rkmpp/build && cd rkmpp/build \

build/cross/Dockerfile.x86_64

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-# Cross-compilation image for x86_64 based on Debian 11
+# Cross-compilation image for x86_64 based on Debian 12
-# Build on Debian 11 (GLIBC 2.31) for maximum runtime compatibility
+# Build on Debian 12 (GLIBC 2.36) to match the runtime images
 
-ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE=debian:11
+ARG DEBIAN_IMAGE=debian:12
 FROM ${DEBIAN_IMAGE}
 
 ARG CHINAMIRRO=0
 ARG GH_PROXY=https://gh-proxy.com/
-ARG RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER_CN=https://rsproxy.cn
+ARG RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/rust-static
-ARG RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT_CN=https://rsproxy.cn/rustup
+ARG RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/rust-static/rustup
-ARG CARGO_INDEX_CN=https://rsproxy.cn/crates.io-index
+ARG CARGO_INDEX_CN=https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/crates.io-index
-ARG CARGO_REGISTRY_CN=sparse+https://rsproxy.cn/index/
+ARG CARGO_REGISTRY_CN=sparse+https://mirrors.ustc.edu.cn/crates.io-index/
 ARG LIBJPEG_TURBO_VERSION=3.1.4.1
 ARG LIBYUV_REV=957f295ea946cbbd13fcfc46e7066f2efa801233
 ARG LIBVPX_VERSION=1.16.0
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ ARG FFMPEG_ROCKCHIP_REV=40c412daccf08164493da0de990eb99a8948116b
 # Optionally use China mirrors for builds in China.
 RUN if [ "$CHINAMIRRO" = "1" ]; then \
         sed -i -E \
-            -e 's|http://deb.debian.org/debian([[:space:]])|http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian\1|g' \
+            -e 's@http://deb.debian.org/debian([[:space:]]|$)@http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian\1@g' \
-            /etc/apt/sources.list; \
+            /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources; \
     fi
 
 # Install Rust toolchain
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         mkdir -p /root/.cargo; \
         printf '%s\n' \
             '[source.crates-io]' \
-            "replace-with = 'rsproxy-sparse'" \
+            "replace-with = 'cn-mirror-sparse'" \
-            '[source.rsproxy]' \
+            '[source.cn-mirror]' \
             "registry = '${CARGO_INDEX_CN}'" \
-            '[source.rsproxy-sparse]' \
+            '[source.cn-mirror-sparse]' \
             "registry = '${CARGO_REGISTRY_CN}'" \
-            '[registries.rsproxy]' \
+            '[registries.cn-mirror]' \
             "index = '${CARGO_INDEX_CN}'" \
             '[net]' \
             'git-fetch-with-cli = true' \

build/cross/patches/0001-v4l2-m2m-reject-undersized-encoder-format.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+--- a/libavcodec/v4l2_m2m_enc.c
++++ b/libavcodec/v4l2_m2m_enc.c
+@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@
+     V4L2m2mPriv *priv = avctx->priv_data;
+     enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmt_output;
+     uint32_t v4l2_fmt_output;
++    unsigned int output_width, output_height;
+     int ret;
+ 
+     ret = ff_v4l2_m2m_create_context(priv, &s);
+@@ -370,6 +371,25 @@
+         v4l2_fmt_output = output->format.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat;
+     else
+         v4l2_fmt_output = output->format.fmt.pix.pixelformat;
++
++    /* Drivers may clamp the requested raw format to their supported size.
++     * The software-frame upload still uses avctx/frame dimensions, so a
++     * smaller negotiated format would overrun the mapped output buffers.
++     * Allow upward alignment, but reject frames that do not fit.
++     */
++    if (V4L2_TYPE_IS_MULTIPLANAR(output->type)) {
++        output_width  = output->format.fmt.pix_mp.width;
++        output_height = output->format.fmt.pix_mp.height;
++    } else {
++        output_width  = output->format.fmt.pix.width;
++        output_height = output->format.fmt.pix.height;
++    }
++    if (output_width < avctx->width || output_height < avctx->height) {
++        av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
++               "Encoder cannot fit requested %dx%d frame in negotiated %ux%u format\n",
++               avctx->width, avctx->height, output_width, output_height);
++        return AVERROR(EINVAL);
++    }
+ 
+     pix_fmt_output = ff_v4l2_format_v4l2_to_avfmt(v4l2_fmt_output, AV_CODEC_ID_RAWVIDEO);
+     if (pix_fmt_output != avctx->pix_fmt) {

build/debian/control.tpl

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Maintainer: SilentWind <admin@mofeng.run>
 Package: one-kvm
 Architecture: {arch}
 Depends: ${{auto}}, ca-certificates{distsuffix}
+Recommends: bluez
 Description: A open and lightweight IP-KVM solution written in Rust
  Enables BIOS-level remote management of servers and workstations.
  .
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ Description: A open and lightweight IP-KVM solution written in Rust
   * Hardware-accelerated video encoding (VAAPI, QSV, RKMPP)
   * WebRTC and MJPEG streaming with low latency
   * USB HID emulation via OTG gadget
+  * Classic Bluetooth keyboard and mouse via BlueZ
   * Mass storage device for ISO/IMG mounting
   * ATX power control via GPIO or USB relay
 Homepage: https://github.com/mofeng-git/One-KVM

build/debian/copyright

@@ -1,16 +1,130 @@
 Format: https://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/copyright-format/1.0/
 Upstream-Name: one-kvm
-Source: https://github.com/mofeng-git/one-KVM
+Upstream-Contact: https://github.com/mofeng-git/One-KVM/issues
+Source: https://github.com/mofeng-git/One-KVM
 
 Files: *
 Copyright: 2025 One-KVM contributors
-License: GPL-2.0
+License: AGPL-3.0-only
+
+Files: protos/*
+Copyright: the RustDesk contributors
+           2025 One-KVM contributors
+License: AGPL-3.0-only
+Comment:
+ Protocol definition files derived from RustDesk
+ (https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk). Modified for One-KVM.
+ See protos/NOTICE for the full attribution.
+
+Files: src/rustdesk/*
+Copyright: the RustDesk contributors
+           2025 One-KVM contributors
+License: AGPL-3.0-only
+Comment:
+ Code derived from the RustDesk project, modified for One-KVM.
+ See src/rustdesk/NOTICE for the full attribution.
+
+Files: libs/hwcodec/*
+Copyright: the RustDesk contributors
+           2025 One-KVM contributors
+License: AGPL-3.0-only
+Comment:
+ Derived from the RustDesk hwcodec component. See libs/hwcodec/NOTICE.
+
+Files: libs/v4l2r/*
+Copyright: 2023-2024 Andrei Lytkin, Daniel Almeida, Collabora Ltd. and other v4l2r contributors
+License: Expat
 
 Files: libs/ventoy-img-rs/resources/*
 Copyright: Ventoy contributors
-License: GPL-2.0
+License: GPL-3.0+
+Comment:
+ Pre-built Ventoy boot files (boot.img, core.img.xz, ventoy.disk.img.xz).
+ Ventoy upstream: https://github.com/ventoy/Ventoy, licensed GPL-3.0-or-later.
 
-License: GPL-2.0
+Files: res/vcpkg/libyuv/*
+Copyright: The LibYuv Project Authors
+License: BSD-3-Clause
+
+Files: third-party/ffmpeg
+Copyright: FFmpeg developers and contributors
+License: GPL-2.0+
+Comment:
+ FFmpeg is built with --enable-gpl --enable-version3 and linked against
+ x264/x265; the resulting build is GPL-compatible with the AGPL-3.0 main
+ program. Upstream: https://ffmpeg.org/
+ The Linux builds use nyanmisaka/ffmpeg-rockchip at the commit pinned by
+ FFMPEG_ROCKCHIP_REV in build/cross/Dockerfile.*.
+
+Files: third-party/x264
+Copyright: x264 LLC and x264 contributors
+License: GPL-2.0+
+Comment: Upstream: https://www.videolan.org/developers/x264.html
+
+Files: third-party/x265
+Copyright: MulticoreWare, Inc. and x265 contributors
+License: GPL-2.0+
+Comment: Upstream: https://www.x265.org/
+
+Files: third-party/libvpx
+Copyright: The WebM Project authors
+License: BSD-3-Clause
+Comment: Upstream: https://www.webmproject.org/code/
+
+Files: third-party/libopus
+Copyright: Opus contributors
+License: BSD-3-Clause
+Comment: Upstream: https://opus-codec.org/
+
+Files: third-party/libjpeg-turbo
+Copyright: D. R. Commander and other libjpeg-turbo contributors
+License: BSD-3-Clause
+Comment: Upstream: https://libjpeg-turbo.org/
+
+Files: third-party/libsodium
+Copyright: 2013-2025 Frank Denis
+License: Expat
+Comment: Upstream: https://libsodium.gitbook.io/
+
+Files: third-party/sqlite
+Copyright: 1994-2010 Hipp, Wyrick & Company, Inc.
+License: SQLite-public-domain
+Comment: Upstream: https://www.sqlite.org/
+
+License: AGPL-3.0-only
+ This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License.
+ .
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ .
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ .
+ On Debian systems, the full text of the GNU Affero General Public License
+ version 3 can be found in the file `/usr/share/common-licenses/AGPL-3'.
+
+License: GPL-3.0+
+ This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+ .
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+ .
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ .
+ On Debian systems, the full text of the GNU General Public License
+ version 3 can be found in the file `/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-3'.
+
+License: GPL-2.0+
  This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of the License, or
@@ -22,8 +136,61 @@ License: GPL-2.0
  GNU General Public License for more details.
  .
  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program.  If not, write to the Free Software
+ along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
- Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
+ .
+ On Debian systems, the full text of the GNU General Public License
+ version 2 can be found in the file `/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2'.
 
-On Debian systems, the full text of the GNU General Public License
+License: Expat
-version 2 can be found in the file `/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2'.
+ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
+ copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
+ to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
+ the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
+ and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
+ Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ .
+ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included
+ in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ .
+ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
+ FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
+ DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+
+License: BSD-3-Clause
+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ .
+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ .
+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ .
+ 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors
+ may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ without specific prior written permission.
+ .
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+License: SQLite-public-domain
+ The author disclaims copyright to this source code.  In place of a legal
+ notice, here is a blessing:
+ .
+ May you do good and not evil.
+ May you find forgiveness for yourself and understand yourself.
+ May you share freely, never taking more than you give.

build/one-kvm.service

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=One-KVM IP-KVM Service
 Documentation=https://github.com/mofeng-git/One-KVM
-After=network-online.target
+After=network-online.target bluetooth.service
 Wants=network-online.target
 
 [Service]

build/package-deb.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # Build deb packages from pre-compiled binaries
-# Binaries are compiled once on Debian 11 (GLIBC 2.31) via build-images.sh
+# Binaries are compiled once on Debian 12 (GLIBC 2.36) via build-images.sh
 # This script packages them directly on the host using dpkg-deb
 # Usage: ./build/build-deb.sh [arch]
 # Example: ./build/build-deb.sh aarch64
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ EOF
     chmod 755 "$PKG_DIR/DEBIAN/prerm"
 
     # Create control file
-    BASE_DEPS="libc6 (>= 2.31), libgcc-s1, libstdc++6, libasound2t64 (>= 1.1) | libasound2 (>= 1.1), libdrm2 (>= 2.4)"
+    BASE_DEPS="libc6 (>= 2.36), libgcc-s1, libstdc++6, libasound2t64 (>= 1.1) | libasound2 (>= 1.1), libdrm2 (>= 2.4)"
     AMD64_DEPS="libva2 (>= 2.0), libva-drm2 (>= 2.10), libva-x11-2 (>= 2.10), libmfx-gen1.2 (>= 22.0) | libmfx1 (>= 21.1), libx11-6 (>= 1.6), libxcb1 (>= 1.14), i965-va-driver-shaders (>= 2.4), intel-media-va-driver-non-free (>= 21.1)"
     DEPS="$BASE_DEPS"
     if [ "$DEB_ARCH" = "amd64" ]; then
@@ -139,10 +139,11 @@ Section: admin
 Priority: optional
 Architecture: $DEB_ARCH
 Depends: $DEPS
+Recommends: bluez
 Maintainer: SilentWind <admin@mofeng.run>
 Description: A open and lightweight IP-KVM solution
  Enables BIOS-level remote management of servers and workstations.
- Built on Debian 11, compatible with Debian 11+, Ubuntu 20.04+.
+ Built on Debian 12, compatible with Debian 12+, Ubuntu 24.04+.
 EOF
 
     # Build deb directly on host

build/package-docker.sh

@@ -204,9 +204,21 @@ get_tool_urls() {
 }
 
 # Download tools for a platform
+# Set CURL_PROXY=http://host:port to route GitHub downloads through an HTTP proxy
+# Set GHPROXY_PREFIX=https://ghfast.top/ to prefix GitHub URLs instead
 download_tools() {
     local platform="$1"
     local staging="$2"
+    local curl_proxy=()
+    if [ -n "${CURL_PROXY:-}" ]; then
+        curl_proxy=(-x "$CURL_PROXY")
+    fi
+    dl() {
+        # dl <url> <output>
+        local url="$1"
+        [ -n "${GHPROXY_PREFIX:-}" ] && url="${GHPROXY_PREFIX%/}/$url"
+        curl -fsSL "${curl_proxy[@]}" "$url" -o "$2"
+    }
 
     get_tool_urls "$platform"
 
@@ -214,14 +226,14 @@ download_tools() {
 
     # ttyd
     if [ ! -f "$staging/ttyd" ]; then
-        curl -fsSL "$TTYD_URL" -o "$staging/ttyd"
+        dl "$TTYD_URL" "$staging/ttyd"
         chmod +x "$staging/ttyd"
     fi
 
     if [ "$INCLUDE_THIRD_PARTY" = true ]; then
         # gostc
         if [ ! -f "$staging/gostc" ]; then
-            curl -fsSL "$GOSTC_URL" -o /tmp/gostc.tar.gz
+            dl "$GOSTC_URL" /tmp/gostc.tar.gz
             tar -xzf /tmp/gostc.tar.gz -C "$staging"
             chmod +x "$staging/gostc"
             rm /tmp/gostc.tar.gz
@@ -229,7 +241,7 @@ download_tools() {
 
         # easytier
         if [ ! -f "$staging/easytier-core" ]; then
-            curl -fsSL "$EASYTIER_URL" -o /tmp/easytier.zip
+            dl "$EASYTIER_URL" /tmp/easytier.zip
             unzip -o /tmp/easytier.zip -d /tmp/easytier
             cp "/tmp/easytier/$EASYTIER_DIR/easytier-core" "$staging/easytier-core"
             chmod +x "$staging/easytier-core"
@@ -311,9 +323,16 @@ build_for_platform() {
 
     local build_cmd="docker buildx build --platform $platform"
     build_cmd="$build_cmd --build-arg TARGETPLATFORM=$platform"
+    if [ -n "${APT_MIRROR:-}" ]; then
+        build_cmd="$build_cmd --build-arg APT_MIRROR=$APT_MIRROR"
+    fi
 
     if [ "$PUSH" = true ]; then
         build_cmd="$build_cmd --push"
+        # Aliyun ACR rejects the OCI artifact manifests used by BuildKit attestations.
+        if [[ "$REGISTRY" == registry.cn-*.aliyuncs.com/* ]]; then
+            build_cmd="$build_cmd --provenance=false --sbom=false"
+        fi
     elif [ "$LOAD" = true ]; then
         build_cmd="$build_cmd --load"
     fi

docs/macos-drag-compatibility.md

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# macOS 拖拽兼容模式（实验性）
+
+适用于 OTG 和 CH9329 后端的绝对鼠标输入。遇到目标 Mac 上拖拽只能移动一小段便停止时，可在设置页的 HID 配置中开启「macOS 拖拽兼容模式」。默认关闭。
+
+配置字段为 `hid.mouse_macos_drag`，旧 PR 的 `ch9329_macos_drag` 字段仍可作为读取别名。OTG 必须同时启用相对鼠标和绝对鼠标接口，否则配置保存会被拒绝。CH9329 同时启用 Linux 兼容开关时，此模式优先。
+
+## 报告行为
+
+- 未按键时仍使用绝对坐标定位。
+- 从绝对输入开始的拖拽：按下使用绝对报告，移动和滚轮使用相对报告，释放时先更新相对按钮状态，再发送绝对按钮释放。
+- 按键报告的通道保持到所有按钮释放，不随拖拽期间的输入模式切换而改变。
+- 从相对输入开始的点击、拖拽继续使用相对按钮报告；此选项不修复原生相对模式的点击兼容问题。
+- 位移从原始 15 位输入坐标换算，累计小数余量，大位移按单包范围分包并保留总量及方向。
+- 运行时使用当前视频采集尺寸，并在 HID 重载后恢复尺寸；视频尚未提供尺寸时使用配置尺寸。
+
+## 验证范围与限制
+
+本次 OTG 扩展及位移换算修改没有 macOS 实机验证。原 PR 作者对旧 CH9329 实现的实机反馈不能视为本版本已经验证。
+
+本地自动化覆盖位移累计/分包、1080p/4K 换算、往返移动、滚轮、输入模式切换、复位、CH9329 命令队列、OTG 临时文件模拟端点及配置校验。临时文件测试仅验证写出的字节，不验证 USB 枚举或目标系统的事件解释。
+
+相对位移受 macOS 鼠标速度、加速、显示缩放及多屏布局影响，无法保证与绝对定位逐像素一致。松手报告携带最后的客户端绝对坐标，仍可能出现落点偏移或光标跳位；大位移分包也可能增加低波特率串口延迟。
+
+后续实机验证应分别覆盖两个后端：窗口/文件/文本拖拽，快速及慢速移动，滚轮和多按钮组合，1080p/4K 与缩放显示，输入模式切换、断开重连、精确落点。异常时关闭此选项恢复默认行为。

libs/bluetooth-hid/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[package]
+name = "one-kvm-bluetooth-hid"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2021"
+license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
+
+[dependencies]
+bluer = { version = "0.17", features = ["bluetoothd", "l2cap"] }
+dbus = { version = "0.9", features = ["vendored"] }
+tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "sync", "time", "process"] }
+serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
+serde_json = "1"
+dbus-crossroads = "0.5"
+dbus-tokio = "0.7"
+libc = "0.2"
+tracing = "0.1"

libs/bluetooth-hid/examples/pairing_probe.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+//! Explicit hardware regression: opens a 10-second pairing window without
+//! removing existing bonds or sending input. Stop the production HID first.
+use one_kvm_bluetooth_hid::{Action, Config, Peripheral};
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<(), String> {
+    let peripheral = Peripheral::start(Config {
+        adapter: "hci0".into(),
+        name: "One-KVM HID".into(),
+        peer: None,
+    })?;
+    let result = async {
+        for _ in 0..50 {
+            if peripheral.status().initialized {
+                break;
+            }
+            tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
+        }
+        let before = peripheral.status();
+        if !before.initialized {
+            return Err(format!("Initialization failed: {:?}", before.error));
+        }
+        if !before
+            .devices
+            .iter()
+            .any(|d| Some(&d.address) == before.peer.as_ref() && d.paired)
+        {
+            return Err("This regression needs an existing bonded computer".into());
+        }
+        peripheral.action(Action::Pair(10)).await?;
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+        let open = peripheral.status();
+        println!("open: {}", serde_json::to_string(&open).unwrap());
+        if open.pairing_seconds == 0 {
+            return Err("Existing bond prematurely closed pairing".into());
+        }
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(10)).await;
+        let expired = peripheral.status();
+        println!("expired: {}", serde_json::to_string(&expired).unwrap());
+        if expired.pairing_seconds != 0 || expired.peer != before.peer {
+            return Err("Window did not expire while preserving the bonded peer".into());
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    .await;
+    let cleanup = peripheral.shutdown().await;
+    result.and(cleanup)
+}

libs/bluetooth-hid/examples/probe.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+//! Native hardware smoke check. Registers for 12 seconds, sends no input,
+//! opens no pairing window, then restores the adapter configuration.
+use one_kvm_bluetooth_hid::{Config, Peripheral};
+use std::time::Duration;
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<(), String> {
+    let peripheral = Peripheral::start(Config {
+        adapter: "hci0".into(),
+        name: "One-KVM HID".into(),
+        peer: None,
+    })?;
+    let mut initialized = false;
+    for _ in 0..12 {
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+        let status = peripheral.status();
+        initialized |= status.initialized;
+        println!("{}", serde_json::to_string(&status).unwrap());
+    }
+    peripheral.shutdown().await?;
+    if !initialized {
+        return Err("Native BlueZ peripheral never initialized".into());
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/bluetooth-hid/src/agent.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+use crate::Shared;
+use dbus::{channel::MatchingReceiver, message::MatchRule, nonblock::Proxy, Path};
+use dbus_crossroads::Crossroads;
+use std::{
+    sync::Arc,
+    time::{Duration, Instant},
+};
+
+const PATH: &str = "/org/onekvm/bluetooth/agent";
+pub struct Agent {
+    connection: Arc<dbus::nonblock::SyncConnection>,
+    task: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
+}
+impl Agent {
+    pub async fn register(shared: Arc<Shared>, adapter: String) -> Result<Self, String> {
+        let (resource, connection) =
+            dbus_tokio::connection::new_system_sync().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let _ = resource.await;
+        });
+        let mut cr = Crossroads::new();
+        let iface = cr.register("org.bluez.Agent1", |b| {
+            b.method("Release", (), (), |_, _: &mut (), ()| Ok(()));
+            b.method("Cancel", (), (), |_, _: &mut (), ()| Ok(()));
+            let state = shared.clone();
+            let name = adapter.clone();
+            b.method(
+                "RequestAuthorization",
+                ("device",),
+                (),
+                move |_, _: &mut (), (path,): (Path<'static>,)| {
+                    authorize(&state, &name, &path, true)
+                },
+            );
+            let state = shared.clone();
+            let name = adapter.clone();
+            b.method(
+                "RequestConfirmation",
+                ("device", "passkey"),
+                (),
+                move |_, _: &mut (), (path, _): (Path<'static>, u32)| {
+                    authorize(&state, &name, &path, true)
+                },
+            );
+            b.method(
+                "AuthorizeService",
+                ("device", "uuid"),
+                (),
+                move |_, _: &mut (), (path, uuid): (Path<'static>, String)| {
+                    if !matches!(uuid.as_str(), "00001124-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb") {
+                        return Err(dbus::MethodErr::from((
+                            "org.bluez.Error.Rejected",
+                            "Not an HID service",
+                        )));
+                    }
+                    authorize(&shared, &adapter, &path, false)
+                },
+            );
+        });
+        cr.insert(PATH, &[iface], ());
+        let profile = cr.register("org.bluez.Profile1", |b| {
+            b.method("Release", (), (), |_, _: &mut (), ()| Ok(()));
+            b.method(
+                "RequestDisconnection",
+                ("device",),
+                (),
+                |_, _: &mut (), (_device,): (Path<'static>,)| Ok(()),
+            );
+            b.method(
+                "NewConnection",
+                ("device", "fd", "properties"),
+                (),
+                |_,
+                 _: &mut (),
+                 (_device, _fd, _props): (
+                    Path<'static>,
+                    dbus::arg::OwnedFd,
+                    dbus::arg::PropMap,
+                )| {
+                    // This profile only publishes SDP. Our L2CAP sockets own both HID channels.
+                    Err::<(), _>(dbus::MethodErr::from((
+                        "org.bluez.Error.Rejected",
+                        "Unexpected profile connection",
+                    )))
+                },
+            );
+        });
+        cr.insert("/org/onekvm/bluetooth/profile", &[profile], ());
+        connection.start_receive(
+            MatchRule::new_method_call(),
+            Box::new(move |msg, conn| {
+                let _ = cr.handle_message(msg, conn);
+                true
+            }),
+        );
+        let agent = Self { connection, task };
+        let proxy = Proxy::new(
+            "org.bluez",
+            "/org/bluez",
+            Duration::from_secs(5),
+            agent.connection.clone(),
+        );
+        let result: Result<(), dbus::Error> = proxy
+            .method_call(
+                "org.bluez.AgentManager1",
+                "RegisterAgent",
+                (Path::from(PATH), "NoInputNoOutput"),
+            )
+            .await;
+        if let Err(error) = result {
+            return Err(error.to_string());
+        }
+        let result: Result<(), dbus::Error> = proxy
+            .method_call(
+                "org.bluez.AgentManager1",
+                "RequestDefaultAgent",
+                (Path::from(PATH),),
+            )
+            .await;
+        result.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let mut options: dbus::arg::PropMap = std::collections::HashMap::new();
+        options.insert(
+            "ServiceRecord".into(),
+            dbus::arg::Variant(Box::new(crate::protocol::sdp())),
+        );
+        options.insert(
+            "Role".into(),
+            dbus::arg::Variant(Box::new("server".to_string())),
+        );
+        options.insert(
+            "RequireAuthentication".into(),
+            dbus::arg::Variant(Box::new(true)),
+        );
+        options.insert(
+            "RequireAuthorization".into(),
+            dbus::arg::Variant(Box::new(false)),
+        );
+        let result: Result<(), dbus::Error> = proxy
+            .method_call(
+                "org.bluez.ProfileManager1",
+                "RegisterProfile",
+                (
+                    Path::from("/org/onekvm/bluetooth/profile"),
+                    crate::protocol::HID_UUID,
+                    options,
+                ),
+            )
+            .await;
+        result.map_err(|e| format!("Register HID SDP: {e}"))?;
+        Ok(agent)
+    }
+}
+impl Drop for Agent {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        self.task.abort();
+    }
+}
+fn authorize(
+    shared: &Shared,
+    adapter: &str,
+    path: &str,
+    pairing: bool,
+) -> Result<(), dbus::MethodErr> {
+    let rejected = || {
+        dbus::MethodErr::from((
+            "org.bluez.Error.Rejected",
+            "Open pairing in One-KVM or select the paired computer",
+        ))
+    };
+    let prefix = format!("/org/bluez/{adapter}/dev_");
+    let address = path
+        .strip_prefix(&prefix)
+        .ok_or_else(rejected)?
+        .replace('_', ":");
+    let mut state = shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+    if pairing
+        && !state
+            .pairing_until
+            .is_some_and(|until| until > Instant::now())
+    {
+        return Err(rejected());
+    }
+    if state.peer.as_ref().is_some_and(|peer| peer != &address) {
+        return Err(rejected());
+    }
+    if state.peer.is_none() {
+        if !pairing || state.bonded_before_pairing.contains(&address) {
+            return Err(rejected());
+        }
+        state.peer = Some(address);
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[test]
+    fn existing_unrelated_bond_cannot_be_adopted_by_agent_callback() {
+        let shared = Shared::new(None);
+        {
+            let mut state = shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+            state.pairing_until = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(120));
+            state
+                .bonded_before_pairing
+                .insert("10:6F:D9:66:97:88".into());
+        }
+        assert!(authorize(
+            &shared,
+            "hci0",
+            "/org/bluez/hci0/dev_10_6F_D9_66_97_88",
+            true
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        assert!(shared.state.lock().unwrap().peer.is_none());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn only_pair_during_window_and_pin_first_peer() {
+        let state = Shared::new(None);
+        let first = "/org/bluez/hci0/dev_10_6F_D9_66_97_88";
+        assert!(authorize(&state, "hci0", first, true).is_err());
+        state.state.lock().unwrap().pairing_until = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(60));
+        assert!(authorize(&state, "hci0", first, true).is_ok());
+        assert!(authorize(
+            &state,
+            "hci0",
+            "/org/bluez/hci0/dev_10_6F_D9_66_97_89",
+            true
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        assert!(authorize(&state, "hci1", first, true).is_err());
+        state.state.lock().unwrap().pairing_until = None;
+        assert!(authorize(&state, "hci0", first, false).is_ok());
+        assert!(authorize(&state, "hci0", first, true).is_err());
+    }
+}

libs/bluetooth-hid/src/bonds.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+//! Only bonds explicitly owned by this HID peripheral may be removed.
+use bluer::{Adapter, Session};
+use std::{future::Future, pin::Pin};
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Bond {
+    pub adapter: String,
+    pub peer: String,
+    pub pending: bool,
+}
+pub type Operation<'a, T> = Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<T, String>> + Send + 'a>>;
+pub trait BondStore: Send + Sync {
+    fn list(&self) -> Operation<'_, Vec<Bond>>;
+    fn save(&self, bond: Bond) -> Operation<'_, ()>;
+    fn remove(&self, bond: Bond) -> Operation<'_, ()>;
+}
+
+pub async fn clean_adapter(store: &dyn BondStore, adapter: &Adapter) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let address = adapter
+        .address()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+        .to_string();
+    clean_owned(store, &address, |peer| async move {
+        let peer = peer.parse().map_err(|_| "Invalid stored HID peer")?;
+        if adapter
+            .device_addresses()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+            .contains(&peer)
+        {
+            adapter
+                .remove_device(peer)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    })
+    .await
+}
+
+async fn clean_owned<F, Fut>(
+    store: &dyn BondStore,
+    address: &str,
+    mut remove: F,
+) -> Result<(), String>
+where
+    F: FnMut(String) -> Fut,
+    Fut: Future<Output = Result<(), String>>,
+{
+    for bond in store
+        .list()
+        .await?
+        .into_iter()
+        .filter(|b| b.pending && b.adapter == address)
+    {
+        remove(bond.peer.clone()).await?;
+        // Keep the tombstone until BlueZ confirms removal; retry safely after interruption.
+        store.remove(bond).await?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub async fn reset(store: &dyn BondStore, explicit: Vec<Bond>) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let session = Session::new().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    let mut owned = store.list().await?;
+    owned.extend(explicit);
+    for mut bond in owned {
+        bond.pending = true;
+        store.save(bond).await?;
+    }
+    for name in session.adapter_names().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())? {
+        clean_adapter(store, &session.adapter(&name).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?).await?;
+    }
+    // Records for absent adapters remain pending and are cleaned before their next use.
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::sync::Mutex;
+    #[derive(Default)]
+    struct Memory(Mutex<Vec<Bond>>);
+    impl BondStore for Memory {
+        fn list(&self) -> Operation<'_, Vec<Bond>> {
+            Box::pin(async { Ok(self.0.lock().unwrap().clone()) })
+        }
+        fn save(&self, bond: Bond) -> Operation<'_, ()> {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                let mut rows = self.0.lock().unwrap();
+                rows.retain(|b| b.adapter != bond.adapter || b.peer != bond.peer);
+                rows.push(bond);
+                Ok(())
+            })
+        }
+        fn remove(&self, bond: Bond) -> Operation<'_, ()> {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                self.0.lock().unwrap().retain(|b| b != &bond);
+                Ok(())
+            })
+        }
+    }
+    fn bond(adapter: &str, peer: &str, pending: bool) -> Bond {
+        Bond {
+            adapter: adapter.into(),
+            peer: peer.into(),
+            pending,
+        }
+    }
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cleanup_only_removes_owned_pending_bonds_on_the_selected_hardware() {
+        let current = bond("adapter-A", "host-1", true);
+        let absent = bond("adapter-B", "host-2", true);
+        let retained = bond("adapter-A", "host-3", false);
+        let store = Memory(Mutex::new(vec![current, absent.clone(), retained.clone()]));
+        let removed = Mutex::new(Vec::new());
+        clean_owned(&store, "adapter-A", |peer| {
+            removed.lock().unwrap().push(peer);
+            async { Ok(()) }
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(*removed.lock().unwrap(), vec!["host-1"]);
+        assert_eq!(store.list().await.unwrap(), vec![absent, retained]);
+    }
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cleanup_failure_keeps_tombstone_and_is_reported() {
+        let record = bond("adapter-A", "host-1", true);
+        let store = Memory(Mutex::new(vec![record.clone()]));
+        assert_eq!(
+            clean_owned(&store, "adapter-A", |_| async {
+                Err("BlueZ denied removal".into())
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err(),
+            "BlueZ denied removal"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(store.list().await.unwrap(), vec![record]);
+        clean_owned(&store, "adapter-A", |_| async { Ok(()) })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(store.list().await.unwrap().is_empty());
+    }
+}

libs/bluetooth-hid/src/controller.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+//! Exclusive controller ownership. No BLE switching or power cycling.
+use std::{
+    fs::{File, OpenOptions},
+    os::{fd::AsRawFd, unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt},
+    process::Stdio,
+    time::Duration,
+};
+use tokio::process::Command;
+pub struct Controller {
+    _lock: File,
+    adapter: String,
+    old_class: (u8, u8),
+    old_connectable: bool,
+}
+async fn run_once(adapter: &str, args: &[&str]) -> Result<String, String> {
+    let mut cmd = Command::new("btmgmt");
+    cmd.arg("--index")
+        .arg(adapter.trim_start_matches("hci"))
+        .args(args)
+        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
+        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
+        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
+        .kill_on_drop(true);
+    let mut child = cmd
+        .spawn()
+        .map_err(|e| format!("Install bluez/btmgmt: {e}"))?;
+    // BlueZ 5.55's btmgmt exits on stdin EOF, even with a command argument.
+    // Keep a pipe open until it finishes; systemd normally supplies /dev/null.
+    let stdin = child.stdin.take();
+    let result = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), child.wait_with_output())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| "btmgmt timeout")?
+        .map_err(|e| format!("Install bluez/btmgmt: {e}"))?;
+    drop(stdin);
+    let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stdout).into_owned();
+    if !result.status.success()
+        || !result.stderr.is_empty()
+        || text.to_lowercase().contains("failed")
+    {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "btmgmt {}: {text} {}",
+            args.join(" "),
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&result.stderr)
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(text)
+}
+async fn run(adapter: &str, args: &[&str]) -> Result<String, String> {
+    // BlueZ updates the EIR/class asynchronously after registering SDP.
+    // Kernel management rejects a simultaneous class change with Busy.
+    for attempt in 0..5 {
+        match run_once(adapter, args).await {
+            Err(error) if error.contains("(Busy)") && attempt < 4 => {
+                tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
+            }
+            result => return result,
+        }
+    }
+    unreachable!()
+}
+impl Controller {
+    pub async fn acquire(adapter: &str) -> Result<Self, String> {
+        let lock = OpenOptions::new()
+            .read(true)
+            .write(true)
+            .create(true)
+            .truncate(false)
+            .mode(0o600)
+            .custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
+            .open(format!("/run/one-kvm-bluetooth-{adapter}.lock"))
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        if unsafe { libc::flock(lock.as_raw_fd(), libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) } != 0 {
+            return Err("Bluetooth adapter already owned by One-KVM".into());
+        }
+        let info = run(adapter, &["info"]).await?;
+        let settings = info
+            .lines()
+            .find_map(|l| l.trim().strip_prefix("current settings:"))
+            .ok_or("Cannot read Bluetooth settings")?;
+        if !settings.split_whitespace().any(|s| s == "br/edr") {
+            return Err(
+                "Classic Bluetooth disabled; enable BR/EDR with btmgmt before using HID".into(),
+            );
+        }
+        let class = info
+            .split_whitespace()
+            .skip_while(|s| *s != "class")
+            .nth(1)
+            .ok_or("Missing Bluetooth class")?;
+        let class =
+            u32::from_str_radix(class.trim_start_matches("0x"), 16).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        Ok(Self {
+            _lock: lock,
+            adapter: adapter.into(),
+            old_class: (((class >> 8) & 0x1f) as u8, (class & 0xfc) as u8),
+            old_connectable: settings.split_whitespace().any(|s| s == "connectable"),
+        })
+    }
+    pub async fn configure(&self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        run(&self.adapter, &["class", "5", "192"]).await?;
+        run(&self.adapter, &["connectable", "on"]).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    pub async fn restore(&self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        let mut errors = vec![];
+        if let Err(e) = run(
+            &self.adapter,
+            &[
+                "class",
+                &self.old_class.0.to_string(),
+                &self.old_class.1.to_string(),
+            ],
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            errors.push(e);
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = run(
+            &self.adapter,
+            &[
+                "connectable",
+                if self.old_connectable { "on" } else { "off" },
+            ],
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            errors.push(e);
+        }
+        if errors.is_empty() {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(errors.join("; "))
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/bluetooth-hid/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,964 @@
+//! Classic Bluetooth HID peripheral: SDP + L2CAP. Linux/BlueZ only.
+mod agent;
+pub mod bonds;
+mod controller;
+mod protocol;
+
+use bluer::{
+    l2cap::{Security, SecurityLevel, SeqPacket, SeqPacketListener, Socket, SocketAddr},
+    Adapter, Address, AddressType, Session,
+};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::{
+    collections::HashSet,
+    sync::{Arc, Mutex},
+    time::{Duration, Instant},
+};
+use tokio::sync::{mpsc, oneshot, watch, Mutex as AsyncMutex};
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Config {
+    pub adapter: String,
+    pub name: String,
+    pub peer: Option<String>,
+}
+impl Config {
+    pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        if !self
+            .adapter
+            .strip_prefix("hci")
+            .is_some_and(|n| !n.is_empty() && n.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()))
+        {
+            return Err("Bluetooth adapter must be hci followed by an index".into());
+        }
+        if self.name.is_empty() || self.name.len() > 64 || self.name.chars().any(char::is_control) {
+            return Err(
+                "Bluetooth name must contain 1–64 UTF-8 bytes without control characters".into(),
+            );
+        }
+        if let Some(peer) = &self.peer {
+            peer.parse::<Address>()
+                .map_err(|_| "Invalid Bluetooth peer address")?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Status {
+    pub initialized: bool,
+    pub connected: bool,
+    pub ready: bool,
+    pub adapter: String,
+    pub adapter_address: String,
+    pub peer: Option<String>,
+    pub pairing_seconds: u32,
+    pub control_connected: bool,
+    pub interrupt_connected: bool,
+    pub leds: u8,
+    pub generation: u64,
+    pub error: Option<String>,
+    pub devices: Vec<Device>,
+}
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Device {
+    pub address: String,
+    pub name: String,
+    pub paired: bool,
+    pub connected: bool,
+}
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub enum Report {
+    Keyboard,
+    Mouse,
+    Consumer,
+}
+impl Report {
+    fn len(self) -> usize {
+        match self {
+            Self::Keyboard => 8,
+            Self::Mouse => 4,
+            Self::Consumer => 2,
+        }
+    }
+    fn id(self) -> u8 {
+        match self {
+            Self::Keyboard => 1,
+            Self::Mouse => 2,
+            Self::Consumer => 3,
+        }
+    }
+}
+struct State {
+    peer: Option<String>,
+    pairing_until: Option<Instant>,
+    bonded_before_pairing: HashSet<String>,
+}
+impl State {
+    fn observe_bond(&mut self, address: &str, paired: bool) {
+        // Just Works may complete without an Agent1 authorization callback.
+        // Adopt only a new bond from our explicit window, respecting a pinned peer.
+        if paired
+            && self.peer.is_none()
+            && self
+                .pairing_until
+                .is_some_and(|until| until > Instant::now())
+            && !self.bonded_before_pairing.contains(address)
+        {
+            self.peer = Some(address.to_owned());
+            tracing::info!(
+                peer = address,
+                "Bluetooth HID selected newly bonded computer"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+    fn close_pairing(&mut self, paired: bool, fallback: Option<String>) {
+        self.pairing_until = None;
+        if !paired {
+            self.peer = fallback;
+        }
+    }
+    fn pairing_completed(&self, selected_paired: bool) -> bool {
+        selected_paired
+            && self
+                .peer
+                .as_ref()
+                .is_some_and(|peer| !self.bonded_before_pairing.contains(peer))
+    }
+}
+struct Shared {
+    state: Mutex<State>,
+}
+impl Shared {
+    fn new(peer: Option<String>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            state: Mutex::new(State {
+                peer,
+                pairing_until: None,
+                bonded_before_pairing: HashSet::new(),
+            }),
+        }
+    }
+    fn allowed(&self, address: Address) -> bool {
+        self.state.lock().unwrap().peer.as_deref() == Some(address.to_string().as_str())
+    }
+}
+pub enum Action {
+    Pair(u32),
+    ClosePairing,
+    Forget,
+    Disconnect,
+    Reset,
+}
+enum Command {
+    Report(Report, Vec<u8>),
+    Action(Action),
+    Stop,
+}
+struct Request {
+    command: Command,
+    result: oneshot::Sender<Result<(), String>>,
+    expires: Instant,
+}
+pub struct Peripheral {
+    tx: mpsc::Sender<Request>,
+    status: watch::Receiver<Status>,
+    task: AsyncMutex<Option<tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>>>,
+}
+impl Peripheral {
+    pub fn start(config: Config) -> Result<Self, String> {
+        Self::start_with_store(config, None)
+    }
+    pub fn start_with_store(
+        config: Config,
+        bonds: Option<Arc<dyn bonds::BondStore>>,
+    ) -> Result<Self, String> {
+        config.validate()?;
+        let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(64);
+        let (state_tx, status) = watch::channel(Status {
+            adapter: config.adapter.clone(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        let task = tokio::spawn(supervise(config, bonds, rx, state_tx));
+        Ok(Self {
+            tx,
+            status,
+            task: AsyncMutex::new(Some(task)),
+        })
+    }
+    pub fn status(&self) -> Status {
+        self.status.borrow().clone()
+    }
+    pub fn subscribe(&self) -> watch::Receiver<Status> {
+        self.status.clone()
+    }
+    async fn request(&self, command: Command, duration: Duration) -> Result<(), String> {
+        let (result, rx) = oneshot::channel();
+        let request = Request {
+            command,
+            result,
+            expires: Instant::now() + duration,
+        };
+        self.tx
+            .try_send(request)
+            .map_err(|_| "Bluetooth input queue unavailable or full".to_string())?;
+        tokio::time::timeout(duration, rx)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|_| "Bluetooth operation timed out".to_string())?
+            .map_err(|_| "Bluetooth worker stopped".to_string())?
+    }
+    pub async fn send(&self, report: Report, value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), String> {
+        if value.len() != report.len() {
+            return Err("Invalid HID report size".into());
+        }
+        self.request(Command::Report(report, value), Duration::from_millis(500))
+            .await
+    }
+    pub async fn action(&self, action: Action) -> Result<(), String> {
+        self.request(Command::Action(action), Duration::from_secs(15))
+            .await
+    }
+    pub async fn shutdown(&self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        if let Some(task) = self.task.lock().await.take() {
+            let result = self.request(Command::Stop, Duration::from_secs(45)).await;
+            // Do not abort: the worker must restore the radio before a backend switch.
+            task.await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            result
+        } else {
+            Ok(())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn listen(address: Address, psm: u16) -> Result<SeqPacketListener, String> {
+    let socket = Socket::<SeqPacket>::new_seq_packet().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    socket
+        .set_security(Security {
+            level: SecurityLevel::Medium,
+            key_size: 0,
+        })
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    socket.bind(SocketAddr::new(address,AddressType::BrEdr,psm))
+        .map_err(|e|format!("Cannot bind classic HID PSM 0x{psm:02x}: {e}. Disable BlueZ input plugin; see Bluetooth HID setup."))?;
+    socket.listen(2).map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+struct Runtime {
+    adapter: Adapter,
+    _session: Session,
+    shared: Arc<Shared>,
+    agent: Option<agent::Agent>,
+    controller: controller::Controller,
+    listeners: [SeqPacketListener; 2],
+    channels: [Option<Arc<SeqPacket>>; 2],
+    channel_peer: Option<Address>,
+    partial_since: Option<Instant>,
+    hid: protocol::HidProtocol,
+    generation: u64,
+    old_pairable: bool,
+    old_powered: bool,
+    old_alias: String,
+    old_discoverable: bool,
+    old_discoverable_timeout: u32,
+    old_pairable_timeout: u32,
+    config: Config,
+    bonds: Option<Arc<dyn bonds::BondStore>>,
+    recorded_peer: Option<String>,
+}
+impl Runtime {
+    async fn open(
+        config: &Config,
+        bonds: Option<Arc<dyn bonds::BondStore>>,
+    ) -> Result<Self, String> {
+        let controller = controller::Controller::acquire(&config.adapter).await?;
+        let session = Session::new().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let adapter = session
+            .adapter(&config.adapter)
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let address = adapter.address().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let mut config = config.clone();
+        if let Some(store) = &bonds {
+            bonds::clean_adapter(store.as_ref(), &adapter).await?;
+            if config.peer.is_none() {
+                config.peer = store
+                    .list()
+                    .await?
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .find(|bond| bond.adapter == address.to_string() && !bond.pending)
+                    .map(|bond| bond.peer);
+            }
+        }
+        // Acquire BOTH channels before changing adapter state. Conflict is a startup error.
+        let listeners = [listen(address, 0x11)?, listen(address, 0x13)?];
+        let old_powered = adapter.is_powered().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let old_pairable = adapter.is_pairable().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let old_alias = adapter.alias().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let old_discoverable = adapter.is_discoverable().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let old_discoverable_timeout = adapter
+            .discoverable_timeout()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let old_pairable_timeout = adapter
+            .pairable_timeout()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let shared = Arc::new(Shared::new(
+            config.peer.as_ref().map(|p| p.to_ascii_uppercase()),
+        ));
+        let mut runtime = Self {
+            adapter,
+            _session: session,
+            shared,
+            agent: None,
+            controller,
+            listeners,
+            channels: [None, None],
+            channel_peer: None,
+            partial_since: None,
+            hid: Default::default(),
+            generation: 0,
+            old_pairable,
+            old_powered,
+            old_alias,
+            old_discoverable,
+            old_discoverable_timeout,
+            old_pairable_timeout,
+            config: config.clone(),
+            bonds,
+            recorded_peer: None,
+        };
+        if let Err(e) = runtime.setup().await {
+            let restore = runtime.close().await;
+            return Err(format!("{e}; cleanup: {restore:?}"));
+        }
+        Ok(runtime)
+    }
+    async fn setup(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        self.adapter
+            .set_powered(true)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        self.adapter
+            .set_discoverable(false)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        self.adapter
+            .set_pairable(false)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        self.adapter
+            .set_alias(self.config.name.clone())
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        self.agent =
+            Some(agent::Agent::register(self.shared.clone(), self.config.adapter.clone()).await?);
+        self.controller.configure().await?;
+        self.public(None).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    async fn public(&self, seconds: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), String> {
+        if let Some(seconds) = seconds {
+            self.adapter
+                .set_pairable_timeout(seconds)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            self.adapter
+                .set_discoverable_timeout(seconds)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            self.adapter
+                .set_pairable(true)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            if let Err(e) = self.adapter.set_discoverable(true).await {
+                let _ = self.adapter.set_pairable(false).await;
+                return Err(e.to_string());
+            }
+        } else {
+            self.adapter
+                .set_discoverable(false)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            self.adapter
+                .set_pairable(false)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    fn drop_channels(&mut self) {
+        for socket in self.channels.iter_mut().filter_map(Option::take) {
+            let _ = socket.shutdown(std::net::Shutdown::Both);
+        }
+        self.channel_peer = None;
+        self.partial_since = None;
+        self.hid = Default::default();
+        self.generation = self.generation.wrapping_add(1);
+    }
+    async fn packet(&self, index: usize, data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), String> {
+        let socket = self.channels[index]
+            .as_ref()
+            .ok_or("Classic HID channel not connected")?;
+        let sent = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(250), socket.send(data))
+            .await
+            .map_err(|_| "HID send timeout")?
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        if sent != data.len() {
+            return Err("Short HID packet write".into());
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    async fn release(&mut self) {
+        for packet in self.hid.release() {
+            if self.channels[1].is_some() && self.packet(1, &packet).await.is_err() {
+                self.drop_channels();
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        self.generation = self.generation.wrapping_add(1);
+    }
+    async fn accept(
+        &mut self,
+        index: usize,
+        socket: SeqPacket,
+        peer: SocketAddr,
+    ) -> Result<(), String> {
+        if peer.addr_type != AddressType::BrEdr {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        // A host can open HID channels before the next status poll.
+        let paired = self
+            .adapter
+            .device(peer.addr)
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+            .is_paired()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        self.shared
+            .state
+            .lock()
+            .unwrap()
+            .observe_bond(&peer.addr.to_string(), paired);
+        if !self.shared.allowed(peer.addr) {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        if self.channel_peer.is_some_and(|p| p != peer.addr) || self.channels[index].is_some() {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        // Kernel BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM negotiates encryption before accept completes.
+        if socket
+            .as_ref()
+            .security()
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+            .key_size
+            < 7
+        {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        self.channel_peer = Some(peer.addr);
+        self.channels[index] = Some(Arc::new(socket));
+        if self.channels.iter().all(Option::is_some) {
+            self.partial_since = None;
+            self.release().await;
+        } else {
+            self.partial_since = Some(Instant::now());
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    async fn status(&mut self) -> Result<Status, String> {
+        if !self.adapter.is_powered().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())? {
+            return Err("Bluetooth adapter powered off".into());
+        }
+        // A daemon restart loses the SDP registration even if the adapter comes back powered.
+        if !self
+            .adapter
+            .uuids()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+            .unwrap_or_default()
+            .iter()
+            .any(|id| id.to_string() == protocol::HID_UUID)
+        {
+            return Err("Classic HID SDP registration lost; restarting Bluetooth backend".into());
+        }
+        let mut status = Status {
+            initialized: true,
+            adapter: self.config.adapter.clone(),
+            adapter_address: self
+                .adapter
+                .address()
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                .to_string(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        for address in self
+            .adapter
+            .device_addresses()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+        {
+            let device = self.adapter.device(address).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            let connected = device.is_connected().await.unwrap_or(false);
+            let paired = device.is_paired().await.unwrap_or(false);
+            self.shared
+                .state
+                .lock()
+                .unwrap()
+                .observe_bond(&address.to_string(), paired);
+            if paired || connected {
+                status.devices.push(Device {
+                    address: address.to_string(),
+                    name: device.alias().await.unwrap_or_default(),
+                    paired,
+                    connected,
+                });
+            }
+        }
+        status.devices.sort_by(|a, b| a.address.cmp(&b.address));
+        let (peer, until) = {
+            let state = self.shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+            (state.peer.clone(), state.pairing_until)
+        };
+        status.peer = peer.clone();
+        let selected = status
+            .devices
+            .iter()
+            .find(|device| Some(&device.address) == peer.as_ref());
+        let selected_paired = selected.is_some_and(|device| device.paired);
+        if selected_paired && self.recorded_peer != peer {
+            if let (Some(store), Some(peer)) = (&self.bonds, &peer) {
+                store
+                    .save(bonds::Bond {
+                        adapter: status.adapter_address.clone(),
+                        peer: peer.clone(),
+                        pending: false,
+                    })
+                    .await?;
+                self.recorded_peer = Some(peer.clone());
+            }
+        }
+        status.connected = selected.is_some_and(|device| device.paired && device.connected);
+        if self.channels.iter().any(Option::is_some)
+            && (!status.connected
+                || self
+                    .partial_since
+                    .is_some_and(|time| time.elapsed() > Duration::from_secs(10)))
+        {
+            self.drop_channels();
+        }
+        if let Some(until) = until {
+            let completed = self
+                .shared
+                .state
+                .lock()
+                .unwrap()
+                .pairing_completed(selected_paired);
+            if until <= Instant::now() || completed {
+                {
+                    let mut state = self.shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+                    state.close_pairing(
+                        selected_paired,
+                        self.config.peer.as_ref().map(|p| p.to_ascii_uppercase()),
+                    );
+                    status.peer = state.peer.clone();
+                }
+                self.public(None).await?;
+                tracing::info!(reason = if completed { "bonded" } else { "expired" }, peer = ?status.peer, "Bluetooth HID pairing window closed");
+            } else {
+                status.pairing_seconds =
+                    until.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now()).as_secs() as u32 + 1;
+            }
+        }
+        status.control_connected = self.channels[0].is_some();
+        status.interrupt_connected = self.channels[1].is_some();
+        status.ready = status.connected
+            && status.control_connected
+            && status.interrupt_connected
+            && !self.hid.suspended;
+        status.leds = self.hid.leds;
+        status.generation = self.generation;
+        Ok(status)
+    }
+    async fn forget(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        self.release().await;
+        self.drop_channels();
+        let peer = self.shared.state.lock().unwrap().peer.clone();
+        if let Some(peer) = &peer {
+            let address = peer.parse().map_err(|_| "Invalid peer")?;
+            if self
+                .adapter
+                .device_addresses()
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                .contains(&address)
+            {
+                self.adapter
+                    .remove_device(address)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            }
+            self.shared
+                .state
+                .lock()
+                .unwrap()
+                .bonded_before_pairing
+                .remove(peer);
+            tracing::info!(%peer, "Bluetooth HID forgot computer");
+        }
+        if let Some(store) = &self.bonds {
+            let address = self
+                .adapter
+                .address()
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                .to_string();
+            for bond in store
+                .list()
+                .await?
+                .into_iter()
+                .filter(|b| b.adapter == address && Some(&b.peer) == peer.as_ref())
+            {
+                store.remove(bond).await?;
+            }
+        }
+        self.recorded_peer = None;
+        self.config.peer = None;
+        self.shared.state.lock().unwrap().peer = None;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    async fn incoming(&mut self, index: usize, data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), String> {
+        if index == 1 {
+            self.hid.output(data);
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        let result = self.hid.control(data);
+        if let Some(reply) = result.reply {
+            self.packet(0, &reply).await?;
+        }
+        if result.reset {
+            self.release().await;
+        }
+        if result.unplug {
+            self.forget().await?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    async fn execute(&mut self, command: Command) -> Result<(), String> {
+        match command {
+            Command::Report(kind, value) => {
+                let peer = self.channel_peer.ok_or("Classic HID is not connected")?;
+                if !self.shared.allowed(peer) || self.channels.iter().any(Option::is_none) {
+                    return Err("Classic HID channels are not ready".into());
+                }
+                let device = self.adapter.device(peer).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+                if !device.is_paired().await.unwrap_or(false)
+                    || !device.is_connected().await.unwrap_or(false)
+                {
+                    self.drop_channels();
+                    return Err("Selected Bluetooth computer disconnected".into());
+                }
+                let packet = self.hid.input(kind, &value)?;
+                if let Err(e) = self.packet(1, &packet).await {
+                    self.drop_channels();
+                    return Err(e);
+                }
+            }
+            Command::Action(Action::Pair(seconds)) => {
+                if !(10..=300).contains(&seconds) {
+                    return Err("Pairing window must be 10–300 seconds".into());
+                }
+                let mut bonded = HashSet::new();
+                for address in self
+                    .adapter
+                    .device_addresses()
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                {
+                    if self
+                        .adapter
+                        .device(address)
+                        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                        .is_paired()
+                        .await
+                        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                    {
+                        bonded.insert(address.to_string());
+                    }
+                }
+                {
+                    let mut state = self.shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+                    // Preserve the original baseline when extending an open window.
+                    if !state
+                        .pairing_until
+                        .is_some_and(|until| until > Instant::now())
+                    {
+                        state.bonded_before_pairing = bonded;
+                    }
+                    state.pairing_until =
+                        Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(seconds.into()));
+                }
+                if let Err(e) = self.public(Some(seconds)).await {
+                    self.shared.state.lock().unwrap().pairing_until = None;
+                    return Err(e);
+                }
+                tracing::info!(seconds, "Bluetooth HID pairing window opened");
+            }
+            Command::Action(Action::ClosePairing) => {
+                self.public(None).await?;
+                let peer = self.shared.state.lock().unwrap().peer.clone();
+                let paired = if let Some(peer) = peer {
+                    self.adapter
+                        .device(peer.parse().map_err(|_| "Invalid HID peer")?)
+                        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                        .is_paired()
+                        .await
+                        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                } else {
+                    false
+                };
+                self.shared
+                    .state
+                    .lock()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .close_pairing(paired, self.config.peer.clone());
+                tracing::info!(reason = "manual", "Bluetooth HID pairing window closed");
+            }
+            Command::Action(Action::Forget) => self.forget().await?,
+            Command::Action(Action::Disconnect) => {
+                self.release().await;
+                self.drop_channels();
+                let peer = self.shared.state.lock().unwrap().peer.clone();
+                if let Some(peer) = peer {
+                    self.adapter
+                        .device(peer.parse().map_err(|_| "Invalid peer")?)
+                        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                        .disconnect()
+                        .await
+                        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+                }
+            }
+            Command::Action(Action::Reset) => self.release().await,
+            Command::Stop => {}
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    async fn close(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+        self.release().await;
+        self.drop_channels();
+        self.agent.take();
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
+        let mut errors = vec![];
+        if let Err(e) = self.adapter.set_discoverable(false).await {
+            errors.push(e.to_string());
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = self.controller.restore().await {
+            errors.push(e);
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = self.adapter.set_alias(self.old_alias.clone()).await {
+            errors.push(e.to_string());
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = self
+            .adapter
+            .set_discoverable_timeout(self.old_discoverable_timeout)
+            .await
+        {
+            errors.push(e.to_string());
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = self
+            .adapter
+            .set_pairable_timeout(self.old_pairable_timeout)
+            .await
+        {
+            errors.push(e.to_string());
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = self.adapter.set_pairable(self.old_pairable).await {
+            errors.push(e.to_string());
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = self.adapter.set_discoverable(self.old_discoverable).await {
+            errors.push(e.to_string());
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = self.adapter.set_powered(self.old_powered).await {
+            errors.push(e.to_string());
+        }
+        if errors.is_empty() {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(errors.join("; "))
+        }
+    }
+}
+async fn receive(socket: Option<Arc<SeqPacket>>, buffer: &mut [u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
+    match socket {
+        Some(socket) => socket.recv(buffer).await,
+        None => std::future::pending().await,
+    }
+}
+async fn supervise(
+    config: Config,
+    bonds: Option<Arc<dyn bonds::BondStore>>,
+    mut rx: mpsc::Receiver<Request>,
+    tx: watch::Sender<Status>,
+) {
+    let mut generation = 0;
+    loop {
+        let mut runtime = match Runtime::open(&config, bonds.clone()).await {
+            Ok(runtime) => runtime,
+            Err(error) => {
+                tx.send_replace(Status {
+                    adapter: config.adapter.clone(),
+                    error: Some(error.clone()),
+                    generation,
+                    ..Default::default()
+                });
+                let delay = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(5));
+                tokio::pin!(delay);
+                loop {
+                    tokio::select! {_=&mut delay=>break,request=rx.recv()=>{
+                        let Some(request)=request else{return;};
+                        if matches!(request.command,Command::Stop){let _=request.result.send(Ok(()));return;}
+                        let _=request.result.send(Err(error.clone()));
+                    }}
+                }
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        runtime.generation = generation;
+        let mut timer = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_millis(500));
+        let failure = loop {
+            let ctl = runtime.channels[0].clone();
+            let intr = runtime.channels[1].clone();
+            let mut ctl_buffer = [0; 1024];
+            let mut intr_buffer = [0; 1024];
+            tokio::select! {
+                accepted=runtime.listeners[0].accept()=>{match accepted{Ok((socket,peer))=>{if let Err(e)=runtime.accept(0,socket,peer).await{break e;}},Err(e)=>break e.to_string()}}
+                accepted=runtime.listeners[1].accept()=>{match accepted{Ok((socket,peer))=>{if let Err(e)=runtime.accept(1,socket,peer).await{break e;}},Err(e)=>break e.to_string()}}
+                read=receive(ctl,&mut ctl_buffer)=>{match read{Ok(n)if n>0=>{if runtime.incoming(0,&ctl_buffer[..n]).await.is_err(){runtime.drop_channels();}},_=>runtime.drop_channels()}}
+                read=receive(intr,&mut intr_buffer)=>{match read{Ok(n)if n>0=>{if runtime.incoming(1,&intr_buffer[..n]).await.is_err(){runtime.drop_channels();}},_=>runtime.drop_channels()}}
+                _=timer.tick()=>{match runtime.status().await{Ok(status)=>{tx.send_if_modified(|old|{if *old!=status{*old=status;true}else{false}});},Err(e)=>break e}}
+                request=rx.recv()=>{
+                    let Some(request)=request else{let _=runtime.close().await;return;};
+                    if matches!(request.command,Command::Stop){let result=runtime.close().await;tx.send_replace(Status{adapter:config.adapter.clone(),..Default::default()});let _=request.result.send(result);return;}
+                    if request.expires<=Instant::now()||request.result.is_closed(){runtime.release().await;continue;}
+                    let action = matches!(&request.command, Command::Action(_));
+                    let result=runtime.execute(request.command).await;
+                    if result.is_err(){runtime.release().await;}
+                    if action {
+                        if let Ok(status) = runtime.status().await { tx.send_replace(status); }
+                    }
+                    let _=request.result.send(result);
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        let restore = runtime.close().await;
+        generation = runtime.generation.wrapping_add(1);
+        tx.send_replace(Status {
+            adapter: config.adapter.clone(),
+            error: Some(format!("{failure}; cleanup: {restore:?}")),
+            generation,
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+        drop(runtime);
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
+    }
+}
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[test]
+    fn closing_pairing_preserves_completed_bonds_but_releases_unpaired_targets() {
+        let shared = Shared::new(Some("10:6F:D9:66:97:88".into()));
+        let mut state = shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+        state.pairing_until = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(120));
+        state.close_pairing(true, None);
+        assert_eq!(state.peer.as_deref(), Some("10:6F:D9:66:97:88"));
+        assert!(state.pairing_until.is_none());
+        state.close_pairing(false, None);
+        assert!(state.peer.is_none());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn configuration_validation() {
+        let mut c = Config {
+            adapter: "hci0".into(),
+            name: "One-KVM".into(),
+            peer: None,
+        };
+        assert!(c.validate().is_ok());
+        c.adapter = "hci0;reboot".into();
+        assert!(c.validate().is_err());
+        c.adapter = "hci1".into();
+        c.peer = Some("bogus".into());
+        assert!(c.validate().is_err());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn peer_isolation() {
+        let state = Shared::new(Some("10:6F:D9:66:97:88".into()));
+        assert!(state.allowed("10:6F:D9:66:97:88".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(!state.allowed("10:6F:D9:66:97:89".parse().unwrap()));
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn new_bond_without_agent_callback_completes_pairing() {
+        let shared = Shared::new(None);
+        let mut state = shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+        state.pairing_until = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(120));
+        let peer = "10:6F:D9:66:97:88";
+        state.observe_bond(peer, false);
+        assert_eq!(state.peer, None);
+        state.observe_bond(peer, true);
+        assert_eq!(state.peer.as_deref(), Some(peer));
+        assert!(state.pairing_completed(true));
+        // A second computer cannot replace the one selected in this window.
+        state.observe_bond("10:6F:D9:66:97:89", true);
+        assert_eq!(state.peer.as_deref(), Some(peer));
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn old_bond_does_not_finish_a_new_window() {
+        let peer = "10:6F:D9:66:97:88";
+        let shared = Shared::new(Some(peer.into()));
+        let mut state = shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+        state.pairing_until = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(120));
+        state.bonded_before_pairing.insert(peer.into());
+        state.observe_bond(peer, true);
+        assert!(!state.pairing_completed(true));
+        state.peer = None;
+        state.observe_bond(peer, true);
+        assert_eq!(state.peer, None);
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn bond_observation_respects_closed_window_and_pinned_peer() {
+        let peer = "10:6F:D9:66:97:88";
+        let shared = Shared::new(None);
+        let mut state = shared.state.lock().unwrap();
+        state.observe_bond(peer, true);
+        assert_eq!(state.peer, None);
+        state.pairing_until = Some(Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(1));
+        state.observe_bond(peer, true);
+        assert_eq!(state.peer, None);
+        state.pairing_until = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(120));
+        state.peer = Some("10:6F:D9:66:97:89".into());
+        state.observe_bond(peer, true);
+        assert_eq!(state.peer.as_deref(), Some("10:6F:D9:66:97:89"));
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize)]
+pub struct AdapterInfo {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub address: String,
+    pub powered: bool,
+}
+pub async fn adapters() -> Result<Vec<AdapterInfo>, String> {
+    let session = Session::new().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    let mut output = vec![];
+    for name in session.adapter_names().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())? {
+        let adapter = session.adapter(&name).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        output.push(AdapterInfo {
+            name,
+            address: adapter
+                .address()
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                .to_string(),
+            powered: adapter.is_powered().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?,
+        });
+    }
+    Ok(output)
+}

libs/bluetooth-hid/src/protocol.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+//! Classic HIDP framing and report descriptor.
+use crate::Report;
+pub const MAP: &[u8] = &[
+    0x05, 0x01, 0x09, 0x06, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x85, 0x01, 0x05, 0x07, 0x19, 0xe0, 0x29, 0xe7, 0x15, 0x00,
+    0x25, 0x01, 0x75, 0x01, 0x95, 0x08, 0x81, 0x02, 0x95, 0x01, 0x75, 0x08, 0x81, 0x01, 0x95, 0x05,
+    0x75, 0x01, 0x05, 0x08, 0x19, 0x01, 0x29, 0x05, 0x91, 0x02, 0x95, 0x01, 0x75, 0x03, 0x91, 0x01,
+    0x95, 0x06, 0x75, 0x08, 0x15, 0x00, 0x25, 0x65, 0x05, 0x07, 0x19, 0x00, 0x29, 0x65, 0x81, 0x00,
+    0xc0, 0x05, 0x01, 0x09, 0x02, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x85, 0x02, 0x09, 0x01, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x05, 0x09, 0x19,
+    0x01, 0x29, 0x05, 0x15, 0x00, 0x25, 0x01, 0x95, 0x05, 0x75, 0x01, 0x81, 0x02, 0x95, 0x01, 0x75,
+    0x03, 0x81, 0x01, 0x05, 0x01, 0x09, 0x30, 0x09, 0x31, 0x09, 0x38, 0x15, 0x81, 0x25, 0x7f, 0x75,
+    0x08, 0x95, 0x03, 0x81, 0x06, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0x05, 0x0c, 0x09, 0x01, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x85, 0x03, 0x15,
+    0x00, 0x26, 0xff, 0x03, 0x19, 0x00, 0x2a, 0xff, 0x03, 0x75, 0x10, 0x95, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0xc0,
+];
+
+pub const HID_UUID: &str = "00001124-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb";
+pub fn sdp() -> String {
+    let hex: String = MAP.iter().map(|byte| format!("{byte:02x}")).collect();
+    format!(
+        r#"<?xml version="1.0"?>
+<record>
+  <attribute id="0x0001"><sequence><uuid value="0x1124"/></sequence></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0004"><sequence><sequence><uuid value="0x0100"/><uint16 value="0x0011"/></sequence><sequence><uuid value="0x0011"/></sequence></sequence></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0005"><sequence><uuid value="0x1002"/></sequence></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0006"><sequence><uint16 value="0x656e"/><uint16 value="0x006a"/><uint16 value="0x0100"/></sequence></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0009"><sequence><sequence><uuid value="0x1124"/><uint16 value="0x0100"/></sequence></sequence></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x000d"><sequence><sequence><sequence><uuid value="0x0100"/><uint16 value="0x0013"/></sequence><sequence><uuid value="0x0011"/></sequence></sequence></sequence></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0100"><text value="One-KVM Keyboard and Mouse"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0101"><text value="Classic Bluetooth HID"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0102"><text value="One-KVM"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0200"><uint16 value="0x0100"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0201"><uint16 value="0x0111"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0202"><uint8 value="0xc0"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0203"><uint8 value="0x00"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0204"><boolean value="false"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0205"><boolean value="false"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0206"><sequence><sequence><uint8 value="0x22"/><text encoding="hex" value="{hex}"/></sequence></sequence></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0207"><sequence><sequence><uint16 value="0x0409"/><uint16 value="0x0100"/></sequence></sequence></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x0209"><boolean value="false"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x020a"><boolean value="false"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x020b"><uint16 value="0x0100"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x020c"><uint16 value="0x0c80"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x020d"><boolean value="true"/></attribute>
+  <attribute id="0x020e"><boolean value="true"/></attribute>
+</record>"#
+    )
+}
+#[derive(Debug, Default)]
+pub struct HidProtocol {
+    pub boot: bool,
+    pub suspended: bool,
+    pub leds: u8,
+    pub keyboard: [u8; 8],
+    pub buttons: u8,
+    pub consumer: [u8; 2],
+}
+#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ControlResult {
+    pub reply: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub unplug: bool,
+    pub reset: bool,
+}
+impl HidProtocol {
+    pub fn input(&mut self, kind: Report, value: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
+        if value.len() != kind.len() {
+            return Err("Invalid HID report length".into());
+        }
+        if self.suspended {
+            return Err("Bluetooth HID is suspended".into());
+        }
+        let mut packet = vec![0xa1, kind.id()];
+        match kind {
+            Report::Keyboard => {
+                self.keyboard.copy_from_slice(value);
+                packet.extend_from_slice(value);
+            }
+            Report::Mouse => {
+                self.buttons = value[0];
+                packet.extend_from_slice(&value[..if self.boot { 3 } else { 4 }]);
+                if self.boot {
+                    packet[2] &= 7;
+                }
+            }
+            Report::Consumer if !self.boot => {
+                self.consumer.copy_from_slice(value);
+                packet.extend_from_slice(value);
+            }
+            Report::Consumer => return Err("Consumer keys unavailable in boot protocol".into()),
+        }
+        Ok(packet)
+    }
+    pub fn release(&mut self) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.keyboard = [0; 8];
+        self.buttons = 0;
+        self.consumer = [0; 2];
+        let mut packets = vec![
+            vec![0xa1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+            if self.boot {
+                vec![0xa1, 2, 0, 0, 0]
+            } else {
+                vec![0xa1, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0]
+            },
+        ];
+        if !self.boot {
+            packets.push(vec![0xa1, 3, 0, 0]);
+        }
+        packets
+    }
+    pub fn output(&mut self, data: &[u8]) -> bool {
+        if data.len() == 3 && data[0] == 0xa2 && data[1] == 1 {
+            self.leds = data[2] & 0x1f;
+            true
+        } else {
+            false
+        }
+    }
+    pub fn control(&mut self, data: &[u8]) -> ControlResult {
+        let mut result = ControlResult::default();
+        let handshake = |code| ControlResult {
+            reply: Some(vec![code]),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let Some(&header) = data.first() else {
+            return handshake(4);
+        };
+        match header {
+            0x13 if data.len() == 1 => {
+                self.suspended = true;
+                result.reset = true;
+            }
+            0x14 if data.len() == 1 => {
+                self.suspended = false;
+                result.reset = true;
+            }
+            0x15 if data.len() == 1 => {
+                result.unplug = true;
+            }
+            0x11 | 0x12 if data.len() == 1 => {
+                self.suspended = false;
+                result.reset = true;
+            }
+            0x60 if data.len() == 1 => {
+                result.reply = Some(vec![0xa0, if self.boot { 0 } else { 1 }]);
+            }
+            0x70 | 0x71 if data.len() == 1 => {
+                self.boot = header == 0x70;
+                result.reply = Some(vec![0]);
+                result.reset = true;
+            }
+            0x52 if data.len() == 3 && data[1] == 1 => {
+                self.leds = data[2] & 0x1f;
+                return handshake(0);
+            }
+            0x41 | 0x49 | 0x42 | 0x4a => {
+                let sized = header & 8 != 0;
+                if data.len() != if sized { 4 } else { 2 } {
+                    return handshake(4);
+                }
+                let mut report = vec![0xa0 | (header & 3), data[1]];
+                match (header & 3, data[1]) {
+                    (1, 1) => report.extend(self.keyboard),
+                    (1, 2) => report.extend(if self.boot {
+                        vec![self.buttons & 7, 0, 0]
+                    } else {
+                        vec![self.buttons, 0, 0, 0]
+                    }),
+                    (1, 3) if !self.boot => report.extend(self.consumer),
+                    (2, 1) => report.push(self.leds),
+                    _ => return handshake(2),
+                }
+                if sized {
+                    report.truncate(1 + u16::from_le_bytes([data[2], data[3]]) as usize);
+                }
+                result.reply = Some(report);
+            }
+            _ => return handshake(3), // ERR_UNSUPPORTED_REQUEST
+        }
+        result
+    }
+}
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[test]
+    fn classic_frames_and_boot_protocol() {
+        let mut hid = HidProtocol::default();
+        assert_eq!(
+            hid.input(Report::Keyboard, &[2, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0])
+                .unwrap(),
+            [0xa1, 1, 2, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
+        );
+        assert_eq!(hid.control(&[0x60]).reply.unwrap(), [0xa0, 1]);
+        assert_eq!(hid.control(&[0x70]).reply.unwrap(), [0]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            hid.input(Report::Mouse, &[0x1f, 127, 128, 1]).unwrap(),
+            [0xa1, 2, 7, 127, 128]
+        );
+        assert!(hid.input(Report::Consumer, &[0, 0]).is_err());
+        assert!(hid.input(Report::Keyboard, &[0]).is_err());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn led_read_write_and_errors() {
+        let mut hid = HidProtocol::default();
+        assert!(hid.output(&[0xa2, 1, 3]));
+        assert_eq!(hid.leds, 3);
+        assert_eq!(hid.control(&[0x42, 1]).reply.unwrap(), [0xa2, 1, 3]);
+        assert_eq!(hid.control(&[0x52, 1, 2]).reply.unwrap(), [0]);
+        assert_eq!(hid.leds, 2);
+        assert_eq!(hid.control(&[0x41, 99]).reply.unwrap(), [2]);
+        assert_eq!(hid.control(&[0x41]).reply.unwrap(), [4]);
+        assert_eq!(hid.control(&[0x90, 0]).reply.unwrap(), [3]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            hid.control(&[0x49, 1, 3, 0]).reply.unwrap(),
+            [0xa1, 1, 0, 0]
+        );
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn suspend_reset_and_virtual_unplug() {
+        let mut hid = HidProtocol::default();
+        assert!(hid.control(&[0x13]).reset);
+        assert!(hid.input(Report::Mouse, &[0; 4]).is_err());
+        assert!(hid.control(&[0x14]).reset);
+        assert!(hid.input(Report::Mouse, &[0; 4]).is_ok());
+        assert!(hid.control(&[0x15]).unplug);
+        hid.keyboard[2] = 4;
+        hid.buttons = 1;
+        assert_eq!(hid.release().len(), 3);
+        assert_eq!(hid.keyboard, [0; 8]);
+        assert_eq!(hid.buttons, 0);
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn sdp_describes_both_classic_channels() {
+        let record = sdp();
+        assert!(record.contains("uuid value=\"0x1124\""));
+        assert!(record.contains("uint16 value=\"0x0011\""));
+        assert!(record.contains("uint16 value=\"0x0013\""));
+        assert!(!record.contains("0x1812"));
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn descriptor_report_sizes() {
+        let (mut pos, mut size, mut count, mut id, mut depth) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+        let mut input = [0; 4];
+        let mut output = [0; 4];
+        while pos < MAP.len() {
+            let prefix = MAP[pos];
+            pos += 1;
+            let length = [0, 1, 2, 4][(prefix & 3) as usize];
+            let mut value = 0;
+            for i in 0..length {
+                value |= (MAP[pos + i] as usize) << (8 * i);
+            }
+            pos += length;
+            match ((prefix >> 2) & 3, prefix >> 4) {
+                (1, 7) => size = value,
+                (1, 8) => id = value,
+                (1, 9) => count = value,
+                (0, 8) => input[id] += size * count,
+                (0, 9) => output[id] += size * count,
+                (0, 10) => depth += 1,
+                (0, 12) => depth -= 1,
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+        assert_eq!(depth, 0);
+        assert_eq!(input, [0, 64, 32, 16]);
+        assert_eq!(output, [0, 8, 0, 0]);
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+# THIS FILE IS AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED BY CARGO
+#
+# When uploading crates to the registry Cargo will automatically
+# "normalize" Cargo.toml files for maximal compatibility
+# with all versions of Cargo and also rewrite `path` dependencies
+# to registry (e.g., crates.io) dependencies.
+#
+# If you are reading this file be aware that the original Cargo.toml
+# will likely look very different (and much more reasonable).
+# See Cargo.toml.orig for the original contents.
+
+[package]
+edition = "2021"
+name = "dtls"
+version = "0.17.2"
+authors = ["Rain Liu <yliu@webrtc.rs>"]
+build = false
+autolib = false
+autobins = false
+autoexamples = false
+autotests = false
+autobenches = false
+description = "A pure Rust implementation of DTLS"
+homepage = "https://webrtc.rs"
+documentation = "https://docs.rs/dtls"
+readme = "README.md"
+license = "MIT/Apache-2.0"
+repository = "https://github.com/webrtc-rs/webrtc/tree/master/dtls"
+
+[features]
+pem = ["dep:pem"]
+
+[lib]
+name = "dtls"
+path = "src/lib.rs"
+
+[dependencies.aes]
+version = "0.8"
+
+[dependencies.aes-gcm]
+version = "0.10"
+
+[dependencies.async-trait]
+version = "0.1"
+
+[dependencies.bytecheck]
+version = "0.8"
+
+[dependencies.byteorder]
+version = "1"
+
+[dependencies.cbc]
+version = "0.1"
+features = [
+    "block-padding",
+    "alloc",
+]
+
+[dependencies.ccm]
+version = "0.5"
+
+[dependencies.chacha20poly1305]
+version = "0.10.1"
+
+[dependencies.der-parser]
+version = "9.0"
+
+[dependencies.hmac]
+version = "0.12"
+
+[dependencies.log]
+version = "0.4"
+
+[dependencies.p256]
+version = "0.13"
+features = [
+    "default",
+    "ecdh",
+    "ecdsa",
+]
+
+[dependencies.p384]
+version = "0.13"
+
+[dependencies.pem]
+version = "3"
+optional = true
+
+[dependencies.portable-atomic]
+version = "1.6"
+
+[dependencies.rand]
+version = "0.9"
+
+[dependencies.rand_core]
+version = "0.6"
+
+[dependencies.rcgen]
+version = "0.13"
+
+[dependencies.ring]
+version = "0.17.14"
+
+[dependencies.rkyv]
+version = "0.8"
+
+[dependencies.openssl]
+version = "0.10"
+features = ["vendored"]
+
+[dependencies.rustls-pki-types]
+version = "1"
+
+[dependencies.sec1]
+version = "0.7"
+features = ["std"]
+
+[dependencies.sha1]
+version = "0.10"
+
+[dependencies.sha2]
+version = "0.10"
+
+[dependencies.thiserror]
+version = "1"
+
+[dependencies.tokio]
+version = "1.32.0"
+features = [
+    "fs",
+    "io-util",
+    "io-std",
+    "macros",
+    "net",
+    "parking_lot",
+    "rt",
+    "rt-multi-thread",
+    "sync",
+    "time",
+]
+
+[dependencies.util]
+version = "0.17.1"
+features = ["conn"]
+default-features = false
+package = "webrtc-util"
+
+[dependencies.x25519-dalek]
+version = "2"
+features = ["static_secrets"]
+
+[dependencies.x509-parser]
+version = "0.16"
+
+[dev-dependencies]

libs/dtls/LICENSE-APACHE

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+                              Apache License
+                        Version 2.0, January 2004
+                     http://www.apache.org/licenses/
+
+TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
+
+1. Definitions.
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+
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+
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+   any Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the Work
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+   Contributor provides its Contributions) on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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+   whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise,
+   unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly
+   negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall any Contributor be
+   liable to You for damages, including any direct, indirect, special,
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+   of any other Contributor, and only if You agree to indemnify,
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+
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+
+   To apply the Apache License to your work, attach the following
+   boilerplate notice, with the fields enclosed by brackets "[]"
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+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.

libs/dtls/LICENSE-MIT

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2021 WebRTC.rs
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

libs/dtls/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# DTLS certificate verification backend
+
+This directory contains `dtls` 0.17.2 from the crates.io release of webrtc-rs.
+The original MIT and Apache-2.0 licenses are preserved.
+
+One-KVM patches only certificate-chain verification and its configuration to
+use vendored OpenSSL instead of rustls/WebPKI. DTLS flights, record protection,
+certificate signatures, SRTP negotiation and the application fingerprint check
+remain unchanged. `rustls-pki-types` remains a certificate-data representation,
+not a TLS implementation.
+
+`certificate_verifier.rs` implements trust-anchor, purpose, certificate-validity
+and DNS/IP identity checks. Server names do not fall back to the certificate
+subject, and partial-label wildcards are rejected. No trust checks are skipped
+by this backend. The upstream application-controlled `insecure_skip_verify`
+policy is preserved, including WebRTC's separate certificate fingerprint check.
+Authentication security level 2 rejects weak RSA keys and SHA-1 leaf signatures.
+
+Run `cargo test --manifest-path libs/dtls/Cargo.toml --lib` after updating this
+fork, and verify the application dependency tree contains no `rustls` engine.

libs/dtls/src/alert/alert_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::error::Error;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_alert() -> Result<()> {
+    let tests = vec![
+        (
+            "Valid Alert",
+            vec![0x02, 0x0A],
+            Alert {
+                alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                alert_description: AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage,
+            },
+            None,
+        ),
+        (
+            "Invalid alert length",
+            vec![0x00],
+            Alert {
+                alert_level: AlertLevel::Invalid,
+                alert_description: AlertDescription::Invalid,
+            },
+            Some(Error::Other("io".to_owned())),
+        ),
+    ];
+
+    for (name, data, wanted, unmarshal_error) in tests {
+        let mut reader = BufReader::new(data.as_slice());
+        let result = Alert::unmarshal(&mut reader);
+
+        if let Some(err) = unmarshal_error {
+            assert!(result.is_err(), "{name} expected error: {err}");
+        } else if let Ok(alert) = result {
+            assert_eq!(wanted, alert, "{name} expected {wanted}, but got {alert}");
+
+            let mut data2: Vec<u8> = vec![];
+            {
+                let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(data2.as_mut());
+                alert.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+            }
+            assert_eq!(data, data2, "{name} expected {data:?}, but got {data2:?}");
+        } else {
+            assert!(result.is_ok(), "{name} expected Ok, but has error");
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/alert/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod alert_test;
+
+use std::fmt;
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use super::content::*;
+use crate::error::Result;
+
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
+pub(crate) enum AlertLevel {
+    Warning = 1,
+    Fatal = 2,
+    Invalid,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for AlertLevel {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match *self {
+            AlertLevel::Warning => write!(f, "LevelWarning"),
+            AlertLevel::Fatal => write!(f, "LevelFatal"),
+            _ => write!(f, "Invalid alert level"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<u8> for AlertLevel {
+    fn from(val: u8) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            1 => AlertLevel::Warning,
+            2 => AlertLevel::Fatal,
+            _ => AlertLevel::Invalid,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
+pub(crate) enum AlertDescription {
+    CloseNotify = 0,
+    UnexpectedMessage = 10,
+    BadRecordMac = 20,
+    DecryptionFailed = 21,
+    RecordOverflow = 22,
+    DecompressionFailure = 30,
+    HandshakeFailure = 40,
+    NoCertificate = 41,
+    BadCertificate = 42,
+    UnsupportedCertificate = 43,
+    CertificateRevoked = 44,
+    CertificateExpired = 45,
+    CertificateUnknown = 46,
+    IllegalParameter = 47,
+    UnknownCa = 48,
+    AccessDenied = 49,
+    DecodeError = 50,
+    DecryptError = 51,
+    ExportRestriction = 60,
+    ProtocolVersion = 70,
+    InsufficientSecurity = 71,
+    InternalError = 80,
+    UserCanceled = 90,
+    NoRenegotiation = 100,
+    UnsupportedExtension = 110,
+    UnknownPskIdentity = 115,
+    Invalid,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for AlertDescription {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match *self {
+            AlertDescription::CloseNotify => write!(f, "CloseNotify"),
+            AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage => write!(f, "UnexpectedMessage"),
+            AlertDescription::BadRecordMac => write!(f, "BadRecordMac"),
+            AlertDescription::DecryptionFailed => write!(f, "DecryptionFailed"),
+            AlertDescription::RecordOverflow => write!(f, "RecordOverflow"),
+            AlertDescription::DecompressionFailure => write!(f, "DecompressionFailure"),
+            AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure => write!(f, "HandshakeFailure"),
+            AlertDescription::NoCertificate => write!(f, "NoCertificate"),
+            AlertDescription::BadCertificate => write!(f, "BadCertificate"),
+            AlertDescription::UnsupportedCertificate => write!(f, "UnsupportedCertificate"),
+            AlertDescription::CertificateRevoked => write!(f, "CertificateRevoked"),
+            AlertDescription::CertificateExpired => write!(f, "CertificateExpired"),
+            AlertDescription::CertificateUnknown => write!(f, "CertificateUnknown"),
+            AlertDescription::IllegalParameter => write!(f, "IllegalParameter"),
+            AlertDescription::UnknownCa => write!(f, "UnknownCA"),
+            AlertDescription::AccessDenied => write!(f, "AccessDenied"),
+            AlertDescription::DecodeError => write!(f, "DecodeError"),
+            AlertDescription::DecryptError => write!(f, "DecryptError"),
+            AlertDescription::ExportRestriction => write!(f, "ExportRestriction"),
+            AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion => write!(f, "ProtocolVersion"),
+            AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity => write!(f, "InsufficientSecurity"),
+            AlertDescription::InternalError => write!(f, "InternalError"),
+            AlertDescription::UserCanceled => write!(f, "UserCanceled"),
+            AlertDescription::NoRenegotiation => write!(f, "NoRenegotiation"),
+            AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension => write!(f, "UnsupportedExtension"),
+            AlertDescription::UnknownPskIdentity => write!(f, "UnknownPskIdentity"),
+            _ => write!(f, "Invalid alert description"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<u8> for AlertDescription {
+    fn from(val: u8) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            0 => AlertDescription::CloseNotify,
+            10 => AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage,
+            20 => AlertDescription::BadRecordMac,
+            21 => AlertDescription::DecryptionFailed,
+            22 => AlertDescription::RecordOverflow,
+            30 => AlertDescription::DecompressionFailure,
+            40 => AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure,
+            41 => AlertDescription::NoCertificate,
+            42 => AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+            43 => AlertDescription::UnsupportedCertificate,
+            44 => AlertDescription::CertificateRevoked,
+            45 => AlertDescription::CertificateExpired,
+            46 => AlertDescription::CertificateUnknown,
+            47 => AlertDescription::IllegalParameter,
+            48 => AlertDescription::UnknownCa,
+            49 => AlertDescription::AccessDenied,
+            50 => AlertDescription::DecodeError,
+            51 => AlertDescription::DecryptError,
+            60 => AlertDescription::ExportRestriction,
+            70 => AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion,
+            71 => AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+            80 => AlertDescription::InternalError,
+            90 => AlertDescription::UserCanceled,
+            100 => AlertDescription::NoRenegotiation,
+            110 => AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension,
+            115 => AlertDescription::UnknownPskIdentity,
+            _ => AlertDescription::Invalid,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// One of the content types supported by the TLS record layer is the
+// alert type.  Alert messages convey the severity of the message
+// (warning or fatal) and a description of the alert.  Alert messages
+// with a level of fatal result in the immediate termination of the
+// connection.  In this case, other connections corresponding to the
+// session may continue, but the session identifier MUST be invalidated,
+// preventing the failed session from being used to establish new
+// connections.  Like other messages, alert messages are encrypted and
+// compressed, as specified by the current connection state.
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 5246 §7.2]
+///
+/// [RFC 5246 §7.2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
+pub struct Alert {
+    pub(crate) alert_level: AlertLevel,
+    pub(crate) alert_description: AlertDescription,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for Alert {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "Alert {}: {}", self.alert_level, self.alert_description)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Alert {
+    pub fn content_type(&self) -> ContentType {
+        ContentType::Alert
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        2
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u8(self.alert_level as u8)?;
+        writer.write_u8(self.alert_description as u8)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let alert_level = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+        let alert_description = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+
+        Ok(Alert {
+            alert_level,
+            alert_description,
+        })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/application_data.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use super::content::*;
+use crate::error::Result;
+
+// Application data messages are carried by the record layer and are
+// fragmented, compressed, and encrypted based on the current connection
+// state.  The messages are treated as transparent data to the record
+// layer.
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 5246 §10]
+///
+/// [RFC 5246 §10]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-10
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct ApplicationData {
+    pub data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl ApplicationData {
+    pub fn content_type(&self) -> ContentType {
+        ContentType::ApplicationData
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        self.data.len()
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_all(&self.data)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut data: Vec<u8> = vec![];
+        reader.read_to_end(&mut data)?;
+
+        Ok(ApplicationData { data })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/certificate_verifier.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+use openssl::stack::Stack;
+use openssl::x509::store::X509StoreBuilder;
+use openssl::x509::verify::{X509CheckFlags, X509VerifyParam};
+use openssl::x509::{X509PurposeId, X509StoreContext, X509};
+use rustls_pki_types::{CertificateDer, ServerName};
+
+use crate::error::{Error, Result};
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
+pub struct RootCertStore {
+    certificates: Vec<X509>,
+}
+
+impl RootCertStore {
+    pub fn empty() -> Self {
+        Self::default()
+    }
+
+    pub fn add(&mut self, certificate: CertificateDer<'_>) -> Result<()> {
+        self.certificates
+            .push(X509::from_der(certificate.as_ref()).map_err(openssl_error)?);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct CertificateVerifier {
+    roots: RootCertStore,
+}
+
+impl CertificateVerifier {
+    pub(crate) fn new(roots: RootCertStore) -> Self {
+        Self { roots }
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn verify_client_cert(
+        &self,
+        end_entity: &CertificateDer<'_>,
+        intermediates: &[CertificateDer<'_>],
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        self.verify(end_entity, intermediates, X509PurposeId::SSL_CLIENT, None)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn verify_server_cert(
+        &self,
+        end_entity: &CertificateDer<'_>,
+        intermediates: &[CertificateDer<'_>],
+        server_name: &str,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        ServerName::try_from(server_name).map_err(|error| Error::Other(error.to_string()))?;
+        self.verify(
+            end_entity,
+            intermediates,
+            X509PurposeId::SSL_SERVER,
+            Some(server_name),
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn verify(
+        &self,
+        end_entity: &CertificateDer<'_>,
+        intermediates: &[CertificateDer<'_>],
+        purpose: X509PurposeId,
+        server_name: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let leaf = X509::from_der(end_entity.as_ref()).map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        let mut chain = Stack::new().map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        for certificate in intermediates {
+            chain
+                .push(X509::from_der(certificate.as_ref()).map_err(openssl_error)?)
+                .map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        }
+        let mut parameters = X509VerifyParam::new().map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        parameters.set_auth_level(2);
+        parameters.set_purpose(purpose).map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        parameters.set_hostflags(
+            X509CheckFlags::NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS | X509CheckFlags::NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
+        );
+        if let Some(server_name) = server_name {
+            if let Ok(address) = server_name.parse() {
+                parameters.set_ip(address).map_err(openssl_error)?;
+            } else {
+                parameters.set_host(server_name).map_err(openssl_error)?;
+            }
+        }
+        let mut store = X509StoreBuilder::new().map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        store.set_param(&parameters).map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        for certificate in &self.roots.certificates {
+            store.add_cert(certificate.clone()).map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        }
+        let store = store.build();
+        let mut context = X509StoreContext::new().map_err(openssl_error)?;
+        context
+            .init(&store, &leaf, &chain, |context| {
+                if context.verify_cert()? {
+                    Ok(None)
+                } else {
+                    Ok(Some(context.error().to_string()))
+                }
+            })
+            .map_err(openssl_error)?
+            .map_or(Ok(()), |error| Err(Error::Other(error)))
+    }
+}
+
+fn openssl_error(error: openssl::error::ErrorStack) -> Error {
+    Error::Other(error.to_string())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use rcgen::{BasicConstraints, CertificateParams, ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose, IsCa, KeyPair};
+
+    fn signed_leaf(
+        parameters: CertificateParams,
+    ) -> (CertificateVerifier, CertificateDer<'static>) {
+        let mut issuer_parameters = CertificateParams::new(Vec::<String>::new()).unwrap();
+        issuer_parameters
+            .distinguished_name
+            .push(rcgen::DnType::CommonName, "test root");
+        issuer_parameters.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        let issuer_key = KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
+        let issuer = issuer_parameters.self_signed(&issuer_key).unwrap();
+        let leaf_key = KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
+        let leaf = parameters
+            .signed_by(&leaf_key, &issuer, &issuer_key)
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut roots = RootCertStore::empty();
+        roots.add(issuer.der().clone()).unwrap();
+        (CertificateVerifier::new(roots), leaf.der().clone())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trusted_server_matches_dns_and_ip_subject_alternative_names() {
+        let parameters =
+            CertificateParams::new(vec!["localhost".into(), "127.0.0.1".into()]).unwrap();
+        let (verifier, leaf) = signed_leaf(parameters);
+        verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "localhost")
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(verifier.verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "127.0.0.1").is_ok());
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "wrong.local")
+            .is_err());
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "127.0.0.2")
+            .is_err());
+        assert!(verifier.verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_untrusted_and_tampered_certificates() {
+        let (verifier, leaf) =
+            signed_leaf(CertificateParams::new(vec!["localhost".into()]).unwrap());
+        let untrusted = CertificateVerifier::new(RootCertStore::empty());
+        assert!(untrusted
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "localhost")
+            .is_err());
+        let mut tampered = leaf.as_ref().to_vec();
+        let last = tampered.len() - 1;
+        tampered[last] ^= 1;
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&CertificateDer::from(tampered), &[], "localhost")
+            .is_err());
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&CertificateDer::from(vec![0]), &[], "localhost")
+            .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_expired_certificate_and_wrong_extended_key_usage() {
+        let mut expired = CertificateParams::new(vec!["localhost".into()]).unwrap();
+        expired.not_before = rcgen::date_time_ymd(2019, 1, 1);
+        expired.not_after = rcgen::date_time_ymd(2020, 1, 1);
+        let (verifier, leaf) = signed_leaf(expired);
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "localhost")
+            .is_err());
+        let mut server_only = CertificateParams::new(vec!["localhost".into()]).unwrap();
+        server_only.extended_key_usages = vec![ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose::ServerAuth];
+        let (verifier, leaf) = signed_leaf(server_only);
+        verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "localhost")
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(verifier.verify_client_cert(&leaf, &[]).is_err());
+        let mut client_only = CertificateParams::new(vec!["localhost".into()]).unwrap();
+        client_only.extended_key_usages = vec![ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose::ClientAuth];
+        let (verifier, leaf) = signed_leaf(client_only);
+        assert!(verifier.verify_client_cert(&leaf, &[]).is_ok());
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "localhost")
+            .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn does_not_fall_back_to_common_name_or_partial_wildcard() {
+        let mut parameters = CertificateParams::new(Vec::<String>::new()).unwrap();
+        parameters
+            .distinguished_name
+            .push(rcgen::DnType::CommonName, "localhost");
+        let (verifier, leaf) = signed_leaf(parameters);
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "localhost")
+            .is_err());
+        let (verifier, leaf) =
+            signed_leaf(CertificateParams::new(vec!["local*.example".into()]).unwrap());
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "localhost.example")
+            .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_weak_rsa_keys_and_sha1_leaf_signatures() {
+        use openssl::asn1::Asn1Time;
+        use openssl::hash::MessageDigest;
+        use openssl::pkey::PKey;
+        use openssl::rsa::Rsa;
+        use openssl::x509::extension::{BasicConstraints, SubjectAlternativeName};
+        use openssl::x509::X509NameBuilder;
+
+        let issuer_key = PKey::from_rsa(Rsa::generate(2048).unwrap()).unwrap();
+        let mut issuer_name = X509NameBuilder::new().unwrap();
+        issuer_name
+            .append_entry_by_text("CN", "strong root")
+            .unwrap();
+        let issuer_name = issuer_name.build();
+        let mut issuer = X509::builder().unwrap();
+        issuer.set_version(2).unwrap();
+        issuer.set_subject_name(&issuer_name).unwrap();
+        issuer.set_issuer_name(&issuer_name).unwrap();
+        issuer.set_pubkey(&issuer_key).unwrap();
+        issuer
+            .set_not_before(&Asn1Time::days_from_now(0).unwrap())
+            .unwrap();
+        issuer
+            .set_not_after(&Asn1Time::days_from_now(1).unwrap())
+            .unwrap();
+        issuer
+            .append_extension(BasicConstraints::new().critical().ca().build().unwrap())
+            .unwrap();
+        issuer.sign(&issuer_key, MessageDigest::sha256()).unwrap();
+        let issuer = issuer.build();
+        let mut roots = RootCertStore::empty();
+        roots
+            .add(CertificateDer::from(issuer.to_der().unwrap()))
+            .unwrap();
+        let verifier = CertificateVerifier::new(roots);
+        for (bits, digest, expected) in [
+            (2048, MessageDigest::sha256(), true),
+            (1024, MessageDigest::sha256(), false),
+            (2048, MessageDigest::sha1(), false),
+        ] {
+            let leaf_key = PKey::from_rsa(Rsa::generate(bits).unwrap()).unwrap();
+            let mut leaf_name = X509NameBuilder::new().unwrap();
+            leaf_name.append_entry_by_text("CN", "localhost").unwrap();
+            let leaf_name = leaf_name.build();
+            let mut leaf = X509::builder().unwrap();
+            leaf.set_version(2).unwrap();
+            leaf.set_subject_name(&leaf_name).unwrap();
+            leaf.set_issuer_name(issuer.subject_name()).unwrap();
+            leaf.set_pubkey(&leaf_key).unwrap();
+            leaf.set_not_before(&Asn1Time::days_from_now(0).unwrap())
+                .unwrap();
+            leaf.set_not_after(&Asn1Time::days_from_now(1).unwrap())
+                .unwrap();
+            let names = SubjectAlternativeName::new()
+                .dns("localhost")
+                .build(&leaf.x509v3_context(Some(&issuer), None))
+                .unwrap();
+            leaf.append_extension(names).unwrap();
+            leaf.sign(&issuer_key, digest).unwrap();
+            let leaf = CertificateDer::from(leaf.build().to_der().unwrap());
+            assert_eq!(
+                verifier.verify_server_cert(&leaf, &[], "localhost").is_ok(),
+                expected
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn dtls_handshake_preserves_mutual_certificate_authentication() {
+        use crate::config::{ClientAuthType, Config};
+        use crate::conn::DTLSConn;
+        use crate::crypto::Certificate;
+        use std::sync::Arc;
+        use std::time::Duration;
+
+        let client_certificate =
+            Certificate::generate_self_signed(vec!["localhost".into()]).unwrap();
+        let server_certificate =
+            Certificate::generate_self_signed(vec!["localhost".into()]).unwrap();
+        let mut client_roots = RootCertStore::empty();
+        client_roots
+            .add(server_certificate.certificate[0].clone())
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut server_roots = RootCertStore::empty();
+        server_roots
+            .add(client_certificate.certificate[0].clone())
+            .unwrap();
+        let client_socket = Arc::new(tokio::net::UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap());
+        let server_socket = Arc::new(tokio::net::UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap());
+        client_socket
+            .connect(server_socket.local_addr().unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        server_socket
+            .connect(client_socket.local_addr().unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let client_config = Config {
+            certificates: vec![client_certificate],
+            roots_cas: client_roots,
+            server_name: "localhost".into(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let server_config = Config {
+            certificates: vec![server_certificate],
+            client_cas: server_roots,
+            client_auth: ClientAuthType::RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let (client, server) = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), async {
+            tokio::try_join!(
+                DTLSConn::new(client_socket, client_config, true, None),
+                DTLSConn::new(server_socket, server_config, false, None),
+            )
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap();
+        client
+            .write(b"authenticated", Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut buffer = [0; 64];
+        let count = server
+            .read(&mut buffer, Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(&buffer[..count], b"authenticated");
+        client.close().await.unwrap();
+        server.close().await.unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verifies_intermediate_chain_without_implicitly_trusting_it() {
+        let mut root_parameters = CertificateParams::new(Vec::<String>::new()).unwrap();
+        root_parameters
+            .distinguished_name
+            .push(rcgen::DnType::CommonName, "test root");
+        root_parameters.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        let root_key = KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
+        let root = root_parameters.self_signed(&root_key).unwrap();
+        let mut intermediate_parameters = CertificateParams::new(Vec::<String>::new()).unwrap();
+        intermediate_parameters
+            .distinguished_name
+            .push(rcgen::DnType::CommonName, "test intermediate");
+        intermediate_parameters.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Constrained(0));
+        let intermediate_key = KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
+        let intermediate = intermediate_parameters
+            .signed_by(&intermediate_key, &root, &root_key)
+            .unwrap();
+        let leaf_key = KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
+        let leaf = CertificateParams::new(vec!["localhost".into()])
+            .unwrap()
+            .signed_by(&leaf_key, &intermediate, &intermediate_key)
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut roots = RootCertStore::empty();
+        roots.add(root.der().clone()).unwrap();
+        let verifier = CertificateVerifier::new(roots);
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(leaf.der(), &[intermediate.der().clone()], "localhost")
+            .is_ok());
+        assert!(verifier
+            .verify_server_cert(leaf.der(), &[], "localhost")
+            .is_err());
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/change_cipher_spec/change_cipher_spec_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_change_cipher_spec_round_trip() -> Result<()> {
+    let c = ChangeCipherSpec {};
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        c.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw.as_slice());
+    let cnew = ChangeCipherSpec::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+    assert_eq!(
+        c, cnew,
+        "ChangeCipherSpec round trip: got {cnew:?}, want {c:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_change_cipher_spec_invalid() -> Result<()> {
+    let data = vec![0x00];
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(data.as_slice());
+    let result = ChangeCipherSpec::unmarshal(&mut reader);
+
+    match result {
+        Ok(_) => panic!("must be error"),
+        Err(err) => assert_eq!(err.to_string(), Error::ErrInvalidCipherSpec.to_string()),
+    };
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/change_cipher_spec/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod change_cipher_spec_test;
+
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use super::content::*;
+use super::error::*;
+
+// The change cipher spec protocol exists to signal transitions in
+// ciphering strategies.  The protocol consists of a single message,
+// which is encrypted and compressed under the current (not the pending)
+// connection state.  The message consists of a single byte of value 1.
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 5246 §7.1]
+///
+/// [RFC 5246 §7.1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.1
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct ChangeCipherSpec;
+
+impl ChangeCipherSpec {
+    pub fn content_type(&self) -> ContentType {
+        ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        1
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u8(0x01)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let data = reader.read_u8()?;
+        if data != 0x01 {
+            return Err(Error::ErrInvalidCipherSpec);
+        }
+
+        Ok(ChangeCipherSpec {})
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_aes_128_ccm.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::client_certificate_type::ClientCertificateType;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_ccm::{CryptoCcm, CryptoCcmTagLen};
+use crate::prf::*;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct CipherSuiteAes128Ccm {
+    ccm: Option<CryptoCcm>,
+    client_certificate_type: ClientCertificateType,
+    id: CipherSuiteId,
+    psk: bool,
+    crypto_ccm_tag_len: CryptoCcmTagLen,
+}
+
+impl CipherSuiteAes128Ccm {
+    const PRF_MAC_LEN: usize = 0;
+    const PRF_KEY_LEN: usize = 16;
+    const PRF_IV_LEN: usize = 4;
+
+    pub fn new(
+        client_certificate_type: ClientCertificateType,
+        id: CipherSuiteId,
+        psk: bool,
+        crypto_ccm_tag_len: CryptoCcmTagLen,
+    ) -> Self {
+        CipherSuiteAes128Ccm {
+            ccm: None,
+            client_certificate_type,
+            id,
+            psk,
+            crypto_ccm_tag_len,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl CipherSuite for CipherSuiteAes128Ccm {
+    fn to_string(&self) -> String {
+        format!("{}", self.id)
+    }
+
+    fn id(&self) -> CipherSuiteId {
+        self.id
+    }
+
+    fn certificate_type(&self) -> ClientCertificateType {
+        self.client_certificate_type
+    }
+
+    fn hash_func(&self) -> CipherSuiteHash {
+        CipherSuiteHash::Sha256
+    }
+
+    fn is_psk(&self) -> bool {
+        self.psk
+    }
+
+    fn is_initialized(&self) -> bool {
+        self.ccm.is_some()
+    }
+
+    fn init(
+        &mut self,
+        master_secret: &[u8],
+        client_random: &[u8],
+        server_random: &[u8],
+        is_client: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let keys = prf_encryption_keys(
+            master_secret,
+            client_random,
+            server_random,
+            CipherSuiteAes128Ccm::PRF_MAC_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteAes128Ccm::PRF_KEY_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteAes128Ccm::PRF_IV_LEN,
+            self.hash_func(),
+        )?;
+
+        if is_client {
+            self.ccm = Some(CryptoCcm::new(
+                &self.crypto_ccm_tag_len,
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_write_iv,
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_write_iv,
+            ));
+        } else {
+            self.ccm = Some(CryptoCcm::new(
+                &self.crypto_ccm_tag_len,
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_write_iv,
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_write_iv,
+            ));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let ccm = self.ccm.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to encrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        ccm.encrypt(pkt_rlh, raw)
+    }
+
+    fn decrypt(&self, input: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let ccm = self.ccm.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to decrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        ccm.decrypt(input)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_aes_128_gcm_sha256.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_gcm::*;
+use crate::prf::*;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256 {
+    gcm: Option<CryptoGcm>,
+    rsa: bool,
+}
+
+impl CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256 {
+    const PRF_MAC_LEN: usize = 0;
+    const PRF_KEY_LEN: usize = 16;
+    const PRF_IV_LEN: usize = 4;
+
+    pub fn new(rsa: bool) -> Self {
+        CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256 { gcm: None, rsa }
+    }
+}
+
+impl CipherSuite for CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256 {
+    fn to_string(&self) -> String {
+        if self.rsa {
+            "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256".to_owned()
+        } else {
+            "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256".to_owned()
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn id(&self) -> CipherSuiteId {
+        if self.rsa {
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256
+        } else {
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn certificate_type(&self) -> ClientCertificateType {
+        if self.rsa {
+            ClientCertificateType::RsaSign
+        } else {
+            ClientCertificateType::EcdsaSign
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn hash_func(&self) -> CipherSuiteHash {
+        CipherSuiteHash::Sha256
+    }
+
+    fn is_psk(&self) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+
+    fn is_initialized(&self) -> bool {
+        self.gcm.is_some()
+    }
+
+    fn init(
+        &mut self,
+        master_secret: &[u8],
+        client_random: &[u8],
+        server_random: &[u8],
+        is_client: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let keys = prf_encryption_keys(
+            master_secret,
+            client_random,
+            server_random,
+            CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::PRF_MAC_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::PRF_KEY_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::PRF_IV_LEN,
+            self.hash_func(),
+        )?;
+
+        if is_client {
+            self.gcm = Some(CryptoGcm::new(
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_write_iv,
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_write_iv,
+            ));
+        } else {
+            self.gcm = Some(CryptoGcm::new(
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_write_iv,
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_write_iv,
+            ));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cg = self.gcm.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to encrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        cg.encrypt(pkt_rlh, raw)
+    }
+
+    fn decrypt(&self, input: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cg = self.gcm.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to decrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        cg.decrypt(input)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_aes_256_cbc_sha.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_cbc::*;
+use crate::prf::*;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha {
+    cbc: Option<CryptoCbc>,
+    rsa: bool,
+}
+
+impl CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha {
+    const PRF_MAC_LEN: usize = 20;
+    const PRF_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
+    const PRF_IV_LEN: usize = 16;
+
+    pub fn new(rsa: bool) -> Self {
+        CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha { cbc: None, rsa }
+    }
+}
+
+impl CipherSuite for CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha {
+    fn to_string(&self) -> String {
+        if self.rsa {
+            "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA".to_owned()
+        } else {
+            "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA".to_owned()
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn id(&self) -> CipherSuiteId {
+        if self.rsa {
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha
+        } else {
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn certificate_type(&self) -> ClientCertificateType {
+        if self.rsa {
+            ClientCertificateType::RsaSign
+        } else {
+            ClientCertificateType::EcdsaSign
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn hash_func(&self) -> CipherSuiteHash {
+        CipherSuiteHash::Sha256
+    }
+
+    fn is_psk(&self) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+
+    fn is_initialized(&self) -> bool {
+        self.cbc.is_some()
+    }
+
+    fn init(
+        &mut self,
+        master_secret: &[u8],
+        client_random: &[u8],
+        server_random: &[u8],
+        is_client: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let keys = prf_encryption_keys(
+            master_secret,
+            client_random,
+            server_random,
+            CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::PRF_MAC_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::PRF_KEY_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::PRF_IV_LEN,
+            self.hash_func(),
+        )?;
+
+        if is_client {
+            self.cbc = Some(CryptoCbc::new(
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_mac_key,
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_mac_key,
+            )?);
+        } else {
+            self.cbc = Some(CryptoCbc::new(
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_mac_key,
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_mac_key,
+            )?);
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cg = self.cbc.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to encrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        cg.encrypt(pkt_rlh, raw)
+    }
+
+    fn decrypt(&self, input: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cg = self.cbc.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to decrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        cg.decrypt(input)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_chacha20_poly1305_sha256.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_chacha20::*;
+use crate::prf::*;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256 {
+    rsa: bool,
+    cipher: Option<CryptoChaCha20>,
+}
+
+impl CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256 {
+    const PRF_MAC_LEN: usize = 0;
+    const PRF_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
+    const PRF_IV_LEN: usize = 12;
+
+    pub fn new(rsa: bool) -> Self {
+        CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256 { rsa, cipher: None }
+    }
+}
+
+impl CipherSuite for CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256 {
+    fn to_string(&self) -> String {
+        if self.rsa {
+            "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256".to_owned()
+        } else {
+            "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256".to_owned()
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn id(&self) -> CipherSuiteId {
+        if self.rsa {
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256
+        } else {
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn certificate_type(&self) -> ClientCertificateType {
+        if self.rsa {
+            ClientCertificateType::RsaSign
+        } else {
+            ClientCertificateType::EcdsaSign
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn hash_func(&self) -> CipherSuiteHash {
+        CipherSuiteHash::Sha256
+    }
+
+    fn is_psk(&self) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+
+    fn is_initialized(&self) -> bool {
+        self.cipher.is_some()
+    }
+
+    fn init(
+        &mut self,
+        master_secret: &[u8],
+        client_random: &[u8],
+        server_random: &[u8],
+        is_client: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let keys = prf_encryption_keys(
+            master_secret,
+            client_random,
+            server_random,
+            CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256::PRF_MAC_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256::PRF_KEY_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256::PRF_IV_LEN,
+            self.hash_func(),
+        )?;
+
+        if is_client {
+            self.cipher = Some(CryptoChaCha20::new(
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_write_iv,
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_write_iv,
+            ));
+        } else {
+            self.cipher = Some(CryptoChaCha20::new(
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_write_iv,
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_write_iv,
+            ));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cg = self.cipher.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to encrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        cg.encrypt(pkt_rlh, raw)
+    }
+
+    fn decrypt(&self, input: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cg = self.cipher.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to decrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        cg.decrypt(input)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::cipher_suite::cipher_suite_aes_128_ccm::CipherSuiteAes128Ccm;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_ccm::CryptoCcmTagLen;
+
+pub fn new_cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm() -> CipherSuiteAes128Ccm {
+    CipherSuiteAes128Ccm::new(
+        ClientCertificateType::EcdsaSign,
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm,
+        false,
+        CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcmTagLength,
+    )
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm8.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::cipher_suite::cipher_suite_aes_128_ccm::CipherSuiteAes128Ccm;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_ccm::CryptoCcmTagLen;
+
+pub fn new_cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm8() -> CipherSuiteAes128Ccm {
+    CipherSuiteAes128Ccm::new(
+        ClientCertificateType::EcdsaSign,
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8,
+        false,
+        CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcm8TagLength,
+    )
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::cipher_suite::cipher_suite_aes_128_ccm::CipherSuiteAes128Ccm;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_ccm::CryptoCcmTagLen;
+
+pub fn new_cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm() -> CipherSuiteAes128Ccm {
+    CipherSuiteAes128Ccm::new(
+        ClientCertificateType::Unsupported,
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm,
+        true,
+        CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcmTagLength,
+    )
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm8.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::cipher_suite::cipher_suite_aes_128_ccm::CipherSuiteAes128Ccm;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_ccm::CryptoCcmTagLen;
+
+pub fn new_cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm8() -> CipherSuiteAes128Ccm {
+    CipherSuiteAes128Ccm::new(
+        ClientCertificateType::Unsupported,
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8,
+        true,
+        CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcm8TagLength,
+    )
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_gcm_sha256.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::crypto::crypto_gcm::*;
+use crate::prf::*;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Default)]
+pub struct CipherSuiteTlsPskWithAes128GcmSha256 {
+    gcm: Option<CryptoGcm>,
+}
+
+impl CipherSuiteTlsPskWithAes128GcmSha256 {
+    const PRF_MAC_LEN: usize = 0;
+    const PRF_KEY_LEN: usize = 16;
+    const PRF_IV_LEN: usize = 4;
+}
+
+impl CipherSuite for CipherSuiteTlsPskWithAes128GcmSha256 {
+    fn to_string(&self) -> String {
+        "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256".to_owned()
+    }
+
+    fn id(&self) -> CipherSuiteId {
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256
+    }
+
+    fn certificate_type(&self) -> ClientCertificateType {
+        ClientCertificateType::Unsupported
+    }
+
+    fn hash_func(&self) -> CipherSuiteHash {
+        CipherSuiteHash::Sha256
+    }
+
+    fn is_psk(&self) -> bool {
+        true
+    }
+
+    fn is_initialized(&self) -> bool {
+        self.gcm.is_some()
+    }
+
+    fn init(
+        &mut self,
+        master_secret: &[u8],
+        client_random: &[u8],
+        server_random: &[u8],
+        is_client: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let keys = prf_encryption_keys(
+            master_secret,
+            client_random,
+            server_random,
+            CipherSuiteTlsPskWithAes128GcmSha256::PRF_MAC_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteTlsPskWithAes128GcmSha256::PRF_KEY_LEN,
+            CipherSuiteTlsPskWithAes128GcmSha256::PRF_IV_LEN,
+            self.hash_func(),
+        )?;
+
+        if is_client {
+            self.gcm = Some(CryptoGcm::new(
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_write_iv,
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_write_iv,
+            ));
+        } else {
+            self.gcm = Some(CryptoGcm::new(
+                &keys.server_write_key,
+                &keys.server_write_iv,
+                &keys.client_write_key,
+                &keys.client_write_iv,
+            ));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cg = self.gcm.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to encrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        cg.encrypt(pkt_rlh, raw)
+    }
+
+    fn decrypt(&self, input: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cg = self.gcm.as_ref().ok_or(Error::Other(
+            "CipherSuite has not been initialized, unable to decrypt".to_owned(),
+        ))?;
+        cg.decrypt(input)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/cipher_suite/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+pub mod cipher_suite_aes_128_ccm;
+pub mod cipher_suite_aes_128_gcm_sha256;
+pub mod cipher_suite_aes_256_cbc_sha;
+pub mod cipher_suite_chacha20_poly1305_sha256;
+pub mod cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm;
+pub mod cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm8;
+pub mod cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm;
+pub mod cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm8;
+pub mod cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_gcm_sha256;
+
+use std::fmt;
+use std::marker::{Send, Sync};
+
+use cipher_suite_aes_128_gcm_sha256::*;
+use cipher_suite_aes_256_cbc_sha::*;
+use cipher_suite_chacha20_poly1305_sha256::*;
+use cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm::*;
+use cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm8::*;
+use cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm::*;
+use cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm8::*;
+use cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_gcm_sha256::*;
+
+use super::client_certificate_type::*;
+use super::error::*;
+use super::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+
+// CipherSuiteID is an ID for our supported CipherSuites
+// Supported Cipher Suites
+#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum CipherSuiteId {
+    // AES-128-CCM
+    Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm = 0xc0ac,
+    Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8 = 0xc0ae,
+
+    // AES-128-GCM-SHA256
+    Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 = 0xc02b,
+    Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 = 0xc02f,
+
+    // AES-256-CBC-SHA
+    Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha = 0xc00a,
+    Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha = 0xc014,
+
+    Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm = 0xc0a4,
+    Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8 = 0xc0a8,
+    Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 = 0x00a8,
+
+    // CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+    Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256 = 0xcca8,
+    Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256 = 0xcca9,
+
+    Unsupported,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for CipherSuiteId {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match *self {
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM")
+            }
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8 => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8")
+            }
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256")
+            }
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256")
+            }
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA")
+            }
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA")
+            }
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm => write!(f, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM"),
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8 => write!(f, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"),
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256")
+            }
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256 => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256")
+            }
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256 => {
+                write!(f, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256")
+            }
+
+            _ => write!(f, "Unsupported CipherSuiteID"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<u16> for CipherSuiteId {
+    fn from(val: u16) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            // AES-128-CCM
+            0xc0ac => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm,
+            0xc0ae => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8,
+
+            // AES-128-GCM-SHA256
+            0xc02b => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256,
+            0xc02f => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256,
+
+            // AES-256-CBC-SHA
+            0xc00a => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha,
+            0xc014 => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha,
+
+            0xc0a4 => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm,
+            0xc0a8 => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8,
+            0x00a8 => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256,
+
+            // CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+            0xcca8 => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256,
+            0xcca9 => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256,
+
+            _ => CipherSuiteId::Unsupported,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<&str> for CipherSuiteId {
+    fn from(val: &str) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm,
+            "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" => {
+                CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8
+            }
+            "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" => {
+                CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256
+            }
+            "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" => {
+                CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256
+            }
+            "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" => {
+                CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha
+            }
+            "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" => {
+                CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha
+            }
+            "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm,
+            "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8,
+            "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" => CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256,
+            "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" => {
+                CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256
+            }
+            "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" => {
+                CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256
+            }
+            _ => CipherSuiteId::Unsupported,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
+pub enum CipherSuiteHash {
+    Sha256,
+}
+
+impl CipherSuiteHash {
+    pub(crate) fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        match *self {
+            CipherSuiteHash::Sha256 => 32,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub trait CipherSuite {
+    fn to_string(&self) -> String;
+    fn id(&self) -> CipherSuiteId;
+    fn certificate_type(&self) -> ClientCertificateType;
+    fn hash_func(&self) -> CipherSuiteHash;
+    fn is_psk(&self) -> bool;
+    fn is_initialized(&self) -> bool;
+
+    // Generate the internal encryption state
+    fn init(
+        &mut self,
+        master_secret: &[u8],
+        client_random: &[u8],
+        server_random: &[u8],
+        is_client: bool,
+    ) -> Result<()>;
+
+    fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>>;
+    fn decrypt(&self, input: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>>;
+}
+
+// Taken from https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
+// A cipher_suite is a specific combination of key agreement, cipher and MAC
+// function.
+pub fn cipher_suite_for_id(id: CipherSuiteId) -> Result<Box<dyn CipherSuite + Send + Sync>> {
+    match id {
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm => {
+            Ok(Box::new(new_cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm()))
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8 => Ok(Box::new(
+            new_cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm8(),
+        )),
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 => {
+            Ok(Box::new(CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::new(false)))
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 => {
+            Ok(Box::new(CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::new(true)))
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha => {
+            Ok(Box::new(CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::new(true)))
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha => {
+            Ok(Box::new(CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::new(false)))
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm => {
+            Ok(Box::new(new_cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm()))
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Ccm_8 => {
+            Ok(Box::new(new_cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm8()))
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Psk_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256 => {
+            Ok(Box::<CipherSuiteTlsPskWithAes128GcmSha256>::default())
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Rsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256 => {
+            Ok(Box::new(CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256::new(true)))
+        }
+        CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_ChaCha20_Poly1305_Sha256 => {
+            Ok(Box::new(CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256::new(false)))
+        }
+
+        _ => Err(Error::ErrInvalidCipherSuite),
+    }
+}
+
+// CipherSuites we support in order of preference
+pub(crate) fn default_cipher_suites() -> Vec<Box<dyn CipherSuite + Send + Sync>> {
+    vec![
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::new(false)),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::new(false)),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::new(true)),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::new(true)),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256::new(false)),
+    ]
+}
+
+fn all_cipher_suites() -> Vec<Box<dyn CipherSuite + Send + Sync>> {
+    vec![
+        Box::new(new_cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm()),
+        Box::new(new_cipher_suite_tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm8()),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::new(false)),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteAes128GcmSha256::new(true)),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::new(false)),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteAes256CbcSha::new(true)),
+        Box::new(new_cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm()),
+        Box::new(new_cipher_suite_tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm8()),
+        Box::<CipherSuiteTlsPskWithAes128GcmSha256>::default(),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256::new(false)),
+        Box::new(CipherSuiteChaCha20Poly1305Sha256::new(true)),
+    ]
+}
+
+fn cipher_suites_for_ids(ids: &[CipherSuiteId]) -> Result<Vec<Box<dyn CipherSuite + Send + Sync>>> {
+    let mut cipher_suites = vec![];
+    for id in ids {
+        cipher_suites.push(cipher_suite_for_id(*id)?);
+    }
+    Ok(cipher_suites)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn parse_cipher_suites(
+    user_selected_suites: &[CipherSuiteId],
+    exclude_psk: bool,
+    exclude_non_psk: bool,
+) -> Result<Vec<Box<dyn CipherSuite + Send + Sync>>> {
+    let cipher_suites = if !user_selected_suites.is_empty() {
+        cipher_suites_for_ids(user_selected_suites)?
+    } else {
+        default_cipher_suites()
+    };
+
+    let filtered_cipher_suites: Vec<Box<dyn CipherSuite + Send + Sync>> = cipher_suites
+        .into_iter()
+        .filter(|c| !((exclude_psk && c.is_psk()) || (exclude_non_psk && !c.is_psk())))
+        .collect();
+
+    if filtered_cipher_suites.is_empty() {
+        Err(Error::ErrNoAvailableCipherSuites)
+    } else {
+        Ok(filtered_cipher_suites)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/client_certificate_type.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ClientCertificateType {
+    RsaSign = 1,
+    EcdsaSign = 64,
+    Unsupported,
+}
+
+impl From<u8> for ClientCertificateType {
+    fn from(val: u8) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            1 => ClientCertificateType::RsaSign,
+            64 => ClientCertificateType::EcdsaSign,
+            _ => ClientCertificateType::Unsupported,
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/compression_methods.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use crate::error::Result;
+
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum CompressionMethodId {
+    Null = 0,
+    Unsupported,
+}
+
+impl From<u8> for CompressionMethodId {
+    fn from(val: u8) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            0 => CompressionMethodId::Null,
+            _ => CompressionMethodId::Unsupported,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct CompressionMethods {
+    pub ids: Vec<CompressionMethodId>,
+}
+
+impl CompressionMethods {
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        1 + self.ids.len()
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u8(self.ids.len() as u8)?;
+
+        for id in &self.ids {
+            writer.write_u8(*id as u8)?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let compression_methods_count = reader.read_u8()? as usize;
+        let mut ids = vec![];
+        for _ in 0..compression_methods_count {
+            let id = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+            if id != CompressionMethodId::Unsupported {
+                ids.push(id);
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(CompressionMethods { ids })
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn default_compression_methods() -> CompressionMethods {
+    CompressionMethods {
+        ids: vec![CompressionMethodId::Null],
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/config.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+use std::future::Future;
+use std::pin::Pin;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use tokio::time::Duration;
+
+use crate::cipher_suite::*;
+use crate::crypto::*;
+use crate::error::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_use_srtp::SrtpProtectionProfile;
+use crate::handshaker::VerifyPeerCertificateFn;
+use crate::signature_hash_algorithm::SignatureScheme;
+
+/// Config is used to configure a DTLS client or server.
+/// After a Config is passed to a DTLS function it must not be modified.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct Config {
+    /// certificates contains certificate chain to present to the other side of the connection.
+    /// Server MUST set this if psk is non-nil
+    /// client SHOULD sets this so CertificateRequests can be handled if psk is non-nil
+    pub certificates: Vec<Certificate>,
+
+    /// cipher_suites is a list of supported cipher suites.
+    /// If cipher_suites is nil, a default list is used
+    pub cipher_suites: Vec<CipherSuiteId>,
+
+    /// signature_schemes contains the signature and hash schemes that the peer requests to verify.
+    pub signature_schemes: Vec<SignatureScheme>,
+
+    /// srtp_protection_profiles are the supported protection profiles
+    /// Clients will send this via use_srtp and assert that the server properly responds
+    /// Servers will assert that clients send one of these profiles and will respond as needed
+    pub srtp_protection_profiles: Vec<SrtpProtectionProfile>,
+
+    /// client_auth determines the server's policy for
+    /// TLS Client Authentication. The default is NoClientCert.
+    pub client_auth: ClientAuthType,
+
+    /// extended_master_secret determines if the "Extended Master Secret" extension
+    /// should be disabled, requested, or required (default requested).
+    pub extended_master_secret: ExtendedMasterSecretType,
+
+    /// flight_interval controls how often we send outbound handshake messages
+    /// defaults to time.Second
+    pub flight_interval: Duration,
+
+    /// psk sets the pre-shared key used by this DTLS connection
+    /// If psk is non-nil only psk cipher_suites will be used
+    pub psk: Option<PskCallback>,
+    pub psk_identity_hint: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+
+    /// insecure_skip_verify controls whether a client verifies the
+    /// server's certificate chain and host name.
+    /// If insecure_skip_verify is true, TLS accepts any certificate
+    /// presented by the server and any host name in that certificate.
+    /// In this mode, TLS is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
+    /// This should be used only for testing.
+    pub insecure_skip_verify: bool,
+
+    /// insecure_hashes allows the use of hashing algorithms that are known
+    /// to be vulnerable.
+    pub insecure_hashes: bool,
+
+    /// insecure_verification allows the use of verification algorithms that are
+    /// known to be vulnerable or deprecated
+    pub insecure_verification: bool,
+    /// VerifyPeerCertificate, if not nil, is called after normal
+    /// certificate verification by either a client or server. It
+    /// receives the certificate provided by the peer and also a flag
+    /// that tells if normal verification has succeeded. If it returns a
+    /// non-nil error, the handshake is aborted and that error results.
+    ///
+    /// If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before
+    /// considering this callback. If normal verification is disabled by
+    /// setting insecure_skip_verify, or (for a server) when client_auth is
+    /// RequestClientCert or RequireAnyClientCert, then this callback will
+    /// be considered but the verifiedChains will always be nil.
+    pub verify_peer_certificate: Option<VerifyPeerCertificateFn>,
+
+    /// roots_cas defines the set of root certificate authorities
+    /// that one peer uses when verifying the other peer's certificates.
+    /// If RootCAs is nil, TLS uses the host's root CA set.
+    /// Used by Client to verify server's certificate
+    pub roots_cas: crate::certificate_verifier::RootCertStore,
+
+    /// client_cas defines the set of root certificate authorities
+    /// that servers use if required to verify a client certificate
+    /// by the policy in client_auth.
+    /// Used by Server to verify client's certificate
+    pub client_cas: crate::certificate_verifier::RootCertStore,
+
+    /// server_name is used to verify the hostname on the returned
+    /// certificates unless insecure_skip_verify is given.
+    pub server_name: String,
+
+    /// mtu is the length at which handshake messages will be fragmented to
+    /// fit within the maximum transmission unit (default is 1200 bytes)
+    pub mtu: usize,
+
+    /// replay_protection_window is the size of the replay attack protection window.
+    /// Duplication of the sequence number is checked in this window size.
+    /// Packet with sequence number older than this value compared to the latest
+    /// accepted packet will be discarded. (default is 64)
+    pub replay_protection_window: usize,
+}
+
+impl Default for Config {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Config {
+            certificates: vec![],
+            cipher_suites: vec![],
+            signature_schemes: vec![],
+            srtp_protection_profiles: vec![],
+            client_auth: ClientAuthType::default(),
+            extended_master_secret: ExtendedMasterSecretType::default(),
+            flight_interval: Duration::default(),
+            psk: None,
+            psk_identity_hint: None,
+            insecure_skip_verify: false,
+            insecure_hashes: false,
+            insecure_verification: false,
+            verify_peer_certificate: None,
+            roots_cas: crate::certificate_verifier::RootCertStore::empty(),
+            client_cas: crate::certificate_verifier::RootCertStore::empty(),
+            server_name: String::default(),
+            mtu: 0,
+            replay_protection_window: 0,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) const DEFAULT_MTU: usize = 1200; // bytes
+
+// PSKCallback is called once we have the remote's psk_identity_hint.
+// If the remote provided none it will be nil
+pub(crate) type PskCallback =
+    Arc<dyn (Fn(&[u8]) -> Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<Vec<u8>>> + Send>>) + Send + Sync>;
+
+// ClientAuthType declares the policy the server will follow for
+// TLS Client Authentication.
+#[derive(Default, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ClientAuthType {
+    #[default]
+    NoClientCert = 0,
+    RequestClientCert = 1,
+    RequireAnyClientCert = 2,
+    VerifyClientCertIfGiven = 3,
+    RequireAndVerifyClientCert = 4,
+}
+
+// ExtendedMasterSecretType declares the policy the client and server
+// will follow for the Extended Master Secret extension
+#[derive(Default, PartialEq, Eq, Copy, Clone)]
+pub enum ExtendedMasterSecretType {
+    #[default]
+    Request = 0,
+    Require = 1,
+    Disable = 2,
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn validate_config(is_client: bool, config: &Config) -> Result<()> {
+    if is_client && config.psk.is_some() && config.psk_identity_hint.is_none() {
+        return Err(Error::ErrPskAndIdentityMustBeSetForClient);
+    }
+
+    if !is_client && config.psk.is_none() && config.certificates.is_empty() {
+        return Err(Error::ErrServerMustHaveCertificate);
+    }
+
+    if !config.certificates.is_empty() && config.psk.is_some() {
+        return Err(Error::ErrPskAndCertificate);
+    }
+
+    if config.psk_identity_hint.is_some() && config.psk.is_none() {
+        return Err(Error::ErrIdentityNoPsk);
+    }
+
+    for cert in &config.certificates {
+        match cert.private_key.kind {
+            CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ed25519(_) => {}
+            CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ecdsa256(_) => {}
+            _ => return Err(Error::ErrInvalidPrivateKey),
+        }
+    }
+
+    parse_cipher_suites(
+        &config.cipher_suites,
+        config.psk.is_none(),
+        config.psk.is_some(),
+    )?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/content.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use super::alert::*;
+use super::application_data::*;
+use super::change_cipher_spec::*;
+use super::handshake::*;
+use crate::error::*;
+
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 4346 §6.2.1]
+///
+/// [RFC 4346 §6.2.1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346#section-6.2.1
+#[derive(Default, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub enum ContentType {
+    ChangeCipherSpec = 20,
+    Alert = 21,
+    Handshake = 22,
+    ApplicationData = 23,
+    #[default]
+    Invalid,
+}
+
+impl From<u8> for ContentType {
+    fn from(val: u8) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            20 => ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec,
+            21 => ContentType::Alert,
+            22 => ContentType::Handshake,
+            23 => ContentType::ApplicationData,
+            _ => ContentType::Invalid,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum Content {
+    ChangeCipherSpec(ChangeCipherSpec),
+    Alert(Alert),
+    Handshake(Handshake),
+    ApplicationData(ApplicationData),
+}
+
+impl Content {
+    pub fn content_type(&self) -> ContentType {
+        match self {
+            Content::ChangeCipherSpec(c) => c.content_type(),
+            Content::Alert(c) => c.content_type(),
+            Content::Handshake(c) => c.content_type(),
+            Content::ApplicationData(c) => c.content_type(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        match self {
+            Content::ChangeCipherSpec(c) => c.size(),
+            Content::Alert(c) => c.size(),
+            Content::Handshake(c) => c.size(),
+            Content::ApplicationData(c) => c.size(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        match self {
+            Content::ChangeCipherSpec(c) => c.marshal(writer),
+            Content::Alert(c) => c.marshal(writer),
+            Content::Handshake(c) => c.marshal(writer),
+            Content::ApplicationData(c) => c.marshal(writer),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(content_type: ContentType, reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        match content_type {
+            ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec => Ok(Content::ChangeCipherSpec(
+                ChangeCipherSpec::unmarshal(reader)?,
+            )),
+            ContentType::Alert => Ok(Content::Alert(Alert::unmarshal(reader)?)),
+            ContentType::Handshake => Ok(Content::Handshake(Handshake::unmarshal(reader)?)),
+            ContentType::ApplicationData => Ok(Content::ApplicationData(
+                ApplicationData::unmarshal(reader)?,
+            )),
+            _ => Err(Error::ErrInvalidContentType),
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/crypto/crypto_cbc.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+// AES-CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)
+// First historic block cipher for AES.
+// CBC mode is insecure and must not be used. It’s been progressively deprecated and
+// removed from SSL libraries.
+// Introduced with TLS 1.0 year 2002. Superseded by GCM in TLS 1.2 year 2008.
+// Removed in TLS 1.3 year 2018.
+// RFC 3268 year 2002 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3268
+
+// https://github.com/RustCrypto/block-ciphers
+
+use aes::cipher::{BlockDecryptMut, BlockEncryptMut, KeyIvInit};
+use p256::elliptic_curve::subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
+use rand::Rng;
+use std::io::Cursor;
+use std::ops::Not;
+
+use super::padding::DtlsPadding;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::error::*;
+use crate::prf::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+type Aes256CbcEnc = cbc::Encryptor<aes::Aes256>;
+type Aes256CbcDec = cbc::Decryptor<aes::Aes256>;
+
+// State needed to handle encrypted input/output
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct CryptoCbc {
+    local_key: Vec<u8>,
+    remote_key: Vec<u8>,
+    write_mac: Vec<u8>,
+    read_mac: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl CryptoCbc {
+    const BLOCK_SIZE: usize = 16;
+    const MAC_SIZE: usize = 20;
+
+    pub fn new(
+        local_key: &[u8],
+        local_mac: &[u8],
+        remote_key: &[u8],
+        remote_mac: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Self> {
+        Ok(CryptoCbc {
+            local_key: local_key.to_vec(),
+            write_mac: local_mac.to_vec(),
+
+            remote_key: remote_key.to_vec(),
+            read_mac: remote_mac.to_vec(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut payload = raw[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..].to_vec();
+        let raw = &raw[..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE];
+
+        // Generate + Append MAC
+        let h = pkt_rlh;
+
+        let mac = prf_mac(
+            h.epoch,
+            h.sequence_number,
+            h.content_type,
+            h.protocol_version,
+            &payload,
+            &self.write_mac,
+        )?;
+        payload.extend_from_slice(&mac);
+
+        let mut iv: Vec<u8> = vec![0; Self::BLOCK_SIZE];
+        rand::rng().fill(iv.as_mut_slice());
+
+        let write_cbc = Aes256CbcEnc::new_from_slices(&self.local_key, &iv)?;
+        let encrypted = write_cbc.encrypt_padded_vec_mut::<DtlsPadding>(&payload);
+
+        // Prepend unencrypte header with encrypted payload
+        let mut r = vec![];
+        r.extend_from_slice(raw);
+        r.extend_from_slice(&iv);
+        r.extend_from_slice(&encrypted);
+
+        let r_len = (r.len() - RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE) as u16;
+        r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE - 2..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]
+            .copy_from_slice(&r_len.to_be_bytes());
+
+        Ok(r)
+    }
+
+    pub fn decrypt(&self, r: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut reader = Cursor::new(r);
+        let h = RecordLayerHeader::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+        if h.content_type == ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec {
+            // Nothing to encrypt with ChangeCipherSpec
+            return Ok(r.to_vec());
+        }
+
+        if r.len() < RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + Self::BLOCK_SIZE {
+            return Err(Error::ErrInvalidPacketLength);
+        }
+
+        let body = &r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..];
+        let iv = &body[0..Self::BLOCK_SIZE];
+        let body = &body[Self::BLOCK_SIZE..];
+
+        if body.is_empty() || !body.len().is_multiple_of(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
+            return Err(Error::ErrInvalidPacketLength);
+        }
+
+        let read_cbc = Aes256CbcDec::new_from_slices(&self.remote_key, iv)?;
+
+        let decrypted = read_cbc
+            .decrypt_padded_vec_mut::<DtlsPadding>(body)
+            .map_err(|_| Error::ErrInvalidPacketLength)?;
+
+        let recv_mac = &decrypted[decrypted.len() - Self::MAC_SIZE..];
+        let decrypted = &decrypted[0..decrypted.len() - Self::MAC_SIZE];
+        let mac = prf_mac(
+            h.epoch,
+            h.sequence_number,
+            h.content_type,
+            h.protocol_version,
+            decrypted,
+            &self.read_mac,
+        )?;
+
+        if recv_mac.ct_eq(&mac).not().into() {
+            return Err(Error::ErrInvalidMac);
+        }
+
+        let mut d = Vec::with_capacity(RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + decrypted.len());
+        d.extend_from_slice(&r[..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]);
+        d.extend_from_slice(decrypted);
+
+        Ok(d)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/crypto/crypto_ccm.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// AES-CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC)
+// Alternative to GCM mode.
+// Available in OpenSSL as of TLS 1.3 (2018), but disabled by default.
+// Two AES computations per block, thus expected to be somewhat slower than AES-GCM.
+// RFC 6655 year 2012 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655
+// Much lower adoption, probably because it came after GCM and offer no significant benefit.
+
+// https://github.com/RustCrypto/AEADs
+// https://docs.rs/ccm/0.3.0/ccm/ Or https://crates.io/crates/aes-ccm?
+
+use std::io::Cursor;
+
+use aes::Aes128;
+use ccm::aead::generic_array::GenericArray;
+use ccm::aead::AeadInPlace;
+use ccm::consts::{U12, U16, U8};
+use ccm::Ccm;
+use ccm::KeyInit;
+use rand::Rng;
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::error::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+
+const CRYPTO_CCM_8_TAG_LENGTH: usize = 8;
+const CRYPTO_CCM_TAG_LENGTH: usize = 16;
+const CRYPTO_CCM_NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 12;
+
+type AesCcm8 = Ccm<Aes128, U8, U12>;
+type AesCcm = Ccm<Aes128, U16, U12>;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub enum CryptoCcmTagLen {
+    CryptoCcm8TagLength,
+    CryptoCcmTagLength,
+}
+
+enum CryptoCcmType {
+    CryptoCcm8(AesCcm8),
+    CryptoCcm(AesCcm),
+}
+
+// State needed to handle encrypted input/output
+pub struct CryptoCcm {
+    local_ccm: CryptoCcmType,
+    remote_ccm: CryptoCcmType,
+    local_write_iv: Vec<u8>,
+    remote_write_iv: Vec<u8>,
+    // used by clone()
+    local_write_key: Vec<u8>,
+    remote_write_key: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl Clone for CryptoCcm {
+    fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+        match self.local_ccm {
+            CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm(_) => Self::new(
+                &CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcmTagLength,
+                &self.local_write_key,
+                &self.local_write_iv,
+                &self.remote_write_key,
+                &self.remote_write_iv,
+            ),
+            CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm8(_) => Self::new(
+                &CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcm8TagLength,
+                &self.local_write_key,
+                &self.local_write_iv,
+                &self.remote_write_key,
+                &self.remote_write_iv,
+            ),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl CryptoCcm {
+    pub fn new(
+        tag_len: &CryptoCcmTagLen,
+        local_key: &[u8],
+        local_write_iv: &[u8],
+        remote_key: &[u8],
+        remote_write_iv: &[u8],
+    ) -> Self {
+        let key = GenericArray::from_slice(local_key);
+        let local_ccm = match tag_len {
+            CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcmTagLength => CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm(AesCcm::new(key)),
+            CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcm8TagLength => CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm8(AesCcm8::new(key)),
+        };
+
+        let key = GenericArray::from_slice(remote_key);
+        let remote_ccm = match tag_len {
+            CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcmTagLength => CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm(AesCcm::new(key)),
+            CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcm8TagLength => CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm8(AesCcm8::new(key)),
+        };
+
+        CryptoCcm {
+            local_ccm,
+            local_write_key: local_key.to_vec(),
+            local_write_iv: local_write_iv.to_vec(),
+            remote_ccm,
+            remote_write_key: remote_key.to_vec(),
+            remote_write_iv: remote_write_iv.to_vec(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let payload = &raw[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..];
+        let raw = &raw[..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE];
+
+        let mut nonce = vec![0u8; CRYPTO_CCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
+        nonce[..4].copy_from_slice(&self.local_write_iv[..4]);
+        rand::rng().fill(&mut nonce[4..]);
+        let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce);
+
+        let additional_data = generate_aead_additional_data(pkt_rlh, payload.len());
+
+        let mut buffer: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+        buffer.extend_from_slice(payload);
+
+        match &self.local_ccm {
+            CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm(ccm) => {
+                ccm.encrypt_in_place(nonce, &additional_data, &mut buffer)
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+            }
+            CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm8(ccm8) => {
+                ccm8.encrypt_in_place(nonce, &additional_data, &mut buffer)
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+            }
+        }
+
+        let mut r = Vec::with_capacity(raw.len() + nonce.len() + buffer.len());
+
+        r.extend_from_slice(raw);
+        r.extend_from_slice(&nonce[4..]);
+        r.extend_from_slice(&buffer);
+
+        // Update recordLayer size to include explicit nonce
+        let r_len = (r.len() - RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE) as u16;
+        r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE - 2..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]
+            .copy_from_slice(&r_len.to_be_bytes());
+
+        Ok(r)
+    }
+
+    pub fn decrypt(&self, r: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut reader = Cursor::new(r);
+        let h = RecordLayerHeader::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+        if h.content_type == ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec {
+            // Nothing to encrypt with ChangeCipherSpec
+            return Ok(r.to_vec());
+        }
+
+        if r.len() <= (RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + 8) {
+            return Err(Error::ErrNotEnoughRoomForNonce);
+        }
+
+        let mut nonce = vec![];
+        nonce.extend_from_slice(&self.remote_write_iv[..4]);
+        nonce.extend_from_slice(&r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + 8]);
+        let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce);
+
+        let out = &r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + 8..];
+
+        let mut buffer: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+        buffer.extend_from_slice(out);
+
+        match &self.remote_ccm {
+            CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm(ccm) => {
+                let additional_data =
+                    generate_aead_additional_data(&h, out.len() - CRYPTO_CCM_TAG_LENGTH);
+                ccm.decrypt_in_place(nonce, &additional_data, &mut buffer)
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+            }
+            CryptoCcmType::CryptoCcm8(ccm8) => {
+                let additional_data =
+                    generate_aead_additional_data(&h, out.len() - CRYPTO_CCM_8_TAG_LENGTH);
+                ccm8.decrypt_in_place(nonce, &additional_data, &mut buffer)
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+            }
+        }
+
+        let mut d = Vec::with_capacity(RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + buffer.len());
+        d.extend_from_slice(&r[..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]);
+        d.extend_from_slice(&buffer);
+
+        Ok(d)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/crypto/crypto_chacha20.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+use std::io::Cursor;
+
+use chacha20poly1305::aead::generic_array::GenericArray;
+use chacha20poly1305::aead::AeadInPlace;
+use chacha20poly1305::{ChaCha20Poly1305, KeyInit};
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::error::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*; // what about Aes256Gcm?
+
+const CRYPTO_CHACHA20_TAG_LENGTH: usize = 16;
+const CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 12;
+
+// State needed to handle encrypted input/output
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct CryptoChaCha20 {
+    local_cc: ChaCha20Poly1305,
+    remote_cc: ChaCha20Poly1305,
+    local_key: Vec<u8>,
+    remote_key: Vec<u8>,
+    local_write_iv: Vec<u8>,
+    remote_write_iv: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+fn noncegen(nonce: &mut [u8], epoch: u16, seqnum: u64) {
+    let epoch: u64 = epoch.into();
+    let seqnum = (seqnum & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF) | (epoch << 48);
+    for i in 0..8 {
+        nonce[i + 4] ^= ((seqnum >> (8 * (7 - i))) & 0xFF) as u8;
+    }
+}
+
+impl CryptoChaCha20 {
+    pub fn new(
+        local_key: &[u8],
+        local_write_iv: &[u8],
+        remote_key: &[u8],
+        remote_write_iv: &[u8],
+    ) -> Self {
+        let key = GenericArray::from_slice(local_key);
+        let local_cc = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(key);
+
+        let key = GenericArray::from_slice(remote_key);
+        let remote_cc = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(key);
+
+        CryptoChaCha20 {
+            local_cc,
+            local_write_iv: local_write_iv.to_vec(),
+            remote_cc,
+            local_key: local_key.to_vec(),
+            remote_key: remote_key.to_vec(),
+            remote_write_iv: remote_write_iv.to_vec(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let payload = &raw[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..];
+        let raw = &raw[..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE];
+
+        let mut nonce = vec![0u8; CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NONCE_LENGTH];
+        nonce[..CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NONCE_LENGTH]
+            .copy_from_slice(&self.local_write_iv[..CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NONCE_LENGTH]);
+
+        noncegen(&mut nonce[..], pkt_rlh.epoch, pkt_rlh.sequence_number);
+        let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce);
+
+        let additional_data = generate_aead_additional_data(pkt_rlh, payload.len());
+
+        let mut buffer: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+        buffer.extend_from_slice(payload);
+
+        let tag = self
+            .local_cc
+            .encrypt_in_place_detached(nonce, &additional_data, &mut buffer)
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        let mut r = Vec::with_capacity(raw.len() + buffer.len() + tag.len());
+        r.extend_from_slice(raw);
+        r.extend_from_slice(&buffer);
+        r.extend_from_slice(&tag);
+
+        // Update recordLayer size to include explicit nonce
+        let r_len = (r.len() - RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE) as u16;
+        r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE - 2..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]
+            .copy_from_slice(&r_len.to_be_bytes());
+
+        Ok(r)
+    }
+
+    pub fn decrypt(&self, r: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut reader = Cursor::new(r);
+        let h = RecordLayerHeader::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+        if h.content_type == ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec {
+            // Nothing to encrypt with ChangeCipherSpec
+            return Ok(r.to_vec());
+        }
+
+        let mut nonce = vec![];
+        nonce.extend_from_slice(&self.remote_write_iv[..]);
+
+        noncegen(&mut nonce[..], h.epoch, h.sequence_number);
+        let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce);
+
+        let out = &r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..];
+
+        let additional_data =
+            generate_aead_additional_data(&h, out.len() - CRYPTO_CHACHA20_TAG_LENGTH);
+
+        let mut buffer: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+        buffer.extend_from_slice(out);
+
+        self.remote_cc
+            .decrypt_in_place(nonce, &additional_data, &mut buffer)
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        let mut d = Vec::with_capacity(RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + buffer.len());
+        d.extend_from_slice(&r[..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]);
+        d.extend_from_slice(&buffer);
+
+        Ok(d)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/crypto/crypto_gcm.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+// AES-GCM (Galois Counter Mode)
+// The most widely used block cipher worldwide.
+// Mandatory as of TLS 1.2 (2008) and used by default by most clients.
+// RFC 5288 year 2008 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288
+
+// https://github.com/RustCrypto/AEADs
+// https://docs.rs/aes-gcm/0.8.0/aes_gcm/
+
+use std::io::Cursor;
+
+use aes_gcm::aead::generic_array::GenericArray;
+use aes_gcm::aead::AeadInPlace;
+use aes_gcm::{Aes128Gcm, KeyInit};
+use rand::Rng;
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::error::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*; // what about Aes256Gcm?
+
+const CRYPTO_GCM_TAG_LENGTH: usize = 16;
+const CRYPTO_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 12;
+
+// State needed to handle encrypted input/output
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct CryptoGcm {
+    local_gcm: Aes128Gcm,
+    remote_gcm: Aes128Gcm,
+    local_write_iv: Vec<u8>,
+    remote_write_iv: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl CryptoGcm {
+    pub fn new(
+        local_key: &[u8],
+        local_write_iv: &[u8],
+        remote_key: &[u8],
+        remote_write_iv: &[u8],
+    ) -> Self {
+        let key = GenericArray::from_slice(local_key);
+        let local_gcm = Aes128Gcm::new(key);
+
+        let key = GenericArray::from_slice(remote_key);
+        let remote_gcm = Aes128Gcm::new(key);
+
+        CryptoGcm {
+            local_gcm,
+            local_write_iv: local_write_iv.to_vec(),
+            remote_gcm,
+            remote_write_iv: remote_write_iv.to_vec(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt(&self, pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let payload = &raw[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..];
+        let raw = &raw[..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE];
+
+        let mut nonce = vec![0u8; CRYPTO_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
+        nonce[..4].copy_from_slice(&self.local_write_iv[..4]);
+        rand::rng().fill(&mut nonce[4..]);
+        let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce);
+
+        let additional_data = generate_aead_additional_data(pkt_rlh, payload.len());
+
+        let mut buffer: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+        buffer.extend_from_slice(payload);
+
+        self.local_gcm
+            .encrypt_in_place(nonce, &additional_data, &mut buffer)
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        let mut r = Vec::with_capacity(raw.len() + nonce.len() + buffer.len());
+        r.extend_from_slice(raw);
+        r.extend_from_slice(&nonce[4..]);
+        r.extend_from_slice(&buffer);
+
+        // Update recordLayer size to include explicit nonce
+        let r_len = (r.len() - RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE) as u16;
+        r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE - 2..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]
+            .copy_from_slice(&r_len.to_be_bytes());
+
+        Ok(r)
+    }
+
+    pub fn decrypt(&self, r: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut reader = Cursor::new(r);
+        let h = RecordLayerHeader::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+        if h.content_type == ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec {
+            // Nothing to encrypt with ChangeCipherSpec
+            return Ok(r.to_vec());
+        }
+
+        if r.len() <= (RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + 8) {
+            return Err(Error::ErrNotEnoughRoomForNonce);
+        }
+
+        let mut nonce = vec![];
+        nonce.extend_from_slice(&self.remote_write_iv[..4]);
+        nonce.extend_from_slice(&r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + 8]);
+        let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce);
+
+        let out = &r[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + 8..];
+
+        let additional_data = generate_aead_additional_data(&h, out.len() - CRYPTO_GCM_TAG_LENGTH);
+
+        let mut buffer: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+        buffer.extend_from_slice(out);
+
+        self.remote_gcm
+            .decrypt_in_place(nonce, &additional_data, &mut buffer)
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        let mut d = Vec::with_capacity(RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE + buffer.len());
+        d.extend_from_slice(&r[..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]);
+        d.extend_from_slice(&buffer);
+
+        Ok(d)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/crypto/crypto_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+use std::io::Cursor;
+
+use x509_parser::pem::Pem;
+
+use super::crypto_ccm::*;
+use super::*;
+use crate::content::ContentType;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::{ProtocolVersion, RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE};
+
+const RAW_PRIVATE_KEY: &str = "
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+";
+
+#[test]
+fn test_generate_key_signature() -> Result<()> {
+    let reader = Cursor::new(RAW_PRIVATE_KEY.as_bytes());
+    let pem = match Pem::read(reader) {
+        Ok((pem, _)) => pem,
+        Err(_) => return Err(Error::Other("Pem::read error".to_owned())),
+    };
+    //let private_key = rsa::RSAPrivateKey::from_pkcs1(&pem.contents)?;
+
+    let client_random = vec![
+        0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e,
+        0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d,
+        0x1e, 0x1f,
+    ];
+    let server_random = vec![
+        0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e,
+        0x7f, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d,
+        0x8e, 0x8f,
+    ];
+    let public_key = vec![
+        0x20, 0x9f, 0xd7, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xcf, 0xf4, 0x29, 0x8d, 0xd3, 0xf9, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0x1b, 0x2a,
+        0xf9, 0x10, 0xa0, 0x53, 0x5b, 0x14, 0x88, 0xd7, 0xf8, 0xfa, 0xbb, 0x34, 0x9a, 0x98, 0x28,
+        0x80, 0xb6, 0x15,
+    ];
+    let expected_signature = vec![
+        0x6f, 0x47, 0x97, 0x85, 0xcc, 0x76, 0x50, 0x93, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x69, 0x0b, 0xc3, 0x03,
+        0xd1, 0xb7, 0xe4, 0xab, 0x88, 0x7b, 0xa6, 0x52, 0x80, 0xdf, 0xaa, 0x25, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0x29,
+        0x32, 0xe4, 0xd8, 0x28, 0x28, 0xb3, 0xe8, 0x04, 0x3c, 0x38, 0x16, 0xfc, 0x78, 0xe9, 0x15,
+        0x7b, 0xc5, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0xcd, 0x83, 0x00, 0x57, 0x4a, 0x3c, 0x23, 0x85, 0x75, 0x6b,
+        0x37, 0xd5, 0x89, 0x72, 0x73, 0xf0, 0x44, 0x8c, 0x00, 0x70, 0x1f, 0x6e, 0xa2, 0x81, 0xd0,
+        0x09, 0xc5, 0x20, 0x36, 0xab, 0x23, 0x09, 0x40, 0x1f, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x96, 0x62, 0xbb, 0x81,
+        0xb0, 0x30, 0x72, 0xad, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x31, 0x63, 0x40, 0x52, 0x0a, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x34,
+        0xde, 0x27, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0x54, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x9f, 0x5a, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x9f, 0x53,
+        0x04, 0x34, 0x62, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x74, 0x83, 0x35, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x7e, 0xbf, 0x5a, 0xc4, 0x52,
+        0xd0, 0xea, 0xf9, 0x61, 0x4e, 0xf5, 0x1c, 0x0e, 0x58, 0x02, 0x71, 0xfb, 0x1f, 0x34, 0x55,
+        0xe8, 0x36, 0x70, 0x3c, 0xc1, 0xcb, 0xc9, 0xb7, 0xbb, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x44, 0x9a, 0x6d, 0x88,
+        0x78, 0x98, 0xd4, 0x91, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0x98, 0x81, 0x23, 0x30, 0x73, 0x39, 0x43, 0xd5, 0xbb,
+        0x70, 0x39, 0xba, 0x1f, 0xdb, 0x70, 0x9f, 0x91, 0x83, 0x56, 0xc2, 0xde, 0xed, 0x17, 0x6d,
+        0x2c, 0x3e, 0x21, 0xea, 0x36, 0xb4, 0x91, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x05, 0x60, 0x90, 0xfd, 0xc6, 0x74,
+        0xa9, 0x7b, 0x18, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x1c, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xd3, 0xc1, 0xc0, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x25,
+        0x48, 0x37, 0x3d, 0x45, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x31, 0x14, 0x0a, 0x66, 0x9f, 0xd8, 0xac, 0x74, 0xa2,
+        0xcd, 0xc8, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x9e, 0xc6, 0x66, 0x25, 0xcf, 0x2c, 0x87, 0x5e, 0x5c, 0x36, 0x75,
+        0x86,
+    ];
+
+    let signature = generate_key_signature(
+        &client_random,
+        &server_random,
+        &public_key,
+        NamedCurve::X25519,
+        &CryptoPrivateKey {
+            kind: CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Rsa256(
+                ring::rsa::KeyPair::from_der(&pem.contents)
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?,
+            ),
+            serialized_der: pem.contents.clone(),
+        }, //hashAlgorithmSHA256,
+    )?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        signature, expected_signature,
+        "Signature generation failed \nexp {expected_signature:?} \nactual {signature:?} "
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_ccm_encryption_and_decryption() -> Result<()> {
+    let key = vec![
+        0x18, 0x78, 0xac, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0xbd, 0xd8, 0xc6, 0x01, 0xa6, 0x17, 0x12, 0x6f, 0x63,
+        0x54,
+    ];
+    let iv = vec![0x0e, 0xb2, 0x09, 0x06];
+
+    let ccm = CryptoCcm::new(&CryptoCcmTagLen::CryptoCcmTagLength, &key, &iv, &key, &iv);
+
+    let rlh = RecordLayerHeader {
+        content_type: ContentType::ApplicationData,
+        protocol_version: ProtocolVersion {
+            major: 0xfe,
+            minor: 0xff,
+        },
+        epoch: 0,
+        sequence_number: 18,
+        content_len: 3,
+    };
+
+    let raw = vec![
+        0x17, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, 0x00, 0x03, 0xff, 0xaa,
+        0xbb,
+    ];
+
+    let cipher_text = ccm.encrypt(&rlh, &raw)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        &cipher_text[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE - 2..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE],
+        [0, 27],
+        "RecordLayer size updating failed \nexp: {:?} \nactual {:?} ",
+        [0, 27],
+        &cipher_text[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE - 2..RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE]
+    );
+
+    let plain_text = ccm.decrypt(&cipher_text)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..],
+        plain_text[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..],
+        "Decryption failed \nexp: {:?} \nactual {:?} ",
+        &raw[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..],
+        &plain_text[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..]
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_certificate_verify() -> Result<()> {
+    let plain_text: Vec<u8> = vec![
+        0x6f, 0x47, 0x97, 0x85, 0xcc, 0x76, 0x50, 0x93, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x69, 0x0b, 0xc3, 0x03,
+        0xd1, 0xb7, 0xe4, 0xab, 0x88, 0x7b, 0xa6, 0x52, 0x80, 0xdf, 0xaa, 0x25, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0x29,
+        0x32, 0xe4, 0xd8, 0x28, 0x28, 0xb3, 0xe8, 0x04, 0x3c, 0x38, 0x16, 0xfc, 0x78, 0xe9, 0x15,
+        0x7b, 0xc5, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfc, 0xcd, 0x83, 0x00, 0x57, 0x4a, 0x3c, 0x23, 0x85, 0x75, 0x6b,
+        0x37, 0xd5, 0x89, 0x72, 0x73, 0xf0, 0x44, 0x8c, 0x00, 0x70, 0x1f, 0x6e, 0xa2, 0x81, 0xd0,
+        0x09, 0xc5, 0x20, 0x36, 0xab, 0x23, 0x09, 0x40, 0x1f, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x96, 0x62, 0xbb, 0x81,
+        0xb0, 0x30, 0x72, 0xad, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x31, 0x63, 0x40, 0x52, 0x0a, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x34,
+        0xde, 0x27, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0x54, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x9f, 0x5a, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x9f, 0x53,
+        0x04, 0x34, 0x62, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x74, 0x83, 0x35, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x7e, 0xbf, 0x5a, 0xc4, 0x52,
+        0xd0, 0xea, 0xf9, 0x61, 0x4e, 0xf5, 0x1c, 0x0e, 0x58, 0x02, 0x71, 0xfb, 0x1f, 0x34, 0x55,
+        0xe8, 0x36, 0x70, 0x3c, 0xc1, 0xcb, 0xc9, 0xb7, 0xbb, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x44, 0x9a, 0x6d, 0x88,
+        0x78, 0x98, 0xd4, 0x91, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0x98, 0x81, 0x23, 0x30, 0x73, 0x39, 0x43, 0xd5, 0xbb,
+        0x70, 0x39, 0xba, 0x1f, 0xdb, 0x70, 0x9f, 0x91, 0x83, 0x56, 0xc2, 0xde, 0xed, 0x17, 0x6d,
+        0x2c, 0x3e, 0x21, 0xea, 0x36, 0xb4, 0x91, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x05, 0x60, 0x90, 0xfd, 0xc6, 0x74,
+        0xa9, 0x7b, 0x18, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x1c, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xd3, 0xc1, 0xc0, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x25,
+        0x48, 0x37, 0x3d, 0x45, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x31, 0x14, 0x0a, 0x66, 0x9f, 0xd8, 0xac, 0x74, 0xa2,
+        0xcd, 0xc8, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x9e, 0xc6, 0x66, 0x25, 0xcf, 0x2c, 0x87, 0x5e, 0x5c, 0x36, 0x75,
+        0x86,
+    ];
+
+    //test ECDSA256
+    let certificate_ecdsa256 = Certificate::generate_self_signed(vec!["localhost".to_owned()])?;
+    let cert_verify_ecdsa256 =
+        generate_certificate_verify(&plain_text, &certificate_ecdsa256.private_key)?;
+    verify_certificate_verify(
+        &plain_text,
+        &SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+            hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha256,
+            signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Ecdsa,
+        },
+        &cert_verify_ecdsa256,
+        &certificate_ecdsa256
+            .certificate
+            .iter()
+            .map(|x| x.as_ref().to_owned())
+            .collect::<Vec<Vec<u8>>>(),
+        false,
+    )?;
+
+    //test ED25519
+    let certificate_ed25519 = Certificate::generate_self_signed_with_alg(
+        vec!["localhost".to_owned()],
+        &rcgen::PKCS_ED25519,
+    )?;
+    let cert_verify_ed25519 =
+        generate_certificate_verify(&plain_text, &certificate_ed25519.private_key)?;
+    verify_certificate_verify(
+        &plain_text,
+        &SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+            hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha256,
+            signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Ed25519,
+        },
+        &cert_verify_ed25519,
+        &certificate_ed25519
+            .certificate
+            .iter()
+            .map(|x| x.as_ref().to_owned())
+            .collect::<Vec<Vec<u8>>>(),
+        false,
+    )?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod crypto_test;
+
+pub mod crypto_cbc;
+pub mod crypto_ccm;
+pub mod crypto_chacha20;
+pub mod crypto_gcm;
+pub mod padding;
+
+use std::convert::TryFrom;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use der_parser::oid;
+use der_parser::oid::Oid;
+
+use crate::certificate_verifier::CertificateVerifier;
+use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
+
+use rcgen::{generate_simple_self_signed, CertifiedKey, KeyPair};
+use ring::rand::SystemRandom;
+use ring::signature::{EcdsaKeyPair, Ed25519KeyPair};
+
+use crate::curve::named_curve::*;
+use crate::error::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+use crate::signature_hash_algorithm::{HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm, SignatureHashAlgorithm};
+
+/// A X.509 certificate(s) used to authenticate a DTLS connection.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
+pub struct Certificate {
+    /// DER-encoded certificates.
+    pub certificate: Vec<CertificateDer<'static>>,
+    /// Private key.
+    pub private_key: CryptoPrivateKey,
+}
+
+impl Certificate {
+    /// Generate a self-signed certificate.
+    ///
+    /// See [`rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed`].
+    pub fn generate_self_signed(subject_alt_names: impl Into<Vec<String>>) -> Result<Self> {
+        let CertifiedKey { cert, key_pair } =
+            generate_simple_self_signed(subject_alt_names).unwrap();
+        Ok(Certificate {
+            certificate: vec![cert.der().to_owned()],
+            private_key: CryptoPrivateKey::try_from(&key_pair)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Generate a self-signed certificate with the given algorithm.
+    ///
+    /// See [`rcgen::Certificate::from_params`].
+    pub fn generate_self_signed_with_alg(
+        subject_alt_names: impl Into<Vec<String>>,
+        alg: &'static rcgen::SignatureAlgorithm,
+    ) -> Result<Self> {
+        let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(subject_alt_names).unwrap();
+        let key_pair = rcgen::KeyPair::generate_for(alg).unwrap();
+        let cert = params.self_signed(&key_pair).unwrap();
+
+        Ok(Certificate {
+            certificate: vec![cert.der().to_owned()],
+            private_key: CryptoPrivateKey::try_from(&key_pair)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Parses a certificate from the ASCII PEM format.
+    #[cfg(feature = "pem")]
+    pub fn from_pem(pem_str: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut pems = pem::parse_many(pem_str).map_err(|e| Error::InvalidPEM(e.to_string()))?;
+        if pems.len() < 2 {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidPEM(format!(
+                "expected at least two PEM blocks, got {}",
+                pems.len()
+            )));
+        }
+        if pems[0].tag() != "PRIVATE_KEY" {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidPEM(format!(
+                "invalid tag (expected: 'PRIVATE_KEY', got: '{}')",
+                pems[0].tag()
+            )));
+        }
+
+        let keypair = KeyPair::try_from(pems[0].contents())
+            .map_err(|e| Error::InvalidPEM(format!("can't decode keypair: {e}")))?;
+
+        let mut rustls_certs = Vec::new();
+        for p in pems.drain(1..) {
+            if p.tag() != "CERTIFICATE" {
+                return Err(Error::InvalidPEM(format!(
+                    "invalid tag (expected: 'CERTIFICATE', got: '{}')",
+                    p.tag()
+                )));
+            }
+            rustls_certs.push(CertificateDer::from(p.contents().to_vec()));
+        }
+
+        Ok(Certificate {
+            certificate: rustls_certs,
+            private_key: CryptoPrivateKey::try_from(&keypair)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Serializes the certificate (including the private key) in PKCS#8 format in PEM.
+    #[cfg(feature = "pem")]
+    pub fn serialize_pem(&self) -> String {
+        let mut data = vec![pem::Pem::new(
+            "PRIVATE_KEY".to_string(),
+            self.private_key.serialized_der.clone(),
+        )];
+        for rustls_cert in &self.certificate {
+            data.push(pem::Pem::new(
+                "CERTIFICATE".to_string(),
+                rustls_cert.as_ref(),
+            ));
+        }
+        pem::encode_many(&data)
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn value_key_message(
+    client_random: &[u8],
+    server_random: &[u8],
+    public_key: &[u8],
+    named_curve: NamedCurve,
+) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut server_ecdh_params = vec![0u8; 4];
+    server_ecdh_params[0] = 3; // named curve
+    server_ecdh_params[1..3].copy_from_slice(&(named_curve as u16).to_be_bytes());
+    server_ecdh_params[3] = public_key.len() as u8;
+
+    let mut plaintext = vec![];
+    plaintext.extend_from_slice(client_random);
+    plaintext.extend_from_slice(server_random);
+    plaintext.extend_from_slice(&server_ecdh_params);
+    plaintext.extend_from_slice(public_key);
+
+    plaintext
+}
+
+/// Either ED25519, ECDSA or RSA keypair.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum CryptoPrivateKeyKind {
+    Ed25519(Ed25519KeyPair),
+    Ecdsa256(EcdsaKeyPair),
+    Rsa256(ring::rsa::KeyPair),
+}
+
+/// Private key.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct CryptoPrivateKey {
+    /// Keypair.
+    pub kind: CryptoPrivateKeyKind,
+    /// DER-encoded keypair.
+    pub serialized_der: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl PartialEq for CryptoPrivateKey {
+    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+        if self.serialized_der != other.serialized_der {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        matches!(
+            (&self.kind, &other.kind),
+            (
+                CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Rsa256(_),
+                CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Rsa256(_)
+            ) | (
+                CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ecdsa256(_),
+                CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ecdsa256(_)
+            ) | (
+                CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ed25519(_),
+                CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ed25519(_)
+            )
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+impl Clone for CryptoPrivateKey {
+    fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+        match self.kind {
+            CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ed25519(_) => CryptoPrivateKey {
+                kind: CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ed25519(
+                    Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked(&self.serialized_der).unwrap(),
+                ),
+                serialized_der: self.serialized_der.clone(),
+            },
+            CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ecdsa256(_) => CryptoPrivateKey {
+                kind: CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ecdsa256(
+                    EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(
+                        &ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING,
+                        &self.serialized_der,
+                        &SystemRandom::new(),
+                    )
+                    .unwrap(),
+                ),
+                serialized_der: self.serialized_der.clone(),
+            },
+            CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Rsa256(_) => CryptoPrivateKey {
+                kind: CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Rsa256(
+                    ring::rsa::KeyPair::from_pkcs8(&self.serialized_der).unwrap(),
+                ),
+                serialized_der: self.serialized_der.clone(),
+            },
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<&KeyPair> for CryptoPrivateKey {
+    type Error = Error;
+
+    fn try_from(key_pair: &KeyPair) -> Result<Self> {
+        Self::from_key_pair(key_pair)
+    }
+}
+
+impl CryptoPrivateKey {
+    pub fn from_key_pair(key_pair: &KeyPair) -> Result<Self> {
+        let serialized_der = key_pair.serialize_der();
+        if key_pair.is_compatible(&rcgen::PKCS_ED25519) {
+            Ok(CryptoPrivateKey {
+                kind: CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ed25519(
+                    Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked(&serialized_der)
+                        .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?,
+                ),
+                serialized_der,
+            })
+        } else if key_pair.is_compatible(&rcgen::PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256) {
+            Ok(CryptoPrivateKey {
+                kind: CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ecdsa256(
+                    EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(
+                        &ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING,
+                        &serialized_der,
+                        &SystemRandom::new(),
+                    )
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?,
+                ),
+                serialized_der,
+            })
+        } else if key_pair.is_compatible(&rcgen::PKCS_RSA_SHA256) {
+            Ok(CryptoPrivateKey {
+                kind: CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Rsa256(
+                    ring::rsa::KeyPair::from_pkcs8(&serialized_der)
+                        .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?,
+                ),
+                serialized_der,
+            })
+        } else {
+            Err(Error::Other("Unsupported key_pair".to_owned()))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
+// certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
+// hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.2
+pub(crate) fn generate_key_signature(
+    client_random: &[u8],
+    server_random: &[u8],
+    public_key: &[u8],
+    named_curve: NamedCurve,
+    private_key: &CryptoPrivateKey, /*, hash_algorithm: HashAlgorithm*/
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let msg = value_key_message(client_random, server_random, public_key, named_curve);
+    let signature = match &private_key.kind {
+        CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ed25519(kp) => kp.sign(&msg).as_ref().to_vec(),
+        CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ecdsa256(kp) => {
+            let system_random = SystemRandom::new();
+            kp.sign(&system_random, &msg)
+                .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?
+                .as_ref()
+                .to_vec()
+        }
+        CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Rsa256(kp) => {
+            let system_random = SystemRandom::new();
+            let mut signature = vec![0; kp.public().modulus_len()];
+            kp.sign(
+                &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+                &system_random,
+                &msg,
+                &mut signature,
+            )
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+            signature
+        }
+    };
+
+    Ok(signature)
+}
+
+// add OID_ED25519 which is not defined in x509_parser
+pub const OID_ED25519: Oid<'static> = oid!(1.3.101 .112);
+pub const OID_ECDSA: Oid<'static> = oid!(1.2.840 .10045 .2 .1);
+
+fn verify_signature(
+    message: &[u8],
+    hash_algorithm: &SignatureHashAlgorithm,
+    remote_key_signature: &[u8],
+    raw_certificates: &[Vec<u8>],
+    insecure_verification: bool,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    if raw_certificates.is_empty() {
+        return Err(Error::ErrLengthMismatch);
+    }
+
+    let (_, certificate) = x509_parser::parse_x509_certificate(&raw_certificates[0])
+        .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    let verify_alg: &dyn ring::signature::VerificationAlgorithm = match hash_algorithm.signature {
+        SignatureAlgorithm::Ed25519 => &ring::signature::ED25519,
+        SignatureAlgorithm::Ecdsa if hash_algorithm.hash == HashAlgorithm::Sha256 => {
+            &ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1
+        }
+        SignatureAlgorithm::Ecdsa if hash_algorithm.hash == HashAlgorithm::Sha384 => {
+            &ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1
+        }
+        SignatureAlgorithm::Rsa if hash_algorithm.hash == HashAlgorithm::Sha1 => {
+            &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_1024_8192_SHA1_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY
+        }
+        SignatureAlgorithm::Rsa if (hash_algorithm.hash == HashAlgorithm::Sha256) => {
+            if remote_key_signature.len() < 256 && insecure_verification {
+                &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_1024_8192_SHA256_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY
+            } else {
+                &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256
+            }
+        }
+        SignatureAlgorithm::Rsa if hash_algorithm.hash == HashAlgorithm::Sha384 => {
+            &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA384
+        }
+        SignatureAlgorithm::Rsa if hash_algorithm.hash == HashAlgorithm::Sha512 => {
+            if remote_key_signature.len() < 256 && insecure_verification {
+                &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_1024_8192_SHA512_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY
+            } else {
+                &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA512
+            }
+        }
+        _ => return Err(Error::ErrKeySignatureVerifyUnimplemented),
+    };
+
+    log::trace!("Picked an algorithm {verify_alg:?}");
+
+    let public_key = ring::signature::UnparsedPublicKey::new(
+        verify_alg,
+        certificate
+            .tbs_certificate
+            .subject_pki
+            .subject_public_key
+            .data,
+    );
+
+    public_key
+        .verify(message, remote_key_signature)
+        .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn verify_key_signature(
+    message: &[u8],
+    hash_algorithm: &SignatureHashAlgorithm,
+    remote_key_signature: &[u8],
+    raw_certificates: &[Vec<u8>],
+    insecure_verification: bool,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    verify_signature(
+        message,
+        hash_algorithm,
+        remote_key_signature,
+        raw_certificates,
+        insecure_verification,
+    )
+}
+
+// If the server has sent a CertificateRequest message, the client MUST send the Certificate
+// message.  The ClientKeyExchange message is now sent, and the content
+// of that message will depend on the public key algorithm selected
+// between the ClientHello and the ServerHello.  If the client has sent
+// a certificate with signing ability, a digitally-signed
+// CertificateVerify message is sent to explicitly verify possession of
+// the private key in the certificate.
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3
+pub(crate) fn generate_certificate_verify(
+    handshake_bodies: &[u8],
+    private_key: &CryptoPrivateKey, /*, hashAlgorithm hashAlgorithm*/
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let signature = match &private_key.kind {
+        CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ed25519(kp) => kp.sign(handshake_bodies).as_ref().to_vec(),
+        CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Ecdsa256(kp) => {
+            let system_random = SystemRandom::new();
+            kp.sign(&system_random, handshake_bodies)
+                .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?
+                .as_ref()
+                .to_vec()
+        }
+        CryptoPrivateKeyKind::Rsa256(kp) => {
+            let system_random = SystemRandom::new();
+            let mut signature = vec![0; kp.public().modulus_len()];
+            kp.sign(
+                &ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+                &system_random,
+                handshake_bodies,
+                &mut signature,
+            )
+            .map_err(|e| Error::Other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+            signature
+        }
+    };
+
+    Ok(signature)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn verify_certificate_verify(
+    handshake_bodies: &[u8],
+    hash_algorithm: &SignatureHashAlgorithm,
+    remote_key_signature: &[u8],
+    raw_certificates: &[Vec<u8>],
+    insecure_verification: bool,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    verify_signature(
+        handshake_bodies,
+        hash_algorithm,
+        remote_key_signature,
+        raw_certificates,
+        insecure_verification,
+    )
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn load_certs(raw_certificates: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<Vec<CertificateDer<'static>>> {
+    if raw_certificates.is_empty() {
+        return Err(Error::ErrLengthMismatch);
+    }
+
+    let mut certs = vec![];
+    for raw_cert in raw_certificates {
+        let cert = CertificateDer::from(raw_cert.to_vec());
+        certs.push(cert);
+    }
+
+    Ok(certs)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn verify_client_cert(
+    raw_certificates: &[Vec<u8>],
+    cert_verifier: &Arc<CertificateVerifier>,
+) -> Result<Vec<CertificateDer<'static>>> {
+    let chains = load_certs(raw_certificates)?;
+
+    let (end_entity, intermediates) = chains
+        .split_first()
+        .ok_or(Error::ErrClientCertificateRequired)?;
+
+    match cert_verifier.verify_client_cert(end_entity, intermediates) {
+        Ok(_) => {}
+        Err(err) => return Err(Error::Other(err.to_string())),
+    };
+
+    Ok(chains)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn verify_server_cert(
+    raw_certificates: &[Vec<u8>],
+    cert_verifier: &Arc<CertificateVerifier>,
+    server_name: &str,
+) -> Result<Vec<CertificateDer<'static>>> {
+    let chains = load_certs(raw_certificates)?;
+
+    let (end_entity, intermediates) = chains
+        .split_first()
+        .ok_or(Error::ErrServerMustHaveCertificate)?;
+    match cert_verifier.verify_server_cert(end_entity, intermediates, server_name) {
+        Ok(_) => {}
+        Err(err) => return Err(Error::Other(err.to_string())),
+    };
+
+    Ok(chains)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn generate_aead_additional_data(h: &RecordLayerHeader, payload_len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut additional_data = vec![0u8; 13];
+    // SequenceNumber MUST be set first
+    // we only want uint48, clobbering an extra 2 (using uint64, rust doesn't have uint48)
+    additional_data[..8].copy_from_slice(&h.sequence_number.to_be_bytes());
+    additional_data[..2].copy_from_slice(&h.epoch.to_be_bytes());
+    additional_data[8] = h.content_type as u8;
+    additional_data[9] = h.protocol_version.major;
+    additional_data[10] = h.protocol_version.minor;
+    additional_data[11..].copy_from_slice(&(payload_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
+
+    additional_data
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    #[cfg(feature = "pem")]
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "pem")]
+    #[test]
+    fn test_certificate_serialize_pem_and_from_pem() -> crate::error::Result<()> {
+        let cert = Certificate::generate_self_signed(vec!["webrtc.rs".to_owned()])?;
+
+        let pem = cert.serialize_pem();
+        let loaded_cert = Certificate::from_pem(&pem)?;
+
+        assert_eq!(loaded_cert, cert);
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/crypto/padding.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+use cbc::cipher::block_padding::{PadType, RawPadding, UnpadError};
+use core::panic;
+
+pub enum DtlsPadding {}
+/// Reference: RFC5246, 6.2.3.2
+impl RawPadding for DtlsPadding {
+    const TYPE: PadType = PadType::Reversible;
+
+    fn raw_pad(block: &mut [u8], pos: usize) {
+        if pos >= block.len() {
+            panic!("`pos` is bigger or equal to block size");
+        }
+
+        let padding_length = block.len() - pos - 1;
+        if padding_length > 255 {
+            panic!("block size is too big for DTLS");
+        }
+
+        set(&mut block[pos..], padding_length as u8);
+    }
+
+    fn raw_unpad(data: &[u8]) -> Result<&[u8], UnpadError> {
+        let padding_length = data.last().copied().unwrap_or(1) as usize;
+        if padding_length + 1 > data.len() {
+            return Err(UnpadError);
+        }
+
+        let padding_begin = data.len() - padding_length - 1;
+
+        if data[padding_begin..data.len() - 1]
+            .iter()
+            .any(|&byte| byte as usize != padding_length)
+        {
+            return Err(UnpadError);
+        }
+
+        Ok(&data[0..padding_begin])
+    }
+}
+
+/// Sets all bytes in `dst` equal to `value`
+#[inline(always)]
+fn set(dst: &mut [u8], value: u8) {
+    // SAFETY: we overwrite valid memory behind `dst`
+    // note: loop is not used here because it produces
+    // unnecessary branch which tests for zero-length slices
+    unsafe {
+        core::ptr::write_bytes(dst.as_mut_ptr(), value, dst.len());
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub mod tests {
+    use rand::Rng;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn padding_length_is_amount_of_bytes_excluding_the_padding_length_itself() -> Result<(), ()> {
+        for original_length in 0..128 {
+            for padding_length in 0..(256 - original_length) {
+                let mut block = vec![0; original_length + padding_length + 1];
+                rand::rng().fill(&mut block[0..original_length]);
+                let original = block[0..original_length].to_vec();
+                DtlsPadding::raw_pad(&mut block, original_length);
+
+                for byte in block[original_length..].iter() {
+                    assert_eq!(*byte as usize, padding_length);
+                }
+                assert_eq!(block[0..original_length], original);
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic]
+    fn full_block_is_padding_error() {
+        for original_length in 0..256 {
+            let mut block = vec![0; original_length];
+            DtlsPadding::raw_pad(&mut block, original_length);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic]
+    fn padding_length_bigger_than_255_is_a_pad_error() {
+        let padding_length = 256;
+        for original_length in 0..128 {
+            let mut block = vec![0; original_length + padding_length + 1];
+            DtlsPadding::raw_pad(&mut block, original_length);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_block_is_unpadding_error() {
+        let r = DtlsPadding::raw_unpad(&[]);
+        assert!(r.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn padding_too_big_for_block_is_unpadding_error() {
+        let r = DtlsPadding::raw_unpad(&[1]);
+        assert!(r.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn one_of_the_padding_bytes_with_value_different_than_padding_length_is_unpadding_error() {
+        for padding_length in 0..16 {
+            for invalid_byte in 0..padding_length {
+                let mut block = vec![0; padding_length + 1];
+                DtlsPadding::raw_pad(&mut block, 0);
+
+                assert_eq!(DtlsPadding::raw_unpad(&block).ok(), Some(&[][..]));
+                block[invalid_byte] = (padding_length - 1) as u8;
+                let r = DtlsPadding::raw_unpad(&block);
+                assert!(r.is_err());
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/curve/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+pub mod named_curve;
+
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-10
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub enum EllipticCurveType {
+    NamedCurve = 0x03,
+    Unsupported,
+}
+
+impl From<u8> for EllipticCurveType {
+    fn from(val: u8) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            0x03 => EllipticCurveType::NamedCurve,
+            _ => EllipticCurveType::Unsupported,
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/curve/named_curve.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+use rand_core::OsRng; // requires 'getrandom' feature
+
+use crate::error::*;
+
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-8
+#[repr(u16)]
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub enum NamedCurve {
+    Unsupported = 0x0000,
+    P256 = 0x0017,
+    P384 = 0x0018,
+    X25519 = 0x001d,
+}
+
+impl From<u16> for NamedCurve {
+    fn from(val: u16) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            0x0017 => NamedCurve::P256,
+            0x0018 => NamedCurve::P384,
+            0x001d => NamedCurve::X25519,
+            _ => NamedCurve::Unsupported,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) enum NamedCurvePrivateKey {
+    EphemeralSecretP256(p256::ecdh::EphemeralSecret),
+    EphemeralSecretP384(p384::ecdh::EphemeralSecret),
+    StaticSecretX25519(x25519_dalek::StaticSecret),
+}
+
+pub struct NamedCurveKeypair {
+    pub(crate) curve: NamedCurve,
+    pub(crate) public_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub(crate) private_key: NamedCurvePrivateKey,
+}
+
+fn elliptic_curve_keypair(curve: NamedCurve) -> Result<NamedCurveKeypair> {
+    let (public_key, private_key) = match curve {
+        NamedCurve::P256 => {
+            let secret_key = p256::ecdh::EphemeralSecret::random(&mut OsRng);
+            let public_key = p256::EncodedPoint::from(secret_key.public_key());
+            (
+                public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+                NamedCurvePrivateKey::EphemeralSecretP256(secret_key),
+            )
+        }
+        NamedCurve::P384 => {
+            let secret_key = p384::ecdh::EphemeralSecret::random(&mut OsRng);
+            let public_key = p384::EncodedPoint::from(secret_key.public_key());
+            (
+                public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+                NamedCurvePrivateKey::EphemeralSecretP384(secret_key),
+            )
+        }
+        NamedCurve::X25519 => {
+            let secret_key = x25519_dalek::StaticSecret::random_from_rng(OsRng);
+            let public_key = x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from(&secret_key);
+            (
+                public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+                NamedCurvePrivateKey::StaticSecretX25519(secret_key),
+            )
+        }
+        _ => return Err(Error::ErrInvalidNamedCurve),
+    };
+
+    Ok(NamedCurveKeypair {
+        curve,
+        public_key,
+        private_key,
+    })
+}
+
+impl NamedCurve {
+    pub fn generate_keypair(&self) -> Result<NamedCurveKeypair> {
+        match *self {
+            NamedCurve::X25519 => elliptic_curve_keypair(NamedCurve::X25519),
+            NamedCurve::P256 => elliptic_curve_keypair(NamedCurve::P256),
+            NamedCurve::P384 => elliptic_curve_keypair(NamedCurve::P384),
+            _ => Err(Error::ErrInvalidNamedCurve),
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/error.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+use std::io;
+use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
+
+use thiserror::Error;
+use tokio::sync::mpsc::error::SendError as MpscSendError;
+use util::KeyingMaterialExporterError;
+
+pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error, PartialEq)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("conn is closed")]
+    ErrConnClosed,
+    #[error("read/write timeout")]
+    ErrDeadlineExceeded,
+    #[error("buffer is too small")]
+    ErrBufferTooSmall,
+    #[error("context is not supported for export_keying_material")]
+    ErrContextUnsupported,
+    #[error("packet is too short")]
+    ErrDtlspacketInvalidLength,
+    #[error("handshake is in progress")]
+    ErrHandshakeInProgress,
+    #[error("invalid content type")]
+    ErrInvalidContentType,
+    #[error("invalid mac")]
+    ErrInvalidMac,
+    #[error("packet length and declared length do not match")]
+    ErrInvalidPacketLength,
+    #[error("export_keying_material can not be used with a reserved label")]
+    ErrReservedExportKeyingMaterial,
+    #[error("client sent certificate verify but we have no certificate to verify")]
+    ErrCertificateVerifyNoCertificate,
+    #[error("client+server do not support any shared cipher suites")]
+    ErrCipherSuiteNoIntersection,
+    #[error("server hello can not be created without a cipher suite")]
+    ErrCipherSuiteUnset,
+    #[error("client sent certificate but did not verify it")]
+    ErrClientCertificateNotVerified,
+    #[error("server required client verification, but got none")]
+    ErrClientCertificateRequired,
+    #[error("server responded with SRTP Profile we do not support")]
+    ErrClientNoMatchingSrtpProfile,
+    #[error("client required Extended Master Secret extension, but server does not support it")]
+    ErrClientRequiredButNoServerEms,
+    #[error("server hello can not be created without a compression method")]
+    ErrCompressionMethodUnset,
+    #[error("client+server cookie does not match")]
+    ErrCookieMismatch,
+    #[error("cookie must not be longer then 255 bytes")]
+    ErrCookieTooLong,
+    #[error("PSK Identity Hint provided but PSK is nil")]
+    ErrIdentityNoPsk,
+    #[error("no certificate provided")]
+    ErrInvalidCertificate,
+    #[error("cipher spec invalid")]
+    ErrInvalidCipherSpec,
+    #[error("invalid or unknown cipher suite")]
+    ErrInvalidCipherSuite,
+    #[error("unable to determine if ClientKeyExchange is a public key or PSK Identity")]
+    ErrInvalidClientKeyExchange,
+    #[error("invalid or unknown compression method")]
+    ErrInvalidCompressionMethod,
+    #[error("ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values")]
+    ErrInvalidEcdsasignature,
+    #[error("invalid or unknown elliptic curve type")]
+    ErrInvalidEllipticCurveType,
+    #[error("invalid extension type")]
+    ErrInvalidExtensionType,
+    #[error("invalid hash algorithm")]
+    ErrInvalidHashAlgorithm,
+    #[error("invalid named curve")]
+    ErrInvalidNamedCurve,
+    #[error("invalid private key type")]
+    ErrInvalidPrivateKey,
+    #[error("named curve and private key type does not match")]
+    ErrNamedCurveAndPrivateKeyMismatch,
+    #[error("invalid server name format")]
+    ErrInvalidSniFormat,
+    #[error("invalid signature algorithm")]
+    ErrInvalidSignatureAlgorithm,
+    #[error("expected and actual key signature do not match")]
+    ErrKeySignatureMismatch,
+    #[error("Conn can not be created with a nil nextConn")]
+    ErrNilNextConn,
+    #[error("connection can not be created, no CipherSuites satisfy this Config")]
+    ErrNoAvailableCipherSuites,
+    #[error("connection can not be created, no SignatureScheme satisfy this Config")]
+    ErrNoAvailableSignatureSchemes,
+    #[error("no certificates configured")]
+    ErrNoCertificates,
+    #[error("no config provided")]
+    ErrNoConfigProvided,
+    #[error("client requested zero or more elliptic curves that are not supported by the server")]
+    ErrNoSupportedEllipticCurves,
+    #[error("unsupported protocol version")]
+    ErrUnsupportedProtocolVersion,
+    #[error("Certificate and PSK provided")]
+    ErrPskAndCertificate,
+    #[error("PSK and PSK Identity Hint must both be set for client")]
+    ErrPskAndIdentityMustBeSetForClient,
+    #[error("SRTP support was requested but server did not respond with use_srtp extension")]
+    ErrRequestedButNoSrtpExtension,
+    #[error("Certificate is mandatory for server")]
+    ErrServerMustHaveCertificate,
+    #[error("client requested SRTP but we have no matching profiles")]
+    ErrServerNoMatchingSrtpProfile,
+    #[error(
+        "server requires the Extended Master Secret extension, but the client does not support it"
+    )]
+    ErrServerRequiredButNoClientEms,
+    #[error("expected and actual verify data does not match")]
+    ErrVerifyDataMismatch,
+    #[error("handshake message unset, unable to marshal")]
+    ErrHandshakeMessageUnset,
+    #[error("invalid flight number")]
+    ErrInvalidFlight,
+    #[error("unable to generate key signature, unimplemented")]
+    ErrKeySignatureGenerateUnimplemented,
+    #[error("unable to verify key signature, unimplemented")]
+    ErrKeySignatureVerifyUnimplemented,
+    #[error("data length and declared length do not match")]
+    ErrLengthMismatch,
+    #[error("buffer not long enough to contain nonce")]
+    ErrNotEnoughRoomForNonce,
+    #[error("feature has not been implemented yet")]
+    ErrNotImplemented,
+    #[error("sequence number overflow")]
+    ErrSequenceNumberOverflow,
+    #[error("unable to marshal fragmented handshakes")]
+    ErrUnableToMarshalFragmented,
+    #[error("invalid state machine transition")]
+    ErrInvalidFsmTransition,
+    #[error("ApplicationData with epoch of 0")]
+    ErrApplicationDataEpochZero,
+    #[error("unhandled contentType")]
+    ErrUnhandledContextType,
+    #[error("context canceled")]
+    ErrContextCanceled,
+    #[error("empty fragment")]
+    ErrEmptyFragment,
+    #[error("Alert is Fatal or Close Notify")]
+    ErrAlertFatalOrClose,
+
+    #[error(
+        "Fragment buffer overflow. New size {new_size} is greater than specified max {max_size}"
+    )]
+    ErrFragmentBufferOverflow { new_size: usize, max_size: usize },
+
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Io(#[source] IoError),
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Util(#[from] util::Error),
+    #[error("utf8: {0}")]
+    Utf8(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Sec1(#[source] sec1::Error),
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Aes(#[from] aes::cipher::InvalidLength),
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    P256(#[source] P256Error),
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    RcGen(#[from] rcgen::Error),
+    #[error("mpsc send: {0}")]
+    MpscSend(String),
+    #[error("keying material: {0}")]
+    KeyingMaterial(#[from] KeyingMaterialExporterError),
+
+    /// Error parsing a given PEM string.
+    #[error("invalid PEM: {0}")]
+    InvalidPEM(String),
+
+    #[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Other(String),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+#[error("io error: {0}")]
+pub struct IoError(#[from] pub io::Error);
+
+// Workaround for wanting PartialEq for io::Error.
+impl PartialEq for IoError {
+    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+        self.0.kind() == other.0.kind()
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<io::Error> for Error {
+    fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
+        Error::Io(IoError(e))
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<sec1::Error> for Error {
+    fn from(e: sec1::Error) -> Self {
+        Error::Sec1(e)
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+#[error("{0}")]
+pub struct P256Error(#[source] p256::elliptic_curve::Error);
+
+impl PartialEq for P256Error {
+    fn eq(&self, _: &Self) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<p256::elliptic_curve::Error> for Error {
+    fn from(e: p256::elliptic_curve::Error) -> Self {
+        Error::P256(P256Error(e))
+    }
+}
+
+// Because Tokio SendError is parameterized, we sadly lose the backtrace.
+impl<T> From<MpscSendError<T>> for Error {
+    fn from(e: MpscSendError<T>) -> Self {
+        Error::MpscSend(e.to_string())
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_server_name.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod extension_server_name_test;
+
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use super::*;
+
+const EXTENSION_SERVER_NAME_TYPE_DNSHOST_NAME: u8 = 0;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExtensionServerName {
+    pub(crate) server_name: String,
+}
+
+impl ExtensionServerName {
+    pub fn extension_value(&self) -> ExtensionValue {
+        ExtensionValue::ServerName
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        //TODO: check how to do cryptobyte?
+        2 + 2 + 1 + 2 + self.server_name.len()
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        //TODO: check how to do cryptobyte?
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(2 + 1 + 2 + self.server_name.len() as u16)?;
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(1 + 2 + self.server_name.len() as u16)?;
+        writer.write_u8(EXTENSION_SERVER_NAME_TYPE_DNSHOST_NAME)?;
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(self.server_name.len() as u16)?;
+        writer.write_all(self.server_name.as_bytes())?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        //TODO: check how to do cryptobyte?
+        let _ = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
+        let _ = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
+
+        let name_type = reader.read_u8()?;
+        if name_type != EXTENSION_SERVER_NAME_TYPE_DNSHOST_NAME {
+            return Err(Error::ErrInvalidSniFormat);
+        }
+
+        let buf_len = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
+        let mut buf: Vec<u8> = vec![0u8; buf_len];
+        reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+
+        let server_name = String::from_utf8(buf)?;
+
+        Ok(ExtensionServerName { server_name })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_server_name/extension_server_name_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_extension_server_name() -> Result<()> {
+    let extension = ExtensionServerName {
+        server_name: "test.domain".to_owned(),
+    };
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        extension.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw.as_slice());
+    let new_extension = ExtensionServerName::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        new_extension, extension,
+        "extensionServerName marshal: got {new_extension:?} expected {extension:?}",
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_supported_elliptic_curves.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod extension_supported_elliptic_curves_test;
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::curve::named_curve::*;
+
+const EXTENSION_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 6;
+
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 8422 §5.1.1]
+///
+/// [RFC 8422 §5.1.1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422#section-5.1.1
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves {
+    pub elliptic_curves: Vec<NamedCurve>,
+}
+
+impl ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves {
+    pub fn extension_value(&self) -> ExtensionValue {
+        ExtensionValue::SupportedEllipticCurves
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        2 + 2 + self.elliptic_curves.len() * 2
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(2 + 2 * self.elliptic_curves.len() as u16)?;
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(2 * self.elliptic_curves.len() as u16)?;
+        for v in &self.elliptic_curves {
+            writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(*v as u16)?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let _ = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+
+        let group_count = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize / 2;
+        let mut elliptic_curves = vec![];
+        for _ in 0..group_count {
+            let elliptic_curve = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?.into();
+            elliptic_curves.push(elliptic_curve);
+        }
+
+        Ok(ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves { elliptic_curves })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_supported_elliptic_curves/extension_supported_elliptic_curves_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_extension_supported_groups() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_supported_groups = vec![0x0, 0x4, 0x0, 0x2, 0x0, 0x1d]; // 0x0, 0xa,
+    let parsed_supported_groups = ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves {
+        elliptic_curves: vec![NamedCurve::X25519],
+    };
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        parsed_supported_groups.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_supported_groups,
+        "extensionSupportedGroups marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_supported_groups:?}"
+    );
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw.as_slice());
+    let new_supported_groups = ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        new_supported_groups, parsed_supported_groups,
+        "extensionSupportedGroups unmarshal: got {new_supported_groups:?}, want {parsed_supported_groups:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_supported_point_formats.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod extension_supported_point_formats_test;
+
+use super::*;
+
+const EXTENSION_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_SIZE: usize = 5;
+
+pub type EllipticCurvePointFormat = u8;
+
+pub const ELLIPTIC_CURVE_POINT_FORMAT_UNCOMPRESSED: EllipticCurvePointFormat = 0;
+
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 4492 §5.1.2]
+///
+/// [RFC 4492 §5.1.2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExtensionSupportedPointFormats {
+    pub(crate) point_formats: Vec<EllipticCurvePointFormat>,
+}
+
+impl ExtensionSupportedPointFormats {
+    pub fn extension_value(&self) -> ExtensionValue {
+        ExtensionValue::SupportedPointFormats
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        2 + 1 + self.point_formats.len()
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(1 + self.point_formats.len() as u16)?;
+        writer.write_u8(self.point_formats.len() as u8)?;
+        for v in &self.point_formats {
+            writer.write_u8(*v)?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let _ = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+
+        let point_format_count = reader.read_u8()? as usize;
+        let mut point_formats = vec![];
+        for _ in 0..point_format_count {
+            let point_format = reader.read_u8()?;
+            point_formats.push(point_format);
+        }
+
+        Ok(ExtensionSupportedPointFormats { point_formats })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_supported_point_formats/extension_supported_point_formats_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_extension_supported_point_formats() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_extension_supported_point_formats = vec![0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00]; // 0x00, 0x0b,
+    let parsed_extension_supported_point_formats = ExtensionSupportedPointFormats {
+        point_formats: vec![ELLIPTIC_CURVE_POINT_FORMAT_UNCOMPRESSED],
+    };
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        parsed_extension_supported_point_formats.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_extension_supported_point_formats,
+        "extensionSupportedPointFormats marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_extension_supported_point_formats:?}"
+    );
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw.as_slice());
+    let new_extension_supported_point_formats =
+        ExtensionSupportedPointFormats::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        new_extension_supported_point_formats, parsed_extension_supported_point_formats,
+        "extensionSupportedPointFormats unmarshal: got {new_extension_supported_point_formats:?}, want {parsed_extension_supported_point_formats:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_supported_signature_algorithms.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod extension_supported_signature_algorithms_test;
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::signature_hash_algorithm::*;
+
+const EXTENSION_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 6;
+
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 5246 §7.4.1.4.1]
+///
+/// [RFC 5246 §7.4.1.4.1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms {
+    pub(crate) signature_hash_algorithms: Vec<SignatureHashAlgorithm>,
+}
+
+impl ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms {
+    pub fn extension_value(&self) -> ExtensionValue {
+        ExtensionValue::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        2 + 2 + self.signature_hash_algorithms.len() * 2
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(2 + 2 * self.signature_hash_algorithms.len() as u16)?;
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(2 * self.signature_hash_algorithms.len() as u16)?;
+        for v in &self.signature_hash_algorithms {
+            writer.write_u8(v.hash as u8)?;
+            writer.write_u8(v.signature as u8)?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let _ = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+
+        let algorithm_count = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize / 2;
+        let mut signature_hash_algorithms = vec![];
+        for _ in 0..algorithm_count {
+            let hash = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+            let signature = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+            signature_hash_algorithms.push(SignatureHashAlgorithm { hash, signature });
+        }
+
+        Ok(ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms {
+            signature_hash_algorithms,
+        })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_supported_signature_algorithms/extension_supported_signature_algorithms_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_extension_supported_signature_algorithms() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_extension_supported_signature_algorithms =
+        vec![0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x05, 0x03, 0x06, 0x03]; //0x00, 0x0d,
+    let parsed_extension_supported_signature_algorithms = ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms {
+        signature_hash_algorithms: vec![
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha256,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Ecdsa,
+            },
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha384,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Ecdsa,
+            },
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha512,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Ecdsa,
+            },
+        ],
+    };
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        parsed_extension_supported_signature_algorithms.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_extension_supported_signature_algorithms,
+        "extensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_extension_supported_signature_algorithms:?}"
+    );
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw.as_slice());
+    let new_extension_supported_signature_algorithms =
+        ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        new_extension_supported_signature_algorithms,
+        parsed_extension_supported_signature_algorithms,
+        "extensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms unmarshal: got {new_extension_supported_signature_algorithms:?}, want {parsed_extension_supported_signature_algorithms:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_use_extended_master_secret.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod extension_use_extended_master_secret_test;
+
+use super::*;
+
+const EXTENSION_USE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 4;
+
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 8422]
+///
+/// [RFC 8422]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret {
+    pub(crate) supported: bool,
+}
+
+impl ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret {
+    pub fn extension_value(&self) -> ExtensionValue {
+        ExtensionValue::UseExtendedMasterSecret
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        2
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        // length
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(0)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let _ = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+
+        Ok(ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret { supported: true })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_use_extended_master_secret/extension_use_extended_master_secret_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_extension_use_extended_master_secret() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_extension_use_extended_master_secret = vec![0x00, 0x00];
+    let parsed_extension_use_extended_master_secret =
+        ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret { supported: true };
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        parsed_extension_use_extended_master_secret.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_extension_use_extended_master_secret,
+        "extension_use_extended_master_secret marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_extension_use_extended_master_secret:?}"
+    );
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw.as_slice());
+    let new_extension_use_extended_master_secret =
+        ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        new_extension_use_extended_master_secret, parsed_extension_use_extended_master_secret,
+        "extension_use_extended_master_secret unmarshal: got {new_extension_use_extended_master_secret:?}, want {parsed_extension_use_extended_master_secret:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_use_srtp.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod extension_use_srtp_test;
+
+use super::*;
+
+// SRTPProtectionProfile defines the parameters and options that are in effect for the SRTP processing
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 5764 §4.1.2]
+///
+/// [RFC 5764 §4.1.2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764#section-4.1.2
+#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum SrtpProtectionProfile {
+    Srtp_Aes128_Cm_Hmac_Sha1_80 = 0x0001,
+    Srtp_Aes128_Cm_Hmac_Sha1_32 = 0x0002,
+    Srtp_Aead_Aes_128_Gcm = 0x0007,
+    Srtp_Aead_Aes_256_Gcm = 0x0008,
+    Unsupported,
+}
+
+impl From<u16> for SrtpProtectionProfile {
+    fn from(val: u16) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            0x0001 => SrtpProtectionProfile::Srtp_Aes128_Cm_Hmac_Sha1_80,
+            0x0002 => SrtpProtectionProfile::Srtp_Aes128_Cm_Hmac_Sha1_32,
+            0x0007 => SrtpProtectionProfile::Srtp_Aead_Aes_128_Gcm,
+            0x0008 => SrtpProtectionProfile::Srtp_Aead_Aes_256_Gcm,
+            _ => SrtpProtectionProfile::Unsupported,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+const EXTENSION_USE_SRTPHEADER_SIZE: usize = 6;
+
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 8422]
+///
+/// [RFC 8422]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422
+#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExtensionUseSrtp {
+    pub(crate) protection_profiles: Vec<SrtpProtectionProfile>,
+}
+
+impl ExtensionUseSrtp {
+    pub fn extension_value(&self) -> ExtensionValue {
+        ExtensionValue::UseSrtp
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        2 + 2 + self.protection_profiles.len() * 2 + 1
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(
+            2 + /* MKI Length */ 1 + 2 * self.protection_profiles.len() as u16,
+        )?;
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(2 * self.protection_profiles.len() as u16)?;
+        for v in &self.protection_profiles {
+            writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(*v as u16)?;
+        }
+
+        /* MKI Length */
+        writer.write_u8(0x00)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let _ = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+
+        let profile_count = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize / 2;
+        let mut protection_profiles = vec![];
+        for _ in 0..profile_count {
+            let protection_profile = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?.into();
+            protection_profiles.push(protection_profile);
+        }
+
+        /* MKI Length */
+        let _ = reader.read_u8()?;
+
+        Ok(ExtensionUseSrtp {
+            protection_profiles,
+        })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/extension_use_srtp/extension_use_srtp_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_extension_use_srtp() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_use_srtp = vec![0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00]; //0x00, 0x0e,
+    let parsed_use_srtp = ExtensionUseSrtp {
+        protection_profiles: vec![SrtpProtectionProfile::Srtp_Aes128_Cm_Hmac_Sha1_80],
+    };
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        parsed_use_srtp.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_use_srtp,
+        "extensionUseSRTP marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_use_srtp:?}"
+    );
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw.as_slice());
+    let new_use_srtp = ExtensionUseSrtp::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        new_use_srtp, parsed_use_srtp,
+        "extensionUseSRTP unmarshal: got {new_use_srtp:?}, want {parsed_use_srtp:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+pub mod extension_server_name;
+pub mod extension_supported_elliptic_curves;
+pub mod extension_supported_point_formats;
+pub mod extension_supported_signature_algorithms;
+pub mod extension_use_extended_master_secret;
+pub mod extension_use_srtp;
+pub mod renegotiation_info;
+
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+use extension_server_name::*;
+use extension_supported_elliptic_curves::*;
+use extension_supported_point_formats::*;
+use extension_supported_signature_algorithms::*;
+use extension_use_extended_master_secret::*;
+use extension_use_srtp::*;
+
+use crate::error::*;
+use crate::extension::renegotiation_info::ExtensionRenegotiationInfo;
+
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ExtensionValue {
+    ServerName = 0,
+    SupportedEllipticCurves = 10,
+    SupportedPointFormats = 11,
+    SupportedSignatureAlgorithms = 13,
+    UseSrtp = 14,
+    UseExtendedMasterSecret = 23,
+    RenegotiationInfo = 65281,
+    Unsupported,
+}
+
+impl From<u16> for ExtensionValue {
+    fn from(val: u16) -> Self {
+        match val {
+            0 => ExtensionValue::ServerName,
+            10 => ExtensionValue::SupportedEllipticCurves,
+            11 => ExtensionValue::SupportedPointFormats,
+            13 => ExtensionValue::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms,
+            14 => ExtensionValue::UseSrtp,
+            23 => ExtensionValue::UseExtendedMasterSecret,
+            65281 => ExtensionValue::RenegotiationInfo,
+            _ => ExtensionValue::Unsupported,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum Extension {
+    ServerName(ExtensionServerName),
+    SupportedEllipticCurves(ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves),
+    SupportedPointFormats(ExtensionSupportedPointFormats),
+    SupportedSignatureAlgorithms(ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms),
+    UseSrtp(ExtensionUseSrtp),
+    UseExtendedMasterSecret(ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret),
+    RenegotiationInfo(ExtensionRenegotiationInfo),
+}
+
+impl Extension {
+    pub fn extension_value(&self) -> ExtensionValue {
+        match self {
+            Extension::ServerName(ext) => ext.extension_value(),
+            Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(ext) => ext.extension_value(),
+            Extension::SupportedPointFormats(ext) => ext.extension_value(),
+            Extension::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms(ext) => ext.extension_value(),
+            Extension::UseSrtp(ext) => ext.extension_value(),
+            Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(ext) => ext.extension_value(),
+            Extension::RenegotiationInfo(ext) => ext.extension_value(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        let mut len = 2;
+
+        len += match self {
+            Extension::ServerName(ext) => ext.size(),
+            Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(ext) => ext.size(),
+            Extension::SupportedPointFormats(ext) => ext.size(),
+            Extension::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms(ext) => ext.size(),
+            Extension::UseSrtp(ext) => ext.size(),
+            Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(ext) => ext.size(),
+            Extension::RenegotiationInfo(ext) => ext.size(),
+        };
+
+        len
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(self.extension_value() as u16)?;
+        match self {
+            Extension::ServerName(ext) => ext.marshal(writer),
+            Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(ext) => ext.marshal(writer),
+            Extension::SupportedPointFormats(ext) => ext.marshal(writer),
+            Extension::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms(ext) => ext.marshal(writer),
+            Extension::UseSrtp(ext) => ext.marshal(writer),
+            Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(ext) => ext.marshal(writer),
+            Extension::RenegotiationInfo(ext) => ext.marshal(writer),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let extension_value: ExtensionValue = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?.into();
+        match extension_value {
+            ExtensionValue::ServerName => Ok(Extension::ServerName(
+                ExtensionServerName::unmarshal(reader)?,
+            )),
+            ExtensionValue::SupportedEllipticCurves => Ok(Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(
+                ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves::unmarshal(reader)?,
+            )),
+            ExtensionValue::SupportedPointFormats => Ok(Extension::SupportedPointFormats(
+                ExtensionSupportedPointFormats::unmarshal(reader)?,
+            )),
+            ExtensionValue::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms => {
+                Ok(Extension::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms(
+                    ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms::unmarshal(reader)?,
+                ))
+            }
+            ExtensionValue::UseSrtp => Ok(Extension::UseSrtp(ExtensionUseSrtp::unmarshal(reader)?)),
+            ExtensionValue::UseExtendedMasterSecret => Ok(Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(
+                ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret::unmarshal(reader)?,
+            )),
+            ExtensionValue::RenegotiationInfo => Ok(Extension::RenegotiationInfo(
+                ExtensionRenegotiationInfo::unmarshal(reader)?,
+            )),
+            _ => Err(Error::ErrInvalidExtensionType),
+        }
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/renegotiation_info.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod renegotiation_info_test;
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::error::Error::ErrInvalidPacketLength;
+
+const RENEGOTIATION_INFO_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 5;
+
+/// RenegotiationInfo allows a Client/Server to
+/// communicate their renegotiation support
+///
+/// ## Specifications
+///
+/// * [RFC 5746]
+///
+/// [RFC 5746]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExtensionRenegotiationInfo {
+    pub(crate) renegotiated_connection: u8,
+}
+
+impl ExtensionRenegotiationInfo {
+    // TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+    pub fn extension_value(&self) -> ExtensionValue {
+        ExtensionValue::RenegotiationInfo
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        3
+    }
+
+    /// marshal encodes the extension
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(1)?; //length
+        writer.write_u8(self.renegotiated_connection)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    /// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let l = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?; //length
+        if l != 1 {
+            return Err(ErrInvalidPacketLength);
+        }
+
+        let renegotiated_connection = reader.read_u8()?;
+
+        Ok(ExtensionRenegotiationInfo {
+            renegotiated_connection,
+        })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/extension/renegotiation_info/renegotiation_info_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_renegotiation_info() -> Result<()> {
+    let extension = ExtensionRenegotiationInfo {
+        renegotiated_connection: 0,
+    };
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        extension.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw.as_slice());
+    let new_extension = ExtensionRenegotiationInfo::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        new_extension.renegotiated_connection,
+        extension.renegotiated_connection
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/flight/flight0.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+use std::fmt;
+use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use rand::Rng;
+
+use super::flight2::*;
+use super::*;
+use crate::config::*;
+use crate::conn::*;
+use crate::curve::named_curve::NamedCurve;
+use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::extension::*;
+use crate::handshake::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+use crate::*;
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct Flight0;
+
+impl fmt::Display for Flight0 {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "Flight 0")
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Flight for Flight0 {
+    async fn parse(
+        &self,
+        _tx: &mut mpsc::Sender<mpsc::Sender<()>>,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let (seq, msgs) = match cache
+            .full_pull_map(
+                0,
+                &[HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                }],
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok((seq, msgs)) => (seq, msgs),
+            Err(_) => return Err((None, None)),
+        };
+
+        state.handshake_recv_sequence = seq;
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::ClientHello) {
+            // Validate type
+            let client_hello = match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::ClientHello(client_hello) => client_hello,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            if client_hello.version != PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2 {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrUnsupportedProtocolVersion),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            state.remote_random = client_hello.random.clone();
+
+            if let Ok(id) =
+                find_matching_cipher_suite(&client_hello.cipher_suites, &cfg.local_cipher_suites)
+            {
+                if let Ok(cipher_suite) = cipher_suite_for_id(id) {
+                    log::debug!(
+                        "[handshake:{}] use cipher suite: {}",
+                        srv_cli_str(state.is_client),
+                        cipher_suite.to_string()
+                    );
+                    let mut cs = state.cipher_suite.lock().await;
+                    *cs = Some(cipher_suite);
+                }
+            } else {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrCipherSuiteNoIntersection),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            for extension in &client_hello.extensions {
+                match extension {
+                    Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(e) => {
+                        if e.elliptic_curves.is_empty() {
+                            return Err((
+                                Some(Alert {
+                                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                                }),
+                                Some(Error::ErrNoSupportedEllipticCurves),
+                            ));
+                        }
+                        for curve in e.elliptic_curves.iter() {
+                            if curve != &NamedCurve::Unsupported {
+                                state.named_curve = *curve;
+                                break;
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Extension::UseSrtp(e) => {
+                        if let Ok(profile) = find_matching_srtp_profile(
+                            &e.protection_profiles,
+                            &cfg.local_srtp_protection_profiles,
+                        ) {
+                            state.srtp_protection_profile = profile;
+                        } else {
+                            return Err((
+                                Some(Alert {
+                                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                                }),
+                                Some(Error::ErrServerNoMatchingSrtpProfile),
+                            ));
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(_) => {
+                        if cfg.extended_master_secret != ExtendedMasterSecretType::Disable {
+                            state.extended_master_secret = true;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Extension::ServerName(e) => {
+                        state.server_name.clone_from(&e.server_name); // remote server name
+                    }
+                    _ => {}
+                }
+            }
+
+            if cfg.extended_master_secret == ExtendedMasterSecretType::Require
+                && !state.extended_master_secret
+            {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrServerRequiredButNoClientEms),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            if state.local_keypair.is_none() {
+                state.local_keypair = match state.named_curve.generate_keypair() {
+                    Ok(local_keypar) => Some(local_keypar),
+                    Err(err) => {
+                        return Err((
+                            Some(Alert {
+                                alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                alert_description: AlertDescription::IllegalParameter,
+                            }),
+                            Some(err),
+                        ))
+                    }
+                };
+            }
+
+            Ok(Box::new(Flight2 {}))
+        } else {
+            Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                }),
+                None,
+            ))
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn generate(
+        &self,
+        state: &mut State,
+        _cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        _cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Packet>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        // Initialize
+        state.cookie = vec![0; COOKIE_LENGTH];
+        rand::rng().fill(state.cookie.as_mut_slice());
+
+        //TODO: figure out difference between golang's atom store and rust atom store
+        let zero_epoch = 0;
+        state.local_epoch.store(zero_epoch, Ordering::SeqCst);
+        state.remote_epoch.store(zero_epoch, Ordering::SeqCst);
+
+        state.named_curve = DEFAULT_NAMED_CURVE;
+        state.local_random.populate();
+
+        Ok(vec![])
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/flight/flight1.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+use std::fmt;
+use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+
+use super::flight3::*;
+use super::*;
+use crate::compression_methods::*;
+use crate::config::*;
+use crate::conn::*;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::curve::named_curve::*;
+use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::extension::extension_server_name::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_elliptic_curves::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_point_formats::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_signature_algorithms::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_use_extended_master_secret::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_use_srtp::*;
+use crate::extension::renegotiation_info::ExtensionRenegotiationInfo;
+use crate::extension::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_client_hello::*;
+use crate::handshake::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+use crate::record_layer::*;
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct Flight1;
+
+impl fmt::Display for Flight1 {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "Flight 1")
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Flight for Flight1 {
+    async fn parse(
+        &self,
+        tx: &mut mpsc::Sender<mpsc::Sender<()>>,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        // HelloVerifyRequest can be skipped by the server,
+        // so allow ServerHello during flight1 also
+        let (seq, msgs) = match cache
+            .full_pull_map(
+                state.handshake_recv_sequence,
+                &[
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::HelloVerifyRequest,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: true,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: true,
+                    },
+                ],
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            // No valid message received. Keep reading
+            Ok((seq, msgs)) => (seq, msgs),
+            Err(_) => return Err((None, None)),
+        };
+
+        if msgs.contains_key(&HandshakeType::ServerHello) {
+            // Flight1 and flight2 were skipped.
+            // Parse as flight3.
+            let flight3 = Flight3 {};
+            return flight3.parse(tx, state, cache, cfg).await;
+        }
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::HelloVerifyRequest) {
+            // DTLS 1.2 clients must not assume that the server will use the protocol version
+            // specified in HelloVerifyRequest message. RFC 6347 Section 4.2.1
+            let h = match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::HelloVerifyRequest(h) => h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            if h.version != PROTOCOL_VERSION1_0 && h.version != PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2 {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrUnsupportedProtocolVersion),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            state.cookie.clone_from(&h.cookie);
+            state.handshake_recv_sequence = seq;
+            Ok(Box::new(Flight3 {}))
+        } else {
+            Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                }),
+                None,
+            ))
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn generate(
+        &self,
+        state: &mut State,
+        _cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Packet>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let zero_epoch = 0;
+        state.local_epoch.store(zero_epoch, Ordering::SeqCst);
+        state.remote_epoch.store(zero_epoch, Ordering::SeqCst);
+
+        state.named_curve = DEFAULT_NAMED_CURVE;
+        state.cookie = vec![];
+        state.local_random.populate();
+
+        let mut extensions = vec![
+            Extension::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms(ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms {
+                signature_hash_algorithms: cfg.local_signature_schemes.clone(),
+            }),
+            Extension::RenegotiationInfo(ExtensionRenegotiationInfo {
+                renegotiated_connection: 0,
+            }),
+        ];
+
+        if cfg.local_psk_callback.is_none() {
+            extensions.extend_from_slice(&[
+                Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves {
+                    elliptic_curves: vec![NamedCurve::P256, NamedCurve::X25519, NamedCurve::P384],
+                }),
+                Extension::SupportedPointFormats(ExtensionSupportedPointFormats {
+                    point_formats: vec![ELLIPTIC_CURVE_POINT_FORMAT_UNCOMPRESSED],
+                }),
+            ]);
+        }
+
+        if !cfg.local_srtp_protection_profiles.is_empty() {
+            extensions.push(Extension::UseSrtp(ExtensionUseSrtp {
+                protection_profiles: cfg.local_srtp_protection_profiles.clone(),
+            }));
+        }
+
+        if cfg.extended_master_secret == ExtendedMasterSecretType::Request
+            || cfg.extended_master_secret == ExtendedMasterSecretType::Require
+        {
+            extensions.push(Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(
+                ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret { supported: true },
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if !cfg.server_name.is_empty() {
+            extensions.push(Extension::ServerName(ExtensionServerName {
+                server_name: cfg.server_name.clone(),
+            }));
+        }
+
+        Ok(vec![Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                0,
+                Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::ClientHello(
+                    HandshakeMessageClientHello {
+                        version: PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                        random: state.local_random.clone(),
+                        cookie: state.cookie.clone(),
+
+                        cipher_suites: cfg.local_cipher_suites.clone(),
+                        compression_methods: default_compression_methods(),
+                        extensions,
+                    },
+                ))),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: false,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+        }])
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/flight/flight2.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+use std::fmt;
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+
+use super::flight0::*;
+use super::flight4::*;
+use super::*;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_hello_verify_request::*;
+use crate::handshake::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct Flight2;
+
+impl fmt::Display for Flight2 {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "Flight 2")
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Flight for Flight2 {
+    fn has_retransmit(&self) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+
+    async fn parse(
+        &self,
+        tx: &mut mpsc::Sender<mpsc::Sender<()>>,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let (seq, msgs) = match cache
+            .full_pull_map(
+                state.handshake_recv_sequence,
+                &[HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                }],
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            // No valid message received. Keep reading
+            Ok((seq, msgs)) => (seq, msgs),
+
+            // Client may retransmit the first ClientHello when HelloVerifyRequest is dropped.
+            // Parse as flight 0 in this case.
+            Err(_) => return Flight0 {}.parse(tx, state, cache, cfg).await,
+        };
+
+        state.handshake_recv_sequence = seq;
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::ClientHello) {
+            // Validate type
+            let client_hello = match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::ClientHello(client_hello) => client_hello,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            if client_hello.version != PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2 {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrUnsupportedProtocolVersion),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            if client_hello.cookie.is_empty() {
+                return Err((None, None));
+            }
+
+            if state.cookie != client_hello.cookie {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::AccessDenied,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrCookieMismatch),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            Ok(Box::new(Flight4 {}))
+        } else {
+            Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                }),
+                None,
+            ))
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn generate(
+        &self,
+        state: &mut State,
+        _cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        _cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Packet>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        state.handshake_send_sequence = 0;
+        Ok(vec![Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                0,
+                Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::HelloVerifyRequest(
+                    HandshakeMessageHelloVerifyRequest {
+                        version: PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                        cookie: state.cookie.clone(),
+                    },
+                ))),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: false,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+        }])
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/flight/flight3.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+use std::fmt;
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use log::*;
+
+use super::flight5::*;
+use super::*;
+use crate::cipher_suite::cipher_suite_for_id;
+use crate::compression_methods::*;
+use crate::config::*;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::curve::named_curve::*;
+use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::extension::extension_server_name::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_elliptic_curves::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_point_formats::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_signature_algorithms::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_use_extended_master_secret::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_use_srtp::*;
+use crate::extension::renegotiation_info::ExtensionRenegotiationInfo;
+use crate::extension::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_client_hello::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_server_key_exchange::*;
+use crate::handshake::*;
+use crate::prf::{prf_pre_master_secret, prf_psk_pre_master_secret};
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+use crate::record_layer::*;
+use crate::{find_matching_cipher_suite, find_matching_srtp_profile};
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct Flight3;
+
+impl fmt::Display for Flight3 {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "Flight 3")
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Flight for Flight3 {
+    async fn parse(
+        &self,
+        _tx: &mut mpsc::Sender<mpsc::Sender<()>>,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        // Clients may receive multiple HelloVerifyRequest messages with different cookies.
+        // Clients SHOULD handle this by sending a new ClientHello with a cookie in response
+        // to the new HelloVerifyRequest. RFC 6347 Section 4.2.1
+        if let Ok((seq, msgs)) = cache
+            .full_pull_map(
+                state.handshake_recv_sequence,
+                &[HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::HelloVerifyRequest,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: true,
+                }],
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::HelloVerifyRequest) {
+                // DTLS 1.2 clients must not assume that the server will use the protocol version
+                // specified in HelloVerifyRequest message. RFC 6347 Section 4.2.1
+                let h = match message {
+                    HandshakeMessage::HelloVerifyRequest(h) => h,
+                    _ => {
+                        return Err((
+                            Some(Alert {
+                                alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                            }),
+                            None,
+                        ))
+                    }
+                };
+
+                // DTLS 1.2 clients must not assume that the server will use the protocol version
+                // specified in HelloVerifyRequest message. RFC 6347 Section 4.2.1
+                if h.version != PROTOCOL_VERSION1_0 && h.version != PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2 {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrUnsupportedProtocolVersion),
+                    ));
+                }
+
+                state.cookie.clone_from(&h.cookie);
+                state.handshake_recv_sequence = seq;
+                return Ok(Box::new(Flight3 {}) as Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>);
+            }
+        }
+
+        let result = if cfg.local_psk_callback.is_some() {
+            cache
+                .full_pull_map(
+                    state.handshake_recv_sequence,
+                    &[
+                        HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                            typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                            epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                            is_client: false,
+                            optional: false,
+                        },
+                        HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                            typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                            epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                            is_client: false,
+                            optional: true,
+                        },
+                        HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                            typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                            epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                            is_client: false,
+                            optional: false,
+                        },
+                    ],
+                )
+                .await
+        } else {
+            cache
+                .full_pull_map(
+                    state.handshake_recv_sequence,
+                    &[
+                        HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                            typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                            epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                            is_client: false,
+                            optional: false,
+                        },
+                        HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                            typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                            epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                            is_client: false,
+                            optional: true,
+                        },
+                        HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                            typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                            epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                            is_client: false,
+                            optional: false,
+                        },
+                        HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                            typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                            epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                            is_client: false,
+                            optional: true,
+                        },
+                        HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                            typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                            epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                            is_client: false,
+                            optional: false,
+                        },
+                    ],
+                )
+                .await
+        };
+
+        let (seq, msgs) = match result {
+            Ok((seq, msgs)) => (seq, msgs),
+            Err(_) => return Err((None, None)),
+        };
+
+        state.handshake_recv_sequence = seq;
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::ServerHello) {
+            let h = match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::ServerHello(h) => h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            if h.version != PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2 {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrUnsupportedProtocolVersion),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            for extension in &h.extensions {
+                match extension {
+                    Extension::UseSrtp(e) => {
+                        let profile = match find_matching_srtp_profile(
+                            &e.protection_profiles,
+                            &cfg.local_srtp_protection_profiles,
+                        ) {
+                            Ok(profile) => profile,
+                            Err(_) => {
+                                return Err((
+                                    Some(Alert {
+                                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                        alert_description: AlertDescription::IllegalParameter,
+                                    }),
+                                    Some(Error::ErrClientNoMatchingSrtpProfile),
+                                ))
+                            }
+                        };
+                        state.srtp_protection_profile = profile;
+                    }
+                    Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(_) => {
+                        if cfg.extended_master_secret != ExtendedMasterSecretType::Disable {
+                            state.extended_master_secret = true;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    _ => {}
+                };
+            }
+
+            if cfg.extended_master_secret == ExtendedMasterSecretType::Require
+                && !state.extended_master_secret
+            {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrClientRequiredButNoServerEms),
+                ));
+            }
+            if !cfg.local_srtp_protection_profiles.is_empty()
+                && state.srtp_protection_profile == SrtpProtectionProfile::Unsupported
+            {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrRequestedButNoSrtpExtension),
+                ));
+            }
+            if find_matching_cipher_suite(&[h.cipher_suite], &cfg.local_cipher_suites).is_err() {
+                debug!(
+                    "[handshake:{}] use cipher suite: {}",
+                    srv_cli_str(state.is_client),
+                    h.cipher_suite
+                );
+
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrCipherSuiteNoIntersection),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            let cipher_suite = match cipher_suite_for_id(h.cipher_suite) {
+                Ok(cipher_suite) => cipher_suite,
+                Err(_) => {
+                    debug!(
+                        "[handshake:{}] use cipher suite: {}",
+                        srv_cli_str(state.is_client),
+                        h.cipher_suite
+                    );
+
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrInvalidCipherSuite),
+                    ));
+                }
+            };
+
+            trace!(
+                "[handshake:{}] use cipher suite: {}",
+                srv_cli_str(state.is_client),
+                cipher_suite.to_string()
+            );
+            {
+                let mut cs = state.cipher_suite.lock().await;
+                *cs = Some(cipher_suite);
+            }
+            state.remote_random = h.random.clone();
+        }
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::Certificate) {
+            let h = match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::Certificate(h) => h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+            state.peer_certificates.clone_from(&h.certificate);
+        }
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange) {
+            let h = match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::ServerKeyExchange(h) => h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            if let Err((alert, err)) = handle_server_key_exchange(state, cfg, h).await {
+                return Err((alert, err));
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::CertificateRequest) {
+            match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::CertificateRequest(_) => {}
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+            state.remote_requested_certificate = true;
+        }
+
+        Ok(Box::new(Flight5 {}) as Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>)
+    }
+
+    async fn generate(
+        &self,
+        state: &mut State,
+        _cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Packet>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let mut extensions = vec![
+            Extension::SupportedSignatureAlgorithms(ExtensionSupportedSignatureAlgorithms {
+                signature_hash_algorithms: cfg.local_signature_schemes.clone(),
+            }),
+            Extension::RenegotiationInfo(ExtensionRenegotiationInfo {
+                renegotiated_connection: 0,
+            }),
+        ];
+
+        if cfg.local_psk_callback.is_none() {
+            extensions.extend_from_slice(&[
+                Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves {
+                    elliptic_curves: vec![NamedCurve::P256, NamedCurve::X25519, NamedCurve::P384],
+                }),
+                Extension::SupportedPointFormats(ExtensionSupportedPointFormats {
+                    point_formats: vec![ELLIPTIC_CURVE_POINT_FORMAT_UNCOMPRESSED],
+                }),
+            ]);
+        }
+
+        if !cfg.local_srtp_protection_profiles.is_empty() {
+            extensions.push(Extension::UseSrtp(ExtensionUseSrtp {
+                protection_profiles: cfg.local_srtp_protection_profiles.clone(),
+            }));
+        }
+
+        if cfg.extended_master_secret == ExtendedMasterSecretType::Request
+            || cfg.extended_master_secret == ExtendedMasterSecretType::Require
+        {
+            extensions.push(Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(
+                ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret { supported: true },
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if !cfg.server_name.is_empty() {
+            extensions.push(Extension::ServerName(ExtensionServerName {
+                server_name: cfg.server_name.clone(),
+            }));
+        }
+
+        Ok(vec![Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                0,
+                Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::ClientHello(
+                    HandshakeMessageClientHello {
+                        version: PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                        random: state.local_random.clone(),
+                        cookie: state.cookie.clone(),
+
+                        cipher_suites: cfg.local_cipher_suites.clone(),
+                        compression_methods: default_compression_methods(),
+                        extensions,
+                    },
+                ))),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: false,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+        }])
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) async fn handle_server_key_exchange(
+    state: &mut State,
+    cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    h: &HandshakeMessageServerKeyExchange,
+) -> Result<(), (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+    if let Some(local_psk_callback) = &cfg.local_psk_callback {
+        let psk = match local_psk_callback(&h.identity_hint).await {
+            Ok(psk) => psk,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                    }),
+                    Some(err),
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+
+        state.identity_hint.clone_from(&h.identity_hint);
+        state.pre_master_secret = prf_psk_pre_master_secret(&psk);
+    } else {
+        let local_keypair = match h.named_curve.generate_keypair() {
+            Ok(local_keypair) => local_keypair,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                    }),
+                    Some(err),
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+
+        state.pre_master_secret = match prf_pre_master_secret(
+            &h.public_key,
+            &local_keypair.private_key,
+            local_keypair.curve,
+        ) {
+            Ok(pre_master_secret) => pre_master_secret,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                    }),
+                    Some(err),
+                ))
+            }
+        };
+
+        state.local_keypair = Some(local_keypair);
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/flight/flight4.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,853 @@
+use std::fmt;
+use std::io::BufWriter;
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use log::*;
+
+use super::flight6::*;
+use super::*;
+use crate::cipher_suite::*;
+use crate::client_certificate_type::*;
+use crate::compression_methods::*;
+use crate::config::*;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::crypto::*;
+use crate::curve::named_curve::*;
+use crate::curve::*;
+use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_elliptic_curves::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_point_formats::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_use_extended_master_secret::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_use_srtp::*;
+use crate::extension::renegotiation_info::ExtensionRenegotiationInfo;
+use crate::extension::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_certificate::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_certificate_request::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_server_hello::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_server_hello_done::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_server_key_exchange::*;
+use crate::handshake::*;
+use crate::prf::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+use crate::record_layer::*;
+use crate::signature_hash_algorithm::*;
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct Flight4;
+
+impl fmt::Display for Flight4 {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "Flight 4")
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Flight for Flight4 {
+    async fn parse(
+        &self,
+        tx: &mut mpsc::Sender<mpsc::Sender<()>>,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let (seq, msgs) = match cache
+            .full_pull_map(
+                state.handshake_recv_sequence,
+                &[
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: true,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: true,
+                    },
+                ],
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok((seq, msgs)) => (seq, msgs),
+            Err(_) => return Err((None, None)),
+        };
+
+        let client_key_exchange = if let Some(HandshakeMessage::ClientKeyExchange(h)) =
+            msgs.get(&HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange)
+        {
+            h
+        } else {
+            return Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                }),
+                None,
+            ));
+        };
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::Certificate) {
+            let h = match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::Certificate(h) => h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            state.peer_certificates.clone_from(&h.certificate);
+            trace!(
+                "[handshake] PeerCertificates4 {}",
+                state.peer_certificates.len()
+            );
+        }
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::CertificateVerify) {
+            let h = match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::CertificateVerify(h) => h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            if state.peer_certificates.is_empty() {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::NoCertificate,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrCertificateVerifyNoCertificate),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            let plain_text = cache
+                .pull_and_merge(&[
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                ])
+                .await;
+
+            // Verify that the pair of hash algorithm and signature is listed.
+            let mut valid_signature_scheme = false;
+            for ss in &cfg.local_signature_schemes {
+                if ss.hash == h.algorithm.hash && ss.signature == h.algorithm.signature {
+                    valid_signature_scheme = true;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            if !valid_signature_scheme {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                    }),
+                    Some(Error::ErrNoAvailableSignatureSchemes),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            if let Err(err) = verify_certificate_verify(
+                &plain_text,
+                &h.algorithm,
+                &h.signature,
+                &state.peer_certificates,
+                cfg.insecure_verification,
+            ) {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                    }),
+                    Some(err),
+                ));
+            }
+
+            let mut chains = vec![];
+            let mut verified = false;
+            if cfg.client_auth as u8 >= ClientAuthType::VerifyClientCertIfGiven as u8 {
+                if let Some(client_cert_verifier) = &cfg.client_cert_verifier {
+                    chains =
+                        match verify_client_cert(&state.peer_certificates, client_cert_verifier) {
+                            Ok(chains) => chains,
+                            Err(err) => {
+                                return Err((
+                                    Some(Alert {
+                                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                        alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                                    }),
+                                    Some(err),
+                                ))
+                            }
+                        };
+                } else {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrInvalidCertificate),
+                    ));
+                }
+
+                verified = true
+            }
+            if let Some(verify_peer_certificate) = &cfg.verify_peer_certificate {
+                if let Err(err) = verify_peer_certificate(&state.peer_certificates, &chains) {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+            state.peer_certificates_verified = verified
+        } else if !state.peer_certificates.is_empty() {
+            // A certificate was received, but we haven't seen a CertificateVerify
+            // keep reading until we receive one
+            return Err((None, None));
+        }
+
+        {
+            let mut cipher_suite = state.cipher_suite.lock().await;
+            if let Some(cipher_suite) = &mut *cipher_suite {
+                if !cipher_suite.is_initialized() {
+                    let mut server_random = vec![];
+                    {
+                        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(server_random.as_mut());
+                        let _ = state.local_random.marshal(&mut writer);
+                    }
+                    let mut client_random = vec![];
+                    {
+                        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(client_random.as_mut());
+                        let _ = state.remote_random.marshal(&mut writer);
+                    }
+
+                    let mut pre_master_secret = vec![];
+                    if let Some(local_psk_callback) = &cfg.local_psk_callback {
+                        let psk = match local_psk_callback(&client_key_exchange.identity_hint).await
+                        {
+                            Ok(psk) => psk,
+                            Err(err) => {
+                                return Err((
+                                    Some(Alert {
+                                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                                    }),
+                                    Some(err),
+                                ))
+                            }
+                        };
+
+                        state
+                            .identity_hint
+                            .clone_from(&client_key_exchange.identity_hint);
+                        pre_master_secret = prf_psk_pre_master_secret(&psk);
+                    } else if let Some(local_keypair) = &state.local_keypair {
+                        pre_master_secret = match prf_pre_master_secret(
+                            &client_key_exchange.public_key,
+                            &local_keypair.private_key,
+                            local_keypair.curve,
+                        ) {
+                            Ok(pre_master_secret) => pre_master_secret,
+                            Err(err) => {
+                                return Err((
+                                    Some(Alert {
+                                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                        alert_description: AlertDescription::IllegalParameter,
+                                    }),
+                                    Some(err),
+                                ))
+                            }
+                        };
+                    }
+
+                    if state.extended_master_secret {
+                        let hf = cipher_suite.hash_func();
+                        let session_hash =
+                            match cache.session_hash(hf, cfg.initial_epoch, &[]).await {
+                                Ok(s) => s,
+                                Err(err) => {
+                                    return Err((
+                                        Some(Alert {
+                                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                                        }),
+                                        Some(err),
+                                    ))
+                                }
+                            };
+
+                        state.master_secret = match prf_extended_master_secret(
+                            &pre_master_secret,
+                            &session_hash,
+                            cipher_suite.hash_func(),
+                        ) {
+                            Ok(ms) => ms,
+                            Err(err) => {
+                                return Err((
+                                    Some(Alert {
+                                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                                    }),
+                                    Some(err),
+                                ))
+                            }
+                        };
+                    } else {
+                        state.master_secret = match prf_master_secret(
+                            &pre_master_secret,
+                            &client_random,
+                            &server_random,
+                            cipher_suite.hash_func(),
+                        ) {
+                            Ok(ms) => ms,
+                            Err(err) => {
+                                return Err((
+                                    Some(Alert {
+                                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                                    }),
+                                    Some(err),
+                                ))
+                            }
+                        };
+                    }
+
+                    if let Err(err) = cipher_suite.init(
+                        &state.master_secret,
+                        &client_random,
+                        &server_random,
+                        false,
+                    ) {
+                        return Err((
+                            Some(Alert {
+                                alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                            }),
+                            Some(err),
+                        ));
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Now, encrypted packets can be handled
+        let (done_tx, mut done_rx) = mpsc::channel(1);
+        if let Err(err) = tx.send(done_tx).await {
+            return Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                }),
+                Some(Error::Other(err.to_string())),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        done_rx.recv().await;
+
+        let (seq, msgs) = match cache
+            .full_pull_map(
+                seq,
+                &[HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch + 1,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                }],
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok((seq, msgs)) => (seq, msgs),
+            // No valid message received. Keep reading
+            Err(_) => return Err((None, None)),
+        };
+
+        state.handshake_recv_sequence = seq;
+
+        if let Some(HandshakeMessage::Finished(h)) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::Finished) {
+            h
+        } else {
+            return Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                }),
+                None,
+            ));
+        };
+
+        match cfg.client_auth {
+            ClientAuthType::RequireAnyClientCert => {
+                trace!(
+                    "{} peer_certificates.len() {}",
+                    srv_cli_str(state.is_client),
+                    state.peer_certificates.len(),
+                );
+                if state.peer_certificates.is_empty() {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::NoCertificate,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrClientCertificateRequired),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+            ClientAuthType::VerifyClientCertIfGiven => {
+                if !state.peer_certificates.is_empty() && !state.peer_certificates_verified {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrClientCertificateNotVerified),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+            ClientAuthType::RequireAndVerifyClientCert => {
+                if state.peer_certificates.is_empty() {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::NoCertificate,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrClientCertificateRequired),
+                    ));
+                }
+                if !state.peer_certificates_verified {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrClientCertificateNotVerified),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+            ClientAuthType::NoClientCert | ClientAuthType::RequestClientCert => {
+                return Ok(Box::new(Flight6 {}) as Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>);
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(Box::new(Flight6 {}) as Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>)
+    }
+
+    async fn generate(
+        &self,
+        state: &mut State,
+        _cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Packet>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let mut extensions = vec![Extension::RenegotiationInfo(ExtensionRenegotiationInfo {
+            renegotiated_connection: 0,
+        })];
+        if (cfg.extended_master_secret == ExtendedMasterSecretType::Request
+            || cfg.extended_master_secret == ExtendedMasterSecretType::Require)
+            && state.extended_master_secret
+        {
+            extensions.push(Extension::UseExtendedMasterSecret(
+                ExtensionUseExtendedMasterSecret { supported: true },
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if state.srtp_protection_profile != SrtpProtectionProfile::Unsupported {
+            extensions.push(Extension::UseSrtp(ExtensionUseSrtp {
+                protection_profiles: vec![state.srtp_protection_profile],
+            }));
+        }
+
+        if cfg.local_psk_callback.is_none() {
+            extensions.extend_from_slice(&[
+                Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves {
+                    elliptic_curves: vec![NamedCurve::P256, NamedCurve::X25519, NamedCurve::P384],
+                }),
+                Extension::SupportedPointFormats(ExtensionSupportedPointFormats {
+                    point_formats: vec![ELLIPTIC_CURVE_POINT_FORMAT_UNCOMPRESSED],
+                }),
+            ]);
+        }
+
+        let mut pkts = vec![Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                0,
+                Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::ServerHello(
+                    HandshakeMessageServerHello {
+                        version: PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                        random: state.local_random.clone(),
+                        cipher_suite: {
+                            let cipher_suite = state.cipher_suite.lock().await;
+                            if let Some(cipher_suite) = &*cipher_suite {
+                                cipher_suite.id()
+                            } else {
+                                CipherSuiteId::Unsupported
+                            }
+                        },
+                        compression_method: default_compression_methods().ids[0],
+                        extensions,
+                    },
+                ))),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: false,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+        }];
+
+        if cfg.local_psk_callback.is_none() {
+            let certificate = match cfg.get_certificate(&cfg.server_name) {
+                Ok(cert) => cert,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            pkts.push(Packet {
+                record: RecordLayer::new(
+                    PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                    0,
+                    Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::Certificate(
+                        HandshakeMessageCertificate {
+                            certificate: certificate
+                                .certificate
+                                .iter()
+                                .map(|x| x.as_ref().to_owned())
+                                .collect(),
+                        },
+                    ))),
+                ),
+                should_encrypt: false,
+                reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+            });
+
+            let mut server_random = vec![];
+            {
+                let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(server_random.as_mut());
+                let _ = state.local_random.marshal(&mut writer);
+            }
+            let mut client_random = vec![];
+            {
+                let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(client_random.as_mut());
+                let _ = state.remote_random.marshal(&mut writer);
+            }
+
+            // Find compatible signature scheme
+            let signature_hash_algo = match select_signature_scheme(
+                &cfg.local_signature_schemes,
+                &certificate.private_key,
+            ) {
+                Ok(s) => s,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            if let Some(local_keypair) = &state.local_keypair {
+                let signature = match generate_key_signature(
+                    &client_random,
+                    &server_random,
+                    &local_keypair.public_key,
+                    state.named_curve,
+                    &certificate.private_key, /*, signature_hash_algo.hash*/
+                ) {
+                    Ok(s) => s,
+                    Err(err) => {
+                        return Err((
+                            Some(Alert {
+                                alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                            }),
+                            Some(err),
+                        ))
+                    }
+                };
+
+                state.local_key_signature = signature;
+
+                pkts.push(Packet {
+                    record: RecordLayer::new(
+                        PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                        0,
+                        Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::ServerKeyExchange(
+                            HandshakeMessageServerKeyExchange {
+                                identity_hint: vec![],
+                                elliptic_curve_type: EllipticCurveType::NamedCurve,
+                                named_curve: state.named_curve,
+                                public_key: local_keypair.public_key.clone(),
+                                algorithm: SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                                    hash: signature_hash_algo.hash,
+                                    signature: signature_hash_algo.signature,
+                                },
+                                signature: state.local_key_signature.clone(),
+                            },
+                        ))),
+                    ),
+                    should_encrypt: false,
+                    reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+                });
+            }
+
+            if cfg.client_auth as u8 > ClientAuthType::NoClientCert as u8 {
+                pkts.push(Packet {
+                    record: RecordLayer::new(
+                        PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                        0,
+                        Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::CertificateRequest(
+                            HandshakeMessageCertificateRequest {
+                                certificate_types: vec![
+                                    ClientCertificateType::RsaSign,
+                                    ClientCertificateType::EcdsaSign,
+                                ],
+                                signature_hash_algorithms: cfg.local_signature_schemes.clone(),
+                            },
+                        ))),
+                    ),
+                    should_encrypt: false,
+                    reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+                });
+            }
+        } else if let Some(local_psk_identity_hint) = &cfg.local_psk_identity_hint {
+            // To help the client in selecting which identity to use, the server
+            // can provide a "PSK identity hint" in the ServerKeyExchange message.
+            // If no hint is provided, the ServerKeyExchange message is omitted.
+            //
+            // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4279#section-2
+            pkts.push(Packet {
+                record: RecordLayer::new(
+                    PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                    0,
+                    Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::ServerKeyExchange(
+                        HandshakeMessageServerKeyExchange {
+                            identity_hint: local_psk_identity_hint.clone(),
+                            elliptic_curve_type: EllipticCurveType::Unsupported,
+                            named_curve: NamedCurve::Unsupported,
+                            public_key: vec![],
+                            algorithm: SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                                hash: HashAlgorithm::Unsupported,
+                                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Unsupported,
+                            },
+                            signature: vec![],
+                        },
+                    ))),
+                ),
+                should_encrypt: false,
+                reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+            });
+        }
+
+        pkts.push(Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                0,
+                Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::ServerHelloDone(
+                    HandshakeMessageServerHelloDone {},
+                ))),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: false,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+        });
+
+        Ok(pkts)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+
+    use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::error::Result;
+
+    struct MockCipherSuite {}
+
+    impl CipherSuite for MockCipherSuite {
+        fn to_string(&self) -> String {
+            "MockCipherSuite".into()
+        }
+        fn id(&self) -> CipherSuiteId {
+            unimplemented!();
+        }
+        fn certificate_type(&self) -> ClientCertificateType {
+            unimplemented!();
+        }
+        fn hash_func(&self) -> CipherSuiteHash {
+            unimplemented!();
+        }
+        fn is_psk(&self) -> bool {
+            false
+        }
+        fn is_initialized(&self) -> bool {
+            panic!("is_initialized called with Certificate but not CertificateVerify");
+        }
+
+        // Generate the internal encryption state
+        fn init(
+            &mut self,
+            _master_secret: &[u8],
+            _client_random: &[u8],
+            _server_random: &[u8],
+            _is_client: bool,
+        ) -> Result<()> {
+            unimplemented!();
+        }
+
+        fn encrypt(&self, _pkt_rlh: &RecordLayerHeader, _raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+            unimplemented!();
+        }
+        fn decrypt(&self, _input: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+            unimplemented!();
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Assert that if a client sends a certificate they must also send a `CertificateVerify`
+    // message. The `Flight4` must not interact with the `cipher_suite` if the `CertificateVerify`
+    // is missing.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_flight4_process_certificateverify() {
+        let mut state = State {
+            cipher_suite: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Some(Box::new(MockCipherSuite {})))),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+
+        let raw_certificate = vec![
+            0x0b, 0x00, 0x01, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x01,
+            0x98, 0x00, 0x01, 0x95, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x91, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x38, 0xa0, 0x03,
+            0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x11, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x3f, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0x62, 0x91,
+            0xdb, 0x4d, 0x28, 0x2c, 0x1f, 0xd6, 0x73, 0x32, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86,
+            0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x32,
+            0x30, 0x35, 0x31, 0x35, 0x31, 0x38, 0x34, 0x33, 0x35, 0x35, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32,
+            0x32, 0x30, 0x36, 0x31, 0x35, 0x31, 0x38, 0x34, 0x33, 0x35, 0x35, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x00,
+            0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06,
+            0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3,
+            0xb7, 0x13, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0xfc, 0xd0, 0x82, 0xf8, 0x94, 0x5e, 0xc0, 0x77, 0x07, 0x81,
+            0x28, 0xc9, 0xcb, 0x08, 0x84, 0x50, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x22, 0xe8, 0x79, 0xb9, 0x15, 0x33,
+            0xc4, 0x56, 0xa1, 0xd3, 0x1b, 0x24, 0xe3, 0x61, 0xbd, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x80, 0x6b, 0x5d,
+            0x96, 0x48, 0xa2, 0x44, 0x9e, 0xce, 0xe8, 0x65, 0xd6, 0x3c, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0x6b, 0xa1,
+            0x36, 0x34, 0xb2, 0x39, 0xe2, 0x03, 0x00, 0xa3, 0x81, 0x92, 0x30, 0x81, 0x8f, 0x30,
+            0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02,
+            0xa4, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x25, 0x04, 0x16, 0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x08,
+            0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x03, 0x02, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05,
+            0x05, 0x07, 0x03, 0x01, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff,
+            0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e,
+            0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb1, 0x1a, 0xe3, 0xeb, 0x6f, 0x7c, 0xc3, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x6f,
+            0x1c, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0x23, 0x08, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x3c, 0xea, 0x31, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x06, 0x03,
+            0x55, 0x1d, 0x11, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x24, 0x30, 0x22, 0x82, 0x20, 0x30, 0x30,
+            0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30,
+            0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30,
+            0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02,
+            0x03, 0x47, 0x00, 0x30, 0x44, 0x02, 0x20, 0x06, 0x31, 0x43, 0xac, 0x03, 0x45, 0x79,
+            0x3c, 0xd7, 0x5f, 0x6e, 0x6a, 0xf8, 0x0e, 0xfd, 0x35, 0x49, 0xee, 0x1b, 0xbc, 0x47,
+            0xce, 0xe3, 0x39, 0xec, 0xe4, 0x62, 0xe1, 0x30, 0x1a, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x02, 0x20, 0x35,
+            0xcd, 0x7a, 0x15, 0x68, 0x09, 0x50, 0x49, 0x9e, 0x3e, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xc2, 0x69, 0x3f,
+            0x9c, 0x0c, 0x98, 0x92, 0x65, 0xec, 0xae, 0x44, 0xfe, 0xe5, 0x68, 0xb8, 0x09, 0x78,
+            0x7f, 0x6b, 0x77,
+        ];
+
+        let raw_client_key_exchange = vec![
+            0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21, 0x20, 0x96,
+            0xed, 0x0c, 0xee, 0xf3, 0x11, 0xb1, 0x9d, 0x8b, 0x1c, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x7c, 0x57,
+            0x7a, 0x14, 0xa6, 0x41, 0xde, 0x63, 0x57, 0x9e, 0xcd, 0x34, 0x54, 0xba, 0x37, 0x4d,
+            0x34, 0x15, 0x18,
+        ];
+
+        let mut cache = HandshakeCache::new();
+        cache
+            .push(raw_certificate, 0, 0, HandshakeType::Certificate, true)
+            .await;
+        cache
+            .push(
+                raw_client_key_exchange,
+                0,
+                1,
+                HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                true,
+            )
+            .await;
+
+        let cfg = HandshakeConfig::default();
+
+        let (mut tx, _rx) = mpsc::channel::<mpsc::Sender<()>>(1);
+
+        let f = Flight4 {};
+        let res = f.parse(&mut tx, &mut state, &cache, &cfg).await;
+        assert!(res.is_err());
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/flight/flight5.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,779 @@
+use std::fmt;
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+
+use super::flight3::*;
+use super::*;
+use crate::change_cipher_spec::ChangeCipherSpec;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::crypto::*;
+use crate::curve::named_curve::*;
+use crate::curve::*;
+use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_certificate::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_certificate_verify::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_client_key_exchange::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_finished::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_server_key_exchange::*;
+use crate::handshake::*;
+use crate::prf::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+use crate::record_layer::*;
+use crate::signature_hash_algorithm::*;
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct Flight5;
+
+impl fmt::Display for Flight5 {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "Flight 5")
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Flight for Flight5 {
+    fn is_last_recv_flight(&self) -> bool {
+        true
+    }
+
+    async fn parse(
+        &self,
+        _tx: &mut mpsc::Sender<mpsc::Sender<()>>,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let (_seq, msgs) = match cache
+            .full_pull_map(
+                state.handshake_recv_sequence,
+                &[HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch + 1,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                }],
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok((seq, msgs)) => (seq, msgs),
+            Err(_) => return Err((None, None)),
+        };
+
+        let finished =
+            if let Some(HandshakeMessage::Finished(h)) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::Finished) {
+                h
+            } else {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                    }),
+                    None,
+                ));
+            };
+
+        let plain_text = cache
+            .pull_and_merge(&[
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch + 1,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+            ])
+            .await;
+
+        {
+            let cipher_suite = state.cipher_suite.lock().await;
+            if let Some(cipher_suite) = &*cipher_suite {
+                let expected_verify_data = match prf_verify_data_server(
+                    &state.master_secret,
+                    &plain_text,
+                    cipher_suite.hash_func(),
+                ) {
+                    Ok(d) => d,
+                    Err(err) => {
+                        return Err((
+                            Some(Alert {
+                                alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                            }),
+                            Some(err),
+                        ))
+                    }
+                };
+
+                if expected_verify_data != finished.verify_data {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrVerifyDataMismatch),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(Box::new(Flight5 {}))
+    }
+
+    async fn generate(
+        &self,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Packet>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let certificate = if !cfg.local_certificates.is_empty() {
+            let cert = match cfg.get_certificate(&cfg.server_name) {
+                Ok(cert) => cert,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+            Some(cert)
+        } else {
+            None
+        };
+
+        let mut pkts = vec![];
+
+        if state.remote_requested_certificate {
+            pkts.push(Packet {
+                record: RecordLayer::new(
+                    PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                    0,
+                    Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::Certificate(
+                        HandshakeMessageCertificate {
+                            certificate: if let Some(cert) = &certificate {
+                                cert.certificate
+                                    .iter()
+                                    .map(|x| x.as_ref().to_owned())
+                                    .collect()
+                            } else {
+                                vec![]
+                            },
+                        },
+                    ))),
+                ),
+                should_encrypt: false,
+                reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+            });
+        }
+
+        let mut client_key_exchange = HandshakeMessageClientKeyExchange {
+            identity_hint: vec![],
+            public_key: vec![],
+        };
+        if cfg.local_psk_callback.is_none() {
+            if let Some(local_keypair) = &state.local_keypair {
+                client_key_exchange
+                    .public_key
+                    .clone_from(&local_keypair.public_key);
+            }
+        } else if let Some(local_psk_identity_hint) = &cfg.local_psk_identity_hint {
+            client_key_exchange
+                .identity_hint
+                .clone_from(local_psk_identity_hint);
+        }
+
+        pkts.push(Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                0,
+                Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::ClientKeyExchange(
+                    client_key_exchange,
+                ))),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: false,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+        });
+
+        let server_key_exchange_data = cache
+            .pull_and_merge(&[HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                is_client: false,
+                optional: false,
+            }])
+            .await;
+
+        let mut server_key_exchange = HandshakeMessageServerKeyExchange {
+            identity_hint: vec![],
+            elliptic_curve_type: EllipticCurveType::Unsupported,
+            named_curve: NamedCurve::Unsupported,
+            public_key: vec![],
+            algorithm: SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Unsupported,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Unsupported,
+            },
+            signature: vec![],
+        };
+
+        // handshakeMessageServerKeyExchange is optional for PSK
+        if server_key_exchange_data.is_empty() {
+            if let Err((alert, err)) =
+                handle_server_key_exchange(state, cfg, &server_key_exchange).await
+            {
+                return Err((alert, err));
+            }
+        } else {
+            let mut reader = BufReader::new(server_key_exchange_data.as_slice());
+            let raw_handshake = match Handshake::unmarshal(&mut reader) {
+                Ok(h) => h,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            match raw_handshake.handshake_message {
+                HandshakeMessage::ServerKeyExchange(h) => server_key_exchange = h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrInvalidContentType),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+        }
+
+        // Append not-yet-sent packets
+        let mut merged = vec![];
+        let mut seq_pred = state.handshake_send_sequence as u16;
+        for p in &mut pkts {
+            let h = match &mut p.record.content {
+                Content::Handshake(h) => h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrInvalidContentType),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+            h.handshake_header.message_sequence = seq_pred;
+            seq_pred += 1;
+
+            let mut raw = vec![];
+            {
+                let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+                if let Err(err) = h.marshal(&mut writer) {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+
+            merged.extend_from_slice(&raw);
+        }
+
+        if let Err((alert, err)) =
+            initialize_cipher_suite(state, cache, cfg, &server_key_exchange, &merged).await
+        {
+            return Err((alert, err));
+        }
+
+        // If the client has sent a certificate with signing ability, a digitally-signed
+        // CertificateVerify message is sent to explicitly verify possession of the
+        // private key in the certificate.
+        if state.remote_requested_certificate && !cfg.local_certificates.is_empty() {
+            let mut plain_text = cache
+                .pull_and_merge(&[
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                ])
+                .await;
+
+            plain_text.extend_from_slice(&merged);
+
+            // Find compatible signature scheme
+            let signature_hash_algo = match select_signature_scheme(
+                &cfg.local_signature_schemes,
+                &certificate.as_ref().unwrap().private_key,
+            ) {
+                Ok(s) => s,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            let cert_verify = match generate_certificate_verify(
+                &plain_text,
+                &certificate.as_ref().unwrap().private_key, /*, signature_hash_algo.hash*/
+            ) {
+                Ok(cert) => cert,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+            state.local_certificates_verify = cert_verify;
+
+            let mut p = Packet {
+                record: RecordLayer::new(
+                    PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                    0,
+                    Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::CertificateVerify(
+                        HandshakeMessageCertificateVerify {
+                            algorithm: signature_hash_algo,
+                            signature: state.local_certificates_verify.clone(),
+                        },
+                    ))),
+                ),
+                should_encrypt: false,
+                reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+            };
+
+            let h = match &mut p.record.content {
+                Content::Handshake(h) => h,
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        Some(Error::ErrInvalidContentType),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+            h.handshake_header.message_sequence = seq_pred;
+
+            // seqPred++ // this is the last use of seqPred
+
+            let mut raw = vec![];
+            {
+                let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+                if let Err(err) = h.marshal(&mut writer) {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+            merged.extend_from_slice(&raw);
+
+            pkts.push(p);
+        }
+
+        pkts.push(Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                0,
+                Content::ChangeCipherSpec(ChangeCipherSpec {}),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: false,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+        });
+
+        if state.local_verify_data.is_empty() {
+            let mut plain_text = cache
+                .pull_and_merge(&[
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch + 1,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                ])
+                .await;
+
+            plain_text.extend_from_slice(&merged);
+
+            let cipher_suite = state.cipher_suite.lock().await;
+            if let Some(cipher_suite) = &*cipher_suite {
+                state.local_verify_data = match prf_verify_data_client(
+                    &state.master_secret,
+                    &plain_text,
+                    cipher_suite.hash_func(),
+                ) {
+                    Ok(data) => data,
+                    Err(err) => {
+                        return Err((
+                            Some(Alert {
+                                alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                            }),
+                            Some(err),
+                        ))
+                    }
+                };
+            }
+        }
+
+        pkts.push(Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                1,
+                Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::Finished(
+                    HandshakeMessageFinished {
+                        verify_data: state.local_verify_data.clone(),
+                    },
+                ))),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: true,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: true,
+        });
+
+        Ok(pkts)
+    }
+}
+async fn initialize_cipher_suite(
+    state: &mut State,
+    cache: &HandshakeCache,
+    cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    h: &HandshakeMessageServerKeyExchange,
+    sending_plain_text: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(), (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+    let mut cipher_suite = state.cipher_suite.lock().await;
+
+    if let Some(cipher_suite) = &*cipher_suite {
+        if cipher_suite.is_initialized() {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut client_random = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(client_random.as_mut());
+        let _ = state.local_random.marshal(&mut writer);
+    }
+    let mut server_random = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(server_random.as_mut());
+        let _ = state.remote_random.marshal(&mut writer);
+    }
+
+    if let Some(cipher_suite) = &*cipher_suite {
+        if state.extended_master_secret {
+            let session_hash = match cache
+                .session_hash(
+                    cipher_suite.hash_func(),
+                    cfg.initial_epoch,
+                    sending_plain_text,
+                )
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(s) => s,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+
+            state.master_secret = match prf_extended_master_secret(
+                &state.pre_master_secret,
+                &session_hash,
+                cipher_suite.hash_func(),
+            ) {
+                Ok(m) => m,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::IllegalParameter,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+        } else {
+            state.master_secret = match prf_master_secret(
+                &state.pre_master_secret,
+                &client_random,
+                &server_random,
+                cipher_suite.hash_func(),
+            ) {
+                Ok(m) => m,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+        }
+    }
+
+    if cfg.local_psk_callback.is_none() {
+        // Verify that the pair of hash algorithm and signiture is listed.
+        let mut valid_signature_scheme = false;
+        for ss in &cfg.local_signature_schemes {
+            if ss.hash == h.algorithm.hash && ss.signature == h.algorithm.signature {
+                valid_signature_scheme = true;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if !valid_signature_scheme {
+            return Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity,
+                }),
+                Some(Error::ErrNoAvailableSignatureSchemes),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let expected_msg =
+            value_key_message(&client_random, &server_random, &h.public_key, h.named_curve);
+        if let Err(err) = verify_key_signature(
+            &expected_msg,
+            &h.algorithm,
+            &h.signature,
+            &state.peer_certificates,
+            cfg.insecure_verification,
+        ) {
+            return Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                }),
+                Some(err),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let mut chains = vec![];
+        if !cfg.insecure_skip_verify {
+            chains = match verify_server_cert(
+                &state.peer_certificates,
+                &cfg.server_cert_verifier,
+                &cfg.server_name,
+            ) {
+                Ok(chains) => chains,
+                Err(err) => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                        }),
+                        Some(err),
+                    ))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if let Some(verify_peer_certificate) = &cfg.verify_peer_certificate {
+            if let Err(err) = verify_peer_certificate(&state.peer_certificates, &chains) {
+                return Err((
+                    Some(Alert {
+                        alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                        alert_description: AlertDescription::BadCertificate,
+                    }),
+                    Some(err),
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if let Some(cipher_suite) = &mut *cipher_suite {
+        if let Err(err) =
+            cipher_suite.init(&state.master_secret, &client_random, &server_random, true)
+        {
+            return Err((
+                Some(Alert {
+                    alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                    alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                }),
+                Some(err),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/flight/flight6.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+use std::fmt;
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::change_cipher_spec::*;
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_message_finished::*;
+use crate::handshake::*;
+use crate::prf::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct Flight6;
+
+impl fmt::Display for Flight6 {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "Flight 6")
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Flight for Flight6 {
+    fn is_last_send_flight(&self) -> bool {
+        true
+    }
+
+    async fn parse(
+        &self,
+        _tx: &mut mpsc::Sender<mpsc::Sender<()>>,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let (_, msgs) = match cache
+            .full_pull_map(
+                state.handshake_recv_sequence - 1,
+                &[HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    epoch: cfg.initial_epoch + 1,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                }],
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok((seq, msgs)) => (seq, msgs),
+            // No valid message received. Keep reading
+            Err(_) => return Err((None, None)),
+        };
+
+        if let Some(message) = msgs.get(&HandshakeType::Finished) {
+            match message {
+                HandshakeMessage::Finished(_) => {}
+                _ => {
+                    return Err((
+                        Some(Alert {
+                            alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                            alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                        }),
+                        None,
+                    ))
+                }
+            };
+        }
+
+        // Other party retransmitted the last flight.
+        Ok(Box::new(Flight6 {}))
+    }
+
+    async fn generate(
+        &self,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Packet>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)> {
+        let mut pkts = vec![Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                0,
+                Content::ChangeCipherSpec(ChangeCipherSpec {}),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: false,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: false,
+        }];
+
+        if state.local_verify_data.is_empty() {
+            let plain_text = cache
+                .pull_and_merge(&[
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: false,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                    HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                        typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                        epoch: cfg.initial_epoch + 1,
+                        is_client: true,
+                        optional: false,
+                    },
+                ])
+                .await;
+
+            let cipher_suite = state.cipher_suite.lock().await;
+            if let Some(cipher_suite) = &*cipher_suite {
+                state.local_verify_data = match prf_verify_data_server(
+                    &state.master_secret,
+                    &plain_text,
+                    cipher_suite.hash_func(),
+                ) {
+                    Ok(data) => data,
+                    Err(err) => {
+                        return Err((
+                            Some(Alert {
+                                alert_level: AlertLevel::Fatal,
+                                alert_description: AlertDescription::InternalError,
+                            }),
+                            Some(err),
+                        ))
+                    }
+                };
+            }
+        }
+
+        pkts.push(Packet {
+            record: RecordLayer::new(
+                PROTOCOL_VERSION1_2,
+                1,
+                Content::Handshake(Handshake::new(HandshakeMessage::Finished(
+                    HandshakeMessageFinished {
+                        verify_data: state.local_verify_data.clone(),
+                    },
+                ))),
+            ),
+            should_encrypt: true,
+            reset_local_sequence_number: true,
+        });
+
+        Ok(pkts)
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/flight/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+pub(crate) mod flight0;
+pub(crate) mod flight1;
+pub(crate) mod flight2;
+pub(crate) mod flight3;
+pub(crate) mod flight4;
+pub(crate) mod flight5;
+pub(crate) mod flight6;
+
+use std::fmt;
+
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use tokio::sync::mpsc;
+
+use crate::alert::*;
+use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_cache::*;
+use crate::handshaker::*;
+use crate::record_layer::*;
+use crate::state::*;
+
+/*
+  DTLS messages are grouped into a series of message flights, according
+  to the diagrams below.  Although each Flight of messages may consist
+  of a number of messages, they should be viewed as monolithic for the
+  purpose of timeout and retransmission.
+  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4347#section-4.2.4
+  Client                                          Server
+  ------                                          ------
+                                      Waiting                 Flight 0
+
+  ClientHello             -------->                           Flight 1
+
+                          <-------    HelloVerifyRequest      Flight 2
+
+  ClientHello              -------->                           Flight 3
+
+                                             ServerHello    \
+                                            Certificate*     \
+                                      ServerKeyExchange*      Flight 4
+                                     CertificateRequest*     /
+                          <--------      ServerHelloDone    /
+
+  Certificate*                                              \
+  ClientKeyExchange                                          \
+  CertificateVerify*                                          Flight 5
+  [ChangeCipherSpec]                                         /
+  Finished                -------->                         /
+
+                                      [ChangeCipherSpec]    \ Flight 6
+                          <--------             Finished    /
+
+*/
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct Packet {
+    pub(crate) record: RecordLayer,
+    pub(crate) should_encrypt: bool,
+    pub(crate) reset_local_sequence_number: bool,
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+pub(crate) trait Flight: fmt::Display + fmt::Debug {
+    fn is_last_send_flight(&self) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+    fn is_last_recv_flight(&self) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+    fn has_retransmit(&self) -> bool {
+        true
+    }
+
+    async fn parse(
+        &self,
+        tx: &mut mpsc::Sender<mpsc::Sender<()>>,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Box<dyn Flight + Send + Sync>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)>;
+
+    async fn generate(
+        &self,
+        state: &mut State,
+        cache: &HandshakeCache,
+        cfg: &HandshakeConfig,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Packet>, (Option<Alert>, Option<Error>)>;
+}

libs/dtls/src/fragment_buffer/fragment_buffer_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_fragment_buffer() -> Result<()> {
+    let tests = vec![
+        (
+            "Single Fragment",
+            vec![vec![
+                0x16, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x03,
+                0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x00,
+            ]],
+            vec![vec![
+                0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0xfe, 0xff,
+                0x00,
+            ]],
+            0,
+        ),
+        (
+            "Single Fragment Epoch 3",
+            vec![vec![
+                0x16, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x03,
+                0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x00,
+            ]],
+            vec![vec![
+                0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0xfe, 0xff,
+                0x00,
+            ]],
+            3,
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multiple Fragments",
+            vec![
+                vec![
+                    0x16, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x81,
+                    0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00,
+                    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
+                ],
+                vec![
+                    0x16, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x81,
+                    0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x05,
+                    0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
+                ],
+                vec![
+                    0x16, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x81,
+                    0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x0A,
+                    0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E,
+                ],
+            ],
+            vec![vec![
+                0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x01,
+                0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e,
+            ]],
+            0,
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multiple Unordered Fragments",
+            vec![
+                vec![
+                    0x16, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x81,
+                    0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00,
+                    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
+                ],
+                vec![
+                    0x16, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x81,
+                    0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x0A,
+                    0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E,
+                ],
+                vec![
+                    0x16, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x81,
+                    0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x05,
+                    0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
+                ],
+            ],
+            vec![vec![
+                0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x01,
+                0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e,
+            ]],
+            0,
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multiple Handshakes in Single Fragment",
+            vec![vec![
+                0x16, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00,
+                0x30, /* record header */
+                0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xfe, 0xff,
+                0x01, 0x01, /*handshake msg 1*/
+                0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xfe, 0xff,
+                0x01, 0x01, /*handshake msg 2*/
+                0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xfe, 0xff,
+                0x01, 0x01, /*handshake msg 3*/
+            ]],
+            vec![
+                vec![
+                    0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xfe,
+                    0xff, 0x01, 0x01,
+                ],
+                vec![
+                    0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xfe,
+                    0xff, 0x01, 0x01,
+                ],
+                vec![
+                    0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xfe,
+                    0xff, 0x01, 0x01,
+                ],
+            ],
+            0,
+        ),
+        // Ensure zero length fragments don't cause an infinite recursive loop which in turn causes
+        // a stack overflow.
+        (
+            "Zero length fragment",
+            vec![vec![
+                0x16, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00,
+                0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+            ]],
+            vec![vec![
+                0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00,
+            ]],
+            0,
+        ),
+    ];
+
+    for (name, inputs, expects, expected_epoch) in tests {
+        let mut fragment_buffer = FragmentBuffer::new();
+        for frag in inputs {
+            let status = fragment_buffer.push(&frag)?;
+            assert!(
+                status,
+                "fragment_buffer didn't accept fragments for '{name}'"
+            );
+        }
+
+        for expected in expects {
+            let (out, epoch) = fragment_buffer.pop()?;
+            assert_eq!(
+                out, expected,
+                "fragment_buffer '{name}' push/pop: got {out:?}, want {expected:?}"
+            );
+
+            assert_eq!(
+                epoch, expected_epoch,
+                "fragment_buffer returned wrong epoch: got {epoch}, want {expected_epoch}"
+            );
+        }
+
+        let result = fragment_buffer.pop();
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "fragment_buffer popped single buffer multiple times for '{name}'"
+        );
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_fragment_buffer_overflow() -> Result<()> {
+    let mut fragment_buffer = FragmentBuffer::new();
+
+    fragment_buffer.push(&[
+        0x16, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x03, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x00,
+    ])?;
+
+    let big_buffer = vec![0; 2_000_000];
+    let result = fragment_buffer.push(&big_buffer);
+
+    assert!(
+        result.is_err(),
+        "Pushing a buffer of size 2MB should have caused FragmentBuffer::push to return an error"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/fragment_buffer/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod fragment_buffer_test;
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::io::{BufWriter, Cursor};
+
+use crate::content::*;
+use crate::error::*;
+use crate::handshake::handshake_header::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+
+// 2 mb max buffer size
+const FRAGMENT_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE: usize = 2_000_000;
+
+pub(crate) struct Fragment {
+    record_layer_header: RecordLayerHeader,
+    handshake_header: HandshakeHeader,
+    data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct FragmentBuffer {
+    // map of MessageSequenceNumbers that hold slices of fragments
+    cache: HashMap<u16, Vec<Fragment>>,
+
+    current_message_sequence_number: u16,
+}
+
+impl FragmentBuffer {
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        FragmentBuffer {
+            cache: HashMap::new(),
+            current_message_sequence_number: 0,
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Attempts to push a DTLS packet to the FragmentBuffer
+    // when it returns true it means the FragmentBuffer has inserted and the buffer shouldn't be handled
+    // when an error returns it is fatal, and the DTLS connection should be stopped
+    pub fn push(&mut self, mut buf: &[u8]) -> Result<bool> {
+        let current_size = self.size();
+        if current_size + buf.len() >= FRAGMENT_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE {
+            return Err(Error::ErrFragmentBufferOverflow {
+                new_size: current_size + buf.len(),
+                max_size: FRAGMENT_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE,
+            });
+        }
+
+        let mut reader = Cursor::new(buf);
+        let record_layer_header = RecordLayerHeader::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+        // Fragment isn't a handshake, we don't need to handle it
+        if record_layer_header.content_type != ContentType::Handshake {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+
+        buf = &buf[RECORD_LAYER_HEADER_SIZE..];
+        while !buf.is_empty() {
+            let mut reader = Cursor::new(buf);
+            let handshake_header = HandshakeHeader::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+            self.cache
+                .entry(handshake_header.message_sequence)
+                .or_default();
+
+            // end index should be the length of handshake header but if the handshake
+            // was fragmented, we should keep them all
+            let mut end = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH + handshake_header.length as usize;
+            if end > buf.len() {
+                end = buf.len();
+            }
+
+            // Discard all headers, when rebuilding the packet we will re-build
+            let data = buf[HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH..end].to_vec();
+
+            if let Some(x) = self.cache.get_mut(&handshake_header.message_sequence) {
+                x.push(Fragment {
+                    record_layer_header,
+                    handshake_header,
+                    data,
+                });
+            }
+            buf = &buf[end..];
+        }
+
+        Ok(true)
+    }
+
+    pub fn pop(&mut self) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, u16)> {
+        let seq_num = self.current_message_sequence_number;
+        if !self.cache.contains_key(&seq_num) {
+            return Err(Error::ErrEmptyFragment);
+        }
+
+        let (content, epoch) = if let Some(frags) = self.cache.get_mut(&seq_num) {
+            let mut raw_message = vec![];
+            // Recursively collect up
+            if !append_message(0, frags, &mut raw_message) {
+                return Err(Error::ErrEmptyFragment);
+            }
+
+            let mut first_header = frags[0].handshake_header;
+            first_header.fragment_offset = 0;
+            first_header.fragment_length = first_header.length;
+
+            let mut raw_header = vec![];
+            {
+                let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw_header.as_mut());
+                if first_header.marshal(&mut writer).is_err() {
+                    return Err(Error::ErrEmptyFragment);
+                }
+            }
+
+            let message_epoch = frags[0].record_layer_header.epoch;
+
+            raw_header.extend_from_slice(&raw_message);
+
+            (raw_header, message_epoch)
+        } else {
+            return Err(Error::ErrEmptyFragment);
+        };
+
+        self.cache.remove(&seq_num);
+        self.current_message_sequence_number += 1;
+
+        Ok((content, epoch))
+    }
+
+    fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        self.cache
+            .values()
+            .map(|fragment| fragment.iter().map(|f| f.data.len()).sum::<usize>())
+            .sum()
+    }
+}
+
+fn append_message(target_offset: u32, frags: &[Fragment], raw_message: &mut Vec<u8>) -> bool {
+    for f in frags {
+        if f.handshake_header.fragment_offset == target_offset {
+            let fragment_end =
+                f.handshake_header.fragment_offset + f.handshake_header.fragment_length;
+
+            // NB: Order here is important, the `f.handshake_header.fragment_length != 0`
+            // MUST come before the recursive call.
+            if fragment_end != f.handshake_header.length
+                && f.handshake_header.fragment_length != 0
+                && !append_message(fragment_end, frags, raw_message)
+            {
+                return false;
+            }
+
+            let mut message = vec![];
+            message.extend_from_slice(&f.data);
+            message.extend_from_slice(raw_message);
+            *raw_message = message;
+            return true;
+        }
+    }
+
+    false
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_cache.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod handshake_cache_test;
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::io::BufReader;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+
+use crate::cipher_suite::*;
+use crate::handshake::*;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct HandshakeCacheItem {
+    typ: HandshakeType,
+    is_client: bool,
+    epoch: u16,
+    message_sequence: u16,
+    data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct HandshakeCachePullRule {
+    pub(crate) typ: HandshakeType,
+    pub(crate) epoch: u16,
+    pub(crate) is_client: bool,
+    pub(crate) optional: bool,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(crate) struct HandshakeCache {
+    cache: Arc<Mutex<Vec<HandshakeCacheItem>>>,
+}
+
+impl HandshakeCache {
+    pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
+        HandshakeCache {
+            cache: Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![])),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) async fn push(
+        &mut self,
+        data: Vec<u8>,
+        epoch: u16,
+        message_sequence: u16,
+        typ: HandshakeType,
+        is_client: bool,
+    ) -> bool {
+        let mut cache = self.cache.lock().await;
+
+        for i in &*cache {
+            if i.message_sequence == message_sequence && i.is_client == is_client {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        cache.push(HandshakeCacheItem {
+            typ,
+            is_client,
+            epoch,
+            message_sequence,
+            data,
+        });
+
+        true
+    }
+
+    // returns a list handshakes that match the requested rules
+    // the list will contain null entries for rules that can't be satisfied
+    // multiple entries may match a rule, but only the last match is returned (ie ClientHello with cookies)
+    pub(crate) async fn pull(&self, rules: &[HandshakeCachePullRule]) -> Vec<HandshakeCacheItem> {
+        let cache = self.cache.lock().await;
+
+        let mut out = vec![];
+        for r in rules {
+            let mut item: Option<HandshakeCacheItem> = None;
+            for c in &*cache {
+                if c.typ == r.typ && c.is_client == r.is_client && c.epoch == r.epoch {
+                    if let Some(x) = &item {
+                        if x.message_sequence < c.message_sequence {
+                            item = Some(c.clone());
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        item = Some(c.clone());
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            if let Some(c) = item {
+                out.push(c);
+            }
+        }
+
+        out
+    }
+
+    // full_pull_map pulls all handshakes between rules[0] to rules[len(rules)-1] as map.
+    pub(crate) async fn full_pull_map(
+        &self,
+        start_seq: isize,
+        rules: &[HandshakeCachePullRule],
+    ) -> Result<(isize, HashMap<HandshakeType, HandshakeMessage>)> {
+        let cache = self.cache.lock().await;
+
+        let mut ci = HashMap::new();
+        for r in rules {
+            let mut item: Option<HandshakeCacheItem> = None;
+            for c in &*cache {
+                if c.typ == r.typ && c.is_client == r.is_client && c.epoch == r.epoch {
+                    if let Some(x) = &item {
+                        if x.message_sequence < c.message_sequence {
+                            item = Some(c.clone());
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        item = Some(c.clone());
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if !r.optional && item.is_none() {
+                // Missing mandatory message.
+                return Err(Error::Other("Missing mandatory message".to_owned()));
+            }
+
+            if let Some(c) = item {
+                ci.insert(r.typ, c);
+            }
+        }
+
+        let mut out = HashMap::new();
+        let mut seq = start_seq;
+        for r in rules {
+            let t = r.typ;
+            if let Some(i) = ci.get(&t) {
+                let mut reader = BufReader::new(i.data.as_slice());
+                let raw_handshake = Handshake::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+                if seq as u16 != raw_handshake.handshake_header.message_sequence {
+                    // There is a gap. Some messages are not arrived.
+                    return Err(Error::Other(
+                        "There is a gap. Some messages are not arrived.".to_owned(),
+                    ));
+                }
+                seq += 1;
+                out.insert(t, raw_handshake.handshake_message);
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok((seq, out))
+    }
+
+    // pull_and_merge calls pull and then merges the results, ignoring any null entries
+    pub(crate) async fn pull_and_merge(&self, rules: &[HandshakeCachePullRule]) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let mut merged = vec![];
+
+        for p in &self.pull(rules).await {
+            merged.extend_from_slice(&p.data);
+        }
+
+        merged
+    }
+
+    // session_hash returns the session hash for Extended Master Secret support
+    // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06#section-4
+    pub(crate) async fn session_hash(
+        &self,
+        hf: CipherSuiteHash,
+        epoch: u16,
+        additional: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let mut merged = vec![];
+
+        // Order defined by https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3
+        let handshake_buffer = self
+            .pull(&[
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                    epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                    epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                    epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                    epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                    epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                    epoch,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                    epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                    epoch,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+            ])
+            .await;
+
+        for p in &handshake_buffer {
+            merged.extend_from_slice(&p.data);
+        }
+
+        merged.extend_from_slice(additional);
+
+        let mut hasher = match hf {
+            CipherSuiteHash::Sha256 => Sha256::new(),
+        };
+        hasher.update(&merged);
+        let result = hasher.finalize();
+
+        Ok(result.as_slice().to_vec())
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_cache/handshake_cache_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
+use super::*;
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn test_handshake_cache_single_push() -> Result<()> {
+    let tests = vec![
+        (
+            "Single Push",
+            vec![HandshakeCacheItem {
+                typ: 0.into(),
+                is_client: true,
+                epoch: 0,
+                message_sequence: 0,
+                data: vec![0x00],
+            }],
+            vec![HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                typ: 0.into(),
+                epoch: 0,
+                is_client: true,
+                optional: false,
+            }],
+            vec![0x00],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multi Push",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 0.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 2,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 0.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![0x00, 0x01, 0x02],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multi Push, Rules set order",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 2,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 0.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 0.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![0x00, 0x01, 0x02],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multi Push, Dupe Seqnum",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 0.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 0.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![0x00, 0x01],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multi Push, Dupe Seqnum Client/Server",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 0.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 0.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![0x00, 0x01, 0x02],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multi Push, Dupe Seqnum with Unique HandshakeType",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 3.into(),
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 3.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![0x00, 0x01, 0x02],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Multi Push, Wrong epoch",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 1,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 2,
+                    data: vec![0x11],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 3.into(),
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 3.into(),
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 1,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x12],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: 3.into(),
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 2,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x12],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 1.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 2.into(),
+                    epoch: 1,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+                HandshakeCachePullRule {
+                    typ: 3.into(),
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    optional: false,
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![0x00, 0x01, 0x02],
+        ),
+    ];
+
+    for (name, inputs, rules, expected) in tests {
+        let mut h = HandshakeCache::new();
+        for i in inputs {
+            h.push(i.data, i.epoch, i.message_sequence, i.typ, i.is_client)
+                .await;
+        }
+        let verify_data = h.pull_and_merge(&rules).await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            verify_data, expected,
+            "handshakeCache '{name}' exp:{expected:?} actual {verify_data:?}",
+        );
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn test_handshake_cache_session_hash() -> Result<()> {
+    let tests = vec![
+        (
+            "Standard Handshake",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 2,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 3,
+                    data: vec![0x03],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 4,
+                    data: vec![0x04],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 5,
+                    data: vec![0x05],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                0x17, 0xe8, 0x8d, 0xb1, 0x87, 0xaf, 0xd6, 0x2c, 0x16, 0xe5, 0xde, 0xbf, 0x3e, 0x65,
+                0x27, 0xcd, 0x00, 0x6b, 0xc0, 0x12, 0xbc, 0x90, 0xb5, 0x1a, 0x81, 0x0c, 0xd8, 0x0c,
+                0x2d, 0x51, 0x1f, 0x43,
+            ],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Handshake With Client Cert Request",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 2,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 3,
+                    data: vec![0x03],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 4,
+                    data: vec![0x04],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 5,
+                    data: vec![0x05],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 6,
+                    data: vec![0x06],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                0x57, 0x35, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x8f, 0x11, 0xae, 0xf7, 0xcb, 0x17, 0x94,
+                0x56, 0xb9, 0x23, 0x2c, 0xde, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x18, 0xdf, 0xda, 0x2c, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0x93,
+                0x25, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x6b,
+            ],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Handshake Ignores after ClientKeyExchange",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 2,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 3,
+                    data: vec![0x03],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 4,
+                    data: vec![0x04],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 5,
+                    data: vec![0x05],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 6,
+                    data: vec![0x06],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0x07],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 1,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0x08],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 1,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0x09],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                0x57, 0x35, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x8f, 0x11, 0xae, 0xf7, 0xcb, 0x17, 0x94,
+                0x56, 0xb9, 0x23, 0x2c, 0xde, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x18, 0xdf, 0xda, 0x2c, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0x93,
+                0x25, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x6b,
+            ],
+        ),
+        (
+            "Handshake Ignores wrong epoch",
+            vec![
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 0,
+                    data: vec![0x00],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 1,
+                    data: vec![0x01],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 2,
+                    data: vec![0x02],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 3,
+                    data: vec![0x03],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 4,
+                    data: vec![0x04],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 5,
+                    data: vec![0x05],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 6,
+                    data: vec![0x06],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0x07],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0xf0],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0xf1],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 1,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0x08],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 1,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0x09],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    is_client: true,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0xf0],
+                },
+                HandshakeCacheItem {
+                    typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
+                    is_client: false,
+                    epoch: 0,
+                    message_sequence: 7,
+                    data: vec![0xf1],
+                },
+            ],
+            vec![
+                0x57, 0x35, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x8f, 0x11, 0xae, 0xf7, 0xcb, 0x17, 0x94,
+                0x56, 0xb9, 0x23, 0x2c, 0xde, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x18, 0xdf, 0xda, 0x2c, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0x93,
+                0x25, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x6b,
+            ],
+        ),
+    ];
+
+    for (name, inputs, expected) in tests {
+        let mut h = HandshakeCache::new();
+        for i in inputs {
+            h.push(i.data, i.epoch, i.message_sequence, i.typ, i.is_client)
+                .await;
+        }
+
+        let verify_data = h.session_hash(CipherSuiteHash::Sha256, 0, &[]).await?;
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            verify_data, expected,
+            "handshakeCacheSessionHassh '{name}' exp: {expected:?} actual {verify_data:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_header.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use super::*;
+
+// msg_len for Handshake messages assumes an extra 12 bytes for
+// sequence, Fragment and version information
+pub(crate) const HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH: usize = 12;
+
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Default)]
+pub struct HandshakeHeader {
+    pub(crate) handshake_type: HandshakeType,
+    pub(crate) length: u32, // uint24 in spec
+    pub(crate) message_sequence: u16,
+    pub(crate) fragment_offset: u32, // uint24 in spec
+    pub(crate) fragment_length: u32, // uint24 in spec
+}
+
+impl HandshakeHeader {
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        1 + 3 + 2 + 3 + 3
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u8(self.handshake_type as u8)?;
+        writer.write_u24::<BigEndian>(self.length)?;
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(self.message_sequence)?;
+        writer.write_u24::<BigEndian>(self.fragment_offset)?;
+        writer.write_u24::<BigEndian>(self.fragment_length)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let handshake_type = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+        let length = reader.read_u24::<BigEndian>()?;
+        let message_sequence = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+        let fragment_offset = reader.read_u24::<BigEndian>()?;
+        let fragment_length = reader.read_u24::<BigEndian>()?;
+
+        Ok(HandshakeHeader {
+            handshake_type,
+            length,
+            message_sequence,
+            fragment_offset,
+            fragment_length,
+        })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_message_certificate.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod handshake_message_certificate_test;
+
+const HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_FIELD_SIZE: usize = 3;
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct HandshakeMessageCertificate {
+    pub(crate) certificate: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
+impl HandshakeMessageCertificate {
+    pub fn handshake_type(&self) -> HandshakeType {
+        HandshakeType::Certificate
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        let mut len = 3;
+
+        for r in &self.certificate {
+            len += HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_FIELD_SIZE + r.len();
+        }
+
+        len
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut payload_size = 0;
+        for r in &self.certificate {
+            payload_size += HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_FIELD_SIZE + r.len();
+        }
+
+        // Total Payload Size
+        writer.write_u24::<BigEndian>(payload_size as u32)?;
+
+        for r in &self.certificate {
+            // Certificate Length
+            writer.write_u24::<BigEndian>(r.len() as u32)?;
+
+            // Certificate body
+            writer.write_all(r)?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut certificate: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![];
+
+        let payload_size = reader.read_u24::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
+        let mut offset = 0;
+        while offset < payload_size {
+            let certificate_len = reader.read_u24::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
+            offset += HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_FIELD_SIZE;
+
+            let mut buf = vec![0; certificate_len];
+            reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+            offset += certificate_len;
+
+            certificate.push(buf);
+        }
+
+        Ok(HandshakeMessageCertificate { certificate })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_message_certificate/handshake_message_certificate_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_handshake_message_certificate() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_certificate = vec![
+        0x00, 0x01, 0x8c, 0x00, 0x01, 0x89, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x85, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x2b, 0x02,
+        0x14, 0x7d, 0x00, 0xcf, 0x07, 0xfc, 0xe2, 0xb6, 0xb8, 0x3f, 0x72, 0xeb, 0x11, 0x36, 0x1b,
+        0xf6, 0x39, 0xf1, 0x3c, 0x33, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d,
+        0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x30, 0x45, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13,
+        0x02, 0x41, 0x55, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x53,
+        0x6f, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x53, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x31, 0x21, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03,
+        0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x18, 0x49, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x74, 0x20, 0x57,
+        0x69, 0x64, 0x67, 0x69, 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x50, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x74, 0x64, 0x30,
+        0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x38, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x35, 0x30, 0x38, 0x35, 0x31, 0x31, 0x32,
+        0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x35, 0x30, 0x38, 0x35, 0x31, 0x31, 0x32,
+        0x5a, 0x30, 0x45, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x41,
+        0x55, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x53, 0x6f, 0x6d,
+        0x65, 0x2d, 0x53, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x31, 0x21, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
+        0x0a, 0x0c, 0x18, 0x49, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x74, 0x20, 0x57, 0x69, 0x64,
+        0x67, 0x69, 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x50, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x74, 0x64, 0x30, 0x59, 0x30,
+        0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+        0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0xf9, 0xb1, 0x62, 0xd6, 0x07, 0xae,
+        0xc3, 0x36, 0x34, 0xf5, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x39, 0x86, 0xe7, 0x3b, 0x59, 0xf7, 0x4a, 0x1d, 0xf4,
+        0x97, 0x4f, 0x91, 0x40, 0x56, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x38, 0x10, 0x15, 0x58, 0xf5, 0xa4,
+        0xcc, 0xdf, 0xd5, 0xf5, 0x4a, 0x35, 0x40, 0x0f, 0x9f, 0x54, 0xb7, 0xe9, 0xe2, 0xae, 0x63,
+        0x83, 0x6a, 0x4c, 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x5f, 0x78, 0xa0, 0xbb, 0x46, 0x54, 0xa4, 0xda, 0x30, 0x0a,
+        0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x48, 0x00, 0x30, 0x45,
+        0x02, 0x20, 0x47, 0x1a, 0x5f, 0x58, 0x2a, 0x74, 0x33, 0x6d, 0xed, 0xac, 0x37, 0x21, 0xfa,
+        0x76, 0x5a, 0x4d, 0x78, 0x68, 0x1a, 0xdd, 0x80, 0xa4, 0xd4, 0xb7, 0x7f, 0x7d, 0x78, 0xb3,
+        0xfb, 0xf3, 0x95, 0xfb, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x73, 0x30, 0xda, 0x2b, 0xc0, 0x0c, 0x9e,
+        0xb2, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x46, 0xb0, 0xbc, 0x66, 0x7f, 0x71, 0x66, 0xbf, 0x16, 0xb3, 0x80, 0x78,
+        0xd0, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xcc, 0xf5, 0xc1, 0x15, 0x0f, 0x58,
+    ];
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw_certificate.as_slice());
+    let c = HandshakeMessageCertificate::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+    //TODO: add x509 parse
+    //  certificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(c.certificate[0])
+    //  if err != nil {
+    //  	t.Error(err)
+    //  }
+    //  copyCertificatePrivateMembers(certificate, parsedCertificate)
+    //  if !reflect.DeepEqual(certificate, parsedCertificate) {
+    //  	t.Errorf("handshakeMessageCertificate unmarshal: got %#v, want %#v", c, parsedCertificate)
+    //  }
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        c.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_certificate,
+        "handshakeMessageCertificate marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_certificate:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_empty_handshake_message_certificate() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_certificate = vec![0x00, 0x00, 0x00];
+
+    let expected_certificate = HandshakeMessageCertificate {
+        certificate: vec![],
+    };
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw_certificate.as_slice());
+    let c = HandshakeMessageCertificate::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        c, expected_certificate,
+        "handshakeMessageCertificate unmarshal: got {c:?}, want {expected_certificate:?}",
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_message_certificate_request.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod handshake_message_certificate_request_test;
+
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::client_certificate_type::*;
+use crate::signature_hash_algorithm::*;
+
+/*
+A non-anonymous server can optionally request a certificate from
+the client, if appropriate for the selected cipher suite.  This
+message, if sent, will immediately follow the ServerKeyExchange
+message (if it is sent; otherwise, this message follows the
+server's Certificate message).
+*/
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct HandshakeMessageCertificateRequest {
+    pub(crate) certificate_types: Vec<ClientCertificateType>,
+    pub(crate) signature_hash_algorithms: Vec<SignatureHashAlgorithm>,
+}
+
+const HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_MIN_LENGTH: usize = 5;
+
+impl HandshakeMessageCertificateRequest {
+    pub fn handshake_type(&self) -> HandshakeType {
+        HandshakeType::CertificateRequest
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        1 + self.certificate_types.len() + 2 + self.signature_hash_algorithms.len() * 2 + 2
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u8(self.certificate_types.len() as u8)?;
+        for v in &self.certificate_types {
+            writer.write_u8(*v as u8)?;
+        }
+
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(2 * self.signature_hash_algorithms.len() as u16)?;
+        for v in &self.signature_hash_algorithms {
+            writer.write_u8(v.hash as u8)?;
+            writer.write_u8(v.signature as u8)?;
+        }
+
+        writer.write_all(&[0x00, 0x00])?; // Distinguished Names Length
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let certificate_types_length = reader.read_u8()?;
+
+        let mut certificate_types = vec![];
+        for _ in 0..certificate_types_length {
+            let cert_type = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+            certificate_types.push(cert_type);
+        }
+
+        let signature_hash_algorithms_length = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+
+        let mut signature_hash_algorithms = vec![];
+        for _ in (0..signature_hash_algorithms_length).step_by(2) {
+            let hash = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+            let signature = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+
+            signature_hash_algorithms.push(SignatureHashAlgorithm { hash, signature });
+        }
+
+        Ok(HandshakeMessageCertificateRequest {
+            certificate_types,
+            signature_hash_algorithms,
+        })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_message_certificate_request/handshake_message_certificate_request_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::signature_hash_algorithm::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_handshake_message_certificate_request() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_certificate_request = vec![
+        0x02, 0x01, 0x40, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01, 0x05, 0x03, 0x05, 0x01, 0x06, 0x01,
+        0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
+    ];
+
+    let parsed_certificate_request = HandshakeMessageCertificateRequest {
+        certificate_types: vec![
+            ClientCertificateType::RsaSign,
+            ClientCertificateType::EcdsaSign,
+        ],
+        signature_hash_algorithms: vec![
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha256,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Ecdsa,
+            },
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha256,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Rsa,
+            },
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha384,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Ecdsa,
+            },
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha384,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Rsa,
+            },
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha512,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Rsa,
+            },
+            SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha1,
+                signature: SignatureAlgorithm::Rsa,
+            },
+        ],
+    };
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw_certificate_request.as_slice());
+    let c = HandshakeMessageCertificateRequest::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+    assert_eq!(
+        c, parsed_certificate_request,
+        "parsedCertificateRequest unmarshal: got {c:?}, want {parsed_certificate_request:?}"
+    );
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        c.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_certificate_request,
+        "parsedCertificateRequest marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_certificate_request:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_message_certificate_verify.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod handshake_message_certificate_verify_test;
+
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::signature_hash_algorithm::*;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct HandshakeMessageCertificateVerify {
+    pub(crate) algorithm: SignatureHashAlgorithm,
+    pub(crate) signature: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+const HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MIN_LENGTH: usize = 4;
+
+impl HandshakeMessageCertificateVerify {
+    pub fn handshake_type(&self) -> HandshakeType {
+        HandshakeType::CertificateVerify
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        1 + 1 + 2 + self.signature.len()
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        writer.write_u8(self.algorithm.hash as u8)?;
+        writer.write_u8(self.algorithm.signature as u8)?;
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(self.signature.len() as u16)?;
+        writer.write_all(&self.signature)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let hash_algorithm = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+        let signature_algorithm = reader.read_u8()?.into();
+        let signature_length = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
+        let mut signature = vec![0; signature_length];
+        reader.read_exact(&mut signature)?;
+
+        Ok(HandshakeMessageCertificateVerify {
+            algorithm: SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+                hash: hash_algorithm,
+                signature: signature_algorithm,
+            },
+            signature,
+        })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_message_certificate_verify/handshake_message_certificate_verify_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_handshake_message_certificate_request() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_certificate_verify = vec![
+        0x04, 0x03, 0x00, 0x47, 0x30, 0x45, 0x02, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x63, 0x17, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xb7, 0x7b,
+        0x0f, 0x86, 0x73, 0x39, 0x1e, 0xba, 0xb3, 0x50, 0x9c, 0xce, 0x9c, 0xe4, 0x8b, 0xe5, 0x13,
+        0x07, 0x59, 0x18, 0x1f, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x2b, 0xca, 0xa6, 0xad, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xd3, 0xb5,
+        0x01, 0xbe, 0x87, 0x6c, 0x04, 0xa1, 0xdc, 0x28, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0xf7, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0xc0, 0x1e,
+        0x00, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0x94, 0xbb, 0x03, 0x0e, 0xf1, 0xcb, 0x28, 0x22, 0x33, 0x23, 0x88, 0xad,
+    ];
+    let parsed_certificate_verify = HandshakeMessageCertificateVerify {
+        algorithm: SignatureHashAlgorithm {
+            hash: raw_certificate_verify[0].into(),
+            signature: raw_certificate_verify[1].into(),
+        },
+        signature: raw_certificate_verify[4..].to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw_certificate_verify.as_slice());
+    let c = HandshakeMessageCertificateVerify::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+    assert_eq!(
+        c, parsed_certificate_verify,
+        "handshakeMessageCertificate unmarshal: got {c:?}, want {parsed_certificate_verify:?}"
+    );
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        c.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_certificate_verify,
+        "handshakeMessageCertificateVerify marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_certificate_verify:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_message_client_hello.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod handshake_message_client_hello_test;
+
+use std::fmt;
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+
+use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+
+use super::handshake_random::*;
+use super::*;
+use crate::cipher_suite::*;
+use crate::compression_methods::*;
+use crate::extension::*;
+use crate::record_layer::record_layer_header::*;
+
+/*
+When a client first connects to a server it is required to send
+the client hello as its first message.  The client can also send a
+client hello in response to a hello request or on its own
+initiative in order to renegotiate the security parameters in an
+existing connection.
+*/
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct HandshakeMessageClientHello {
+    pub(crate) version: ProtocolVersion,
+    pub(crate) random: HandshakeRandom,
+    pub(crate) cookie: Vec<u8>,
+
+    pub(crate) cipher_suites: Vec<CipherSuiteId>,
+    pub(crate) compression_methods: CompressionMethods,
+    pub(crate) extensions: Vec<Extension>,
+}
+
+impl PartialEq for HandshakeMessageClientHello {
+    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+        if !(self.version == other.version
+            && self.random == other.random
+            && self.cookie == other.cookie
+            && self.compression_methods == other.compression_methods
+            && self.extensions == other.extensions
+            && self.cipher_suites.len() == other.cipher_suites.len())
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        for i in 0..self.cipher_suites.len() {
+            if self.cipher_suites[i] != other.cipher_suites[i] {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        true
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for HandshakeMessageClientHello {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        let mut cipher_suites_str = String::new();
+        for cipher_suite in &self.cipher_suites {
+            cipher_suites_str += &cipher_suite.to_string();
+            cipher_suites_str += " ";
+        }
+        let s = [
+            format!("version: {:?} random: {:?}", self.version, self.random),
+            format!("cookie: {:?}", self.cookie),
+            format!("cipher_suites: {cipher_suites_str:?}"),
+            format!("compression_methods: {:?}", self.compression_methods),
+            format!("extensions: {:?}", self.extensions),
+        ];
+        write!(f, "{}", s.join(" "))
+    }
+}
+
+const HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE_CLIENT_HELLO_VARIABLE_WIDTH_START: usize = 34;
+
+impl HandshakeMessageClientHello {
+    pub fn handshake_type(&self) -> HandshakeType {
+        HandshakeType::ClientHello
+    }
+
+    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
+        let mut len = 0;
+
+        len += 2; // version.major+minor
+        len += self.random.size();
+
+        // SessionID
+        len += 1;
+
+        len += 1 + self.cookie.len();
+
+        len += 2 + 2 * self.cipher_suites.len();
+
+        len += self.compression_methods.size();
+
+        len += 2;
+        for extension in &self.extensions {
+            len += extension.size();
+        }
+
+        len
+    }
+
+    pub fn marshal<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
+        if self.cookie.len() > 255 {
+            return Err(Error::ErrCookieTooLong);
+        }
+
+        writer.write_u8(self.version.major)?;
+        writer.write_u8(self.version.minor)?;
+        self.random.marshal(writer)?;
+
+        // SessionID
+        writer.write_u8(0x00)?;
+
+        writer.write_u8(self.cookie.len() as u8)?;
+        writer.write_all(&self.cookie)?;
+
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(2 * self.cipher_suites.len() as u16)?;
+        for cipher_suite in &self.cipher_suites {
+            writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(*cipher_suite as u16)?;
+        }
+
+        self.compression_methods.marshal(writer)?;
+
+        let mut extension_buffer = vec![];
+        {
+            let mut extension_writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(extension_buffer.as_mut());
+            for extension in &self.extensions {
+                extension.marshal(&mut extension_writer)?;
+            }
+        }
+
+        writer.write_u16::<BigEndian>(extension_buffer.len() as u16)?;
+        writer.write_all(&extension_buffer)?;
+
+        Ok(writer.flush()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn unmarshal<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self> {
+        let major = reader.read_u8()?;
+        let minor = reader.read_u8()?;
+        let random = HandshakeRandom::unmarshal(reader)?;
+
+        // Session ID
+        reader.read_u8()?;
+
+        let cookie_len = reader.read_u8()? as usize;
+        let mut cookie = vec![0; cookie_len];
+        reader.read_exact(&mut cookie)?;
+
+        let cipher_suites_len = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize / 2;
+        let mut cipher_suites = vec![];
+        for _ in 0..cipher_suites_len {
+            let id: CipherSuiteId = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?.into();
+            //let cipher_suite = cipher_suite_for_id(id)?;
+            cipher_suites.push(id);
+        }
+
+        let compression_methods = CompressionMethods::unmarshal(reader)?;
+        let mut extensions = vec![];
+
+        let extension_buffer_len = reader.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
+        let mut extension_buffer = vec![0u8; extension_buffer_len];
+        reader.read_exact(&mut extension_buffer)?;
+
+        let mut offset = 0;
+        while offset < extension_buffer_len {
+            let mut extension_reader = BufReader::new(&extension_buffer[offset..]);
+            if let Ok(extension) = Extension::unmarshal(&mut extension_reader) {
+                extensions.push(extension);
+            } else {
+                log::warn!(
+                    "Unsupported Extension Type {} {}",
+                    extension_buffer[offset],
+                    extension_buffer[offset + 1]
+                );
+            }
+
+            let extension_len =
+                u16::from_be_bytes([extension_buffer[offset + 2], extension_buffer[offset + 3]])
+                    as usize;
+            offset += 4 + extension_len;
+        }
+
+        Ok(HandshakeMessageClientHello {
+            version: ProtocolVersion { major, minor },
+            random,
+            cookie,
+
+            cipher_suites,
+            compression_methods,
+            extensions,
+        })
+    }
+}

libs/dtls/src/handshake/handshake_message_client_hello/handshake_message_client_hello_test.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter};
+use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime};
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::curve::named_curve::*;
+use crate::extension::extension_supported_elliptic_curves::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_handshake_message_client_hello() -> Result<()> {
+    let raw_client_hello = vec![
+        0xfe, 0xfd, 0xb6, 0x2f, 0xce, 0x5c, 0x42, 0x54, 0xff, 0x86, 0xe1, 0x24, 0x41, 0x91, 0x42,
+        0x62, 0x15, 0xad, 0x16, 0xc9, 0x15, 0x8d, 0x95, 0x71, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x22, 0xd7, 0x47, 0xec,
+        0xd8, 0x3d, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x00, 0x14, 0xe6, 0x14, 0x3a, 0x1b, 0x04, 0xea, 0x9e, 0x7a, 0x14,
+        0xd6, 0x6c, 0x57, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x32, 0x85, 0x76, 0x18, 0xde, 0xd8, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc0, 0x2b,
+        0xc0, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x1d,
+    ];
+
+    let gmt_unix_time = if let Some(unix_time) =
+        SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH.checked_add(Duration::new(3056586332u64, 0))
+    {
+        unix_time
+    } else {
+        SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH
+    };
+    let parsed_client_hello = HandshakeMessageClientHello {
+        version: ProtocolVersion {
+            major: 0xFE,
+            minor: 0xFD,
+        },
+        random: HandshakeRandom {
+            gmt_unix_time,
+            random_bytes: [
+                0x42, 0x54, 0xff, 0x86, 0xe1, 0x24, 0x41, 0x91, 0x42, 0x62, 0x15, 0xad, 0x16, 0xc9,
+                0x15, 0x8d, 0x95, 0x71, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x22, 0xd7, 0x47, 0xec, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0xdc, 0x4b,
+            ],
+        },
+        cookie: vec![
+            0xe6, 0x14, 0x3a, 0x1b, 0x04, 0xea, 0x9e, 0x7a, 0x14, 0xd6, 0x6c, 0x57, 0xd0, 0x0e,
+            0x32, 0x85, 0x76, 0x18, 0xde, 0xd8,
+        ],
+        cipher_suites: vec![
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_128_Gcm_Sha256,
+            CipherSuiteId::Tls_Ecdhe_Ecdsa_With_Aes_256_Cbc_Sha,
+            //Box::<CipherSuiteTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256>::default(),
+            //Box::<CipherSuiteTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha>::default(),
+        ],
+        compression_methods: CompressionMethods {
+            ids: vec![CompressionMethodId::Null],
+        },
+        extensions: vec![Extension::SupportedEllipticCurves(
+            ExtensionSupportedEllipticCurves {
+                elliptic_curves: vec![NamedCurve::X25519],
+            },
+        )],
+    };
+
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(raw_client_hello.as_slice());
+    let c = HandshakeMessageClientHello::unmarshal(&mut reader)?;
+    assert_eq!(
+        c, parsed_client_hello,
+        "handshakeMessageClientHello unmarshal: got {c:?}, want {parsed_client_hello:?}"
+    );
+
+    let mut raw = vec![];
+    {
+        let mut writer = BufWriter::<&mut Vec<u8>>::new(raw.as_mut());
+        c.marshal(&mut writer)?;
+    }
+    assert_eq!(
+        raw, raw_client_hello,
+        "handshakeMessageClientHello marshal: got {raw:?}, want {raw_client_hello:?}"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}